Volume LIX] *September 1944* [*Number 3*

POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY

AN AMERICAN DILEMMA

AN AMERICAN DILEMMA, by Gunnar Myrdal,[1] is an important, perhaps a great, book. It is predictable that in the future it will be classed with Tocqueville's *American Democracy* and Bryce's *American Commonwealth*. This is high praise, but the achievement is so clear and so broadly based that it has wider scope than the problem it is devoted to—the Negro. It is, in fact, a critical evaluation of contemporary American civilization. This achievement is the more remarkable because it stems from a deliberate undertaking, financed by a foundation. Instead of producing a dull, ponderous and innocuous report on the Negro, we have a revealing study of the United States and the place of the Negro within it. To Frederick P. Keppel, so long and so fruitfully associated with Columbia College, belongs much of the credit for initiating and supporting the undertaking. It will long remain a monument to his breadth of interest and to his wisdom.

Mr. Myrdal brought to the study an active career in politics, a wide training in the social sciences, and complete objectivity in regard to the special foibles and shortcomings in American life. As an outsider, he achieved the kind of objectivity which would seem impossible for one reared within the American scene, but the study is neither impartial nor indifferent. The

[1] *An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy*, by Gunnar Myrdal, with the assistance of Richard Sterner and Arnold Rose. 2 Volumes. New York and London, Harper & Brothers, 1944. lv, 705; xii, 709-1493 pp. $7.50. Carnegie Corporation of New York, "Negro in American Life Series".

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author is partial toward democracy and appreciative of the Negro. When viewed narrowly, this is a long, brilliant and many-sided defense of the Negro against the charges of inferiority which buttress discrimination against him, and a justification of the Negro's claim to full acceptance as a member of the American community. The book is an extensive and oft-repeated demonstration of the failure of the American credo as it applies to the Negro. But the real theme is the credo, the American faith, the ethos of American life—freedom, equality, justice, opportunity, the right of man to claim his full share of the available chances for the good life. The American dilemma is the sense of inner defeat and frustration that comes from our failure to practice the faith we uphold.

The dilemma has its being in the American conscience. Its roots lie in the moralistic character of the American people and their restlessness in the face of a hypocritical situation. If the American people could only be indifferent to the contradictions in their own culture, then the dilemma would not exist—or, at least, not in this particular, unhappy form. (If they were less in earnest about their own values, then the hypocrisy would not matter—at least, not sufficiently to give rise to the surge of compassion and hatred which is so often evidenced in matters affecting the Negro, not only in the same person, but even at almost the some moment.) The nature of the dilemma is one that exists in each man and not just between men. It is not the North against the South; it is rather the believer in liberty, justice, equality, who also believes that the Negro ought to be kept in his place, against himself. It is he who feels like a good, even if not too lettered, child of the Enlightenment, of the American Revolution, of the Christian Church, cherishing justice, equality, freedom, dignity and self-respect, who often finds himself enmeshed in race prejudice, hatred, persecution, and even a lynching.

It is, however, not solely a white man's problem, as the author would have it (p. xlvii). If the Negro could be all things to all men, then the issues would have a different quality and the "problem" would be the white man's. But the Negro is not all things to all men — he is also a man with

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prejudices, attitudes, habits, wishes and ambitions. More than that, he has become culturally a European, a white man with a black face. Had the Negro remained immune from the values of his American environment, then the problem would have had a different texture and might not have raised the moral issues that oppress our conscience. The difficulty is that the Negro believes the preachings of his white neighbors (p. 4); he believes in the doctrine of the equality of man in the sight of God, in the right to live, to work, to travel, to learn, to climb up and down the scale as other people. He believes in democracy—that is where he has learned to verbalize the values to which his community is attuned. In that sense, he helps create the problem of moral conflict, because he keeps prodding his white neighbors with the very words and ideas that express the ethos of American life. If the Negro were like a Gypsy, unconcerned, or like the American Indian who would rather be left alone in his community than disturbed by "progress", then the stress would not be so great. The trouble is that the Negro expects to be treated like any other American because he feels himself like any other American, and we expect him to feel that way, to think and to behave that way—except when the heavy burden of the past stands in our way, and we behave as if all that we believe, and have taught the Negro to believe, was not true. It is not true for the Negro, and, therefore, it is not true for anyone, not even for ourselves. Our doctrines have a universal reach and flavor; *all* men are created equal. All American citizens are equal before the law. We do not say that he of the darker hue is not equal; we do not say that; we do not believe it; and yet we practice it. When our darker brother rises to taunt us with our hypocrisy, our weary conscience gives us no rest.

It is a white man's problem only in the sense that the American has made the Negro into a white man and refuses to recognize his handiwork. We have given the Negro our own set of values and refuse to acknowledge them. We either refuse to acknowledge that they are ours, or in despair insist that these are not the true values, that the Negro, because he is black, could not be as good as a white man. He simply could

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not! And we keep repeating it because we ourselves are not convinced by our own insistent protestations. Our conscience has got the best of us and will give us no rest—no rest at all until we forget about it. But we will not forget about it until we concentrate upon the ten thousand items of individual failings of our standards to carry over in universal terms, and talk about that—about poor housing, about insufficiency of education, about poor wages, about bad transportation, about the inequality of justice — talk about that, are burdened by and worried by that, rather than by the Negro problem. It is then, only then, that we will sleep in peace and stop protesting our good intentions, our lack of prejudice, our greater qualities and the poor Negro's "handicaps"—handicaps that God gave him so that we should not be blamed for the Negro's hurt, for his pain, for his failings, for his bitterness, for his crazy outbursts, for his escape into make-believe, for his "tomfoolery", for his "shiftlessness". It is not our fault. It is the nature of the Negro, his inner nature. Yes, but our conscience, our American conscience, with its gospel—Christian, democratic, equalitarian, so full of brotherly love and human kindness—keeps troubling us, and we have no peace. There will be no peace at home, because we have no peace in our hearts; these are torn and we will heal them only by accepting the inevitable: that all Americans are equal before the law, in the detail, specifically in each case where the problem arises; that the issues are the dignity and majesty of the law, not this man's darker hue, and action based on that belief. There is no other road to repose.

The Negro is part of the complex of American civilization (p. xliv), and not even segregation really isolates him or the issues his presence has precipitated. In that sense, at least, there is no Negro problem; there are only the stress and strains of American life. There is no way of abstracting the "Negro" and his problems from the rest of the community and looking at them in a kind of vacuum, as if the rest of the social structure did not exist. It is easier and truer to say that the structure exists rather than the Negro problem. There is no way of taking the Negro out of our American setting

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and looking at him as a separate item in our culture. Viewed from any angle — politics, political parties, labor, industry, agriculture, religion, art, music, dancing, speech and story, tradition and popular gossip—the whole flavor of American life is involved in any discussion of the Negro. The Negro as an isolated unit does not exist. What does exist is an entire culture—the American culture—which has been molded in a special way by the presence of a large segment of our population which comes from Africa instead of Europe. But "It", the Negro problem, does not exist. What we have instead is an American community that thinks, feels, plays, sings, writes, draws and governs itself in a special way because of the penetration of the African immigrant into American life. We are a different people because of that. The problem is not a Negro problem; it is a problem of American culture we are talking about, and the specific issues are as wide and numerous as the culture contains. There are really as many problems as the culture presents, and as many "solutions" as the culture permits. It will be a glad day in American life when we begin talking about the issues in particular, rather than about a nonexistent problem in general.

In explaining the character of the issues raised by the Negro, the author argues (p. liv) that the moral latitude in America between the "good" and the "bad" is so wide that there is no connection between them; that even in the large cities the good people have no more contact with political corruption, vice and crime "than if they lived in another country" and that the race issue is, therefore, not typical of American culture. It "is only a corner—although a fairly big one—of American civilization." This seems to contradict what the reviewer believes to be a truer statement: "The Negro Problem is an integral part of . . . the whole complex. . . . It cannot be treated in isolation" (p. xlix). Not only can it not be treated in isolation, but it would be just as pertinent to say that it exists only as a part of the whole complex.

There is no need for separating the virtuous from the evil in American life. American culture contains them both in full measure, and they are enough alike to recognize each other as

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Americans; it takes them both to give the American community its special flavor. If we should not boast of our moral virtues, we need not unduly whimper our failings—the shortcomings will change and the evils make room for other failings than those complained of, as soon as the virtuous in our community become better than they are. If there is a gulf between the best of the culture and that part of it which is revealed by the Negro's place in the American community, that gulf may help explain the evils. Perhaps if there were no such gulf, the evils would be less conspicuous. It is just possible that the way out of the evils is to improve the character of the "good" as much as it is to change the character of the "evil". The Negro problem belongs to the whole community, not to a part of it. When the whole community becomes immersed and slightly tarnished, if you will, then the Negro problem will become less of a strain upon our conscience. We would have more composure if we were less "pristine" white; we would improve the evils complained of, if in a measure we recognized that these shortcomings are ours—that we are our brothers' keepers, or, at least, that their grip upon us has something of a strangle hold in it.

Ours, as the author points out, is a self-conscious community. We are possessed, more than any other country, "large or small", of "the *most explicitly expressed* system of general ideas in reference to human interrelations" (p. 3); and these ideas are bent in the direction of freedom, of human dignity. Ours is the "land of the free", "the cradle of liberty", "the home of democracy". There is even something of a proselyting zeal about our sense of mission in the world. These self-evident truths have not merely an American, but a world-wide, import, and the four freedoms are but an extension of the American credo. The Negro and his ills, as well as his strivings, are within this frame of ideas and aspirations—their very poignancy is due to the failure to make the credo apply to him as fully as it is meant to apply to all members of the American community. Since the ideals that dominate American life are believed in by all groups—the conservatives as well as the liberals, the "old aristocrats" and the new immigrants, all

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worship at the same shrine—the American credo belongs to no special sect, caste, or class, and it is this "spiritual convergence" (p. 13) which makes "the nation great" and holds the promise of an even "greater future".

The author agrees, however, that the ideals of the American ethos are in conflict with the equally strong tradition of disregard for law and the readiness for personal violence. We have the ingrained habit of regulating every detail by a new law and the easy convenience of partial enforcement, no enforcement, or persistent violation. The story of Prohibition is but a conspicuous example of a wider pattern. The consequence is a certain defeatism that may well become "chronic" (p. 20). The task seems so great, the achievement so small, that a kind of negative natural law (p. 19) has affected even the Negroes, who feel that little can be expected from good intentions translated into law, that all efforts will be defeated, that the old evils will persist. Pessimism rather than optimism seems to have replaced the idealism implicit in the ethos and this is particularly true among intellectuals (p. 20). For them, at least, it seems that "in principle the Negro problem was settled long ago, in practice the solution is not effectuated" (p. 24). The Negro problem appears as a lag, a century old. In outcome, however, the lag has very vivid consequences, especially for the people in the South. It has imposed upon them a kind of ambivalence in their attitude toward the Negro—he is good and bad, kindly and dangerous. They believe the good and evil report with half their minds. The Southerner has become incapable of facing the issues logically. A kind of addiction to half-truths has been devised, a readiness to indulge in gossip, an unconscious readiness to sacrifice truth to grace, a need to keep the surface unruffled —all of this just because it has become impossible to face the reality that the Negro is a man, just like other men, an American, endowed by the law with inalienable rights. Rather than face that, there is an escape into make-believe, because that is the only means to avoid a stark reality that ruffles tempers, rouses anger and opens the gateway to violence.

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The Negro "is our problem", "let us deal with our own", "we know the Negro"—all of that and much more, because of a special insight and knowledge of the Negro which the Southerner claims as his special possession, but which is in a large part constructed and assumed insight. True or not, it serves to keep the surface polished, it helps to keep the "Negro low and the white high". This knowledge is in reality a kind of "high-strung" self-assertion; it serves to conceal a deep disturbance. What the white man has is an abstraction, untrue but satisfying. The conflict with the issues raised by the Negro in the South, at least, has tended spiritually to isolate the white man from the broad current of cultural and social development. He is so obsessed with the Negro that all issues are distorted and pulled out of joint. The obsession leaves him spiritually awry. The author quotes Weldon Johnson (p. 43) to the effect, "The race problem involves the saving of the white man's soul and the black man's body."

People in the South and many in the North would reverse the trend of American experience in so far as it affects the Negro. American experience works toward the dissolving of minority groups. The American ethos is all-embracing, and the minority, which in Europe strives to remain unique and isolated, here strives to become part of the majority, to be incorporated and lost within the great American folk. But, for the Negro, another doctrine is advanced (p. 53), that he is to develop a "race pride" of his own—a bit of advice offered by even the Negro's "best friends". There is an assumption that here the trend of American history will reverse itself; that instead of becoming part of the American folk, the Negroes will remain a nation within a nation, more and more isolated, more and more self-conscious, more and more pure. There are many indications in the volume under review that the author himself is inclined to accept, even if not approve of, this projected line of future development of the Negro in the United States. The reviewer disagrees with the advice, the assumptions, the policy and the doctrine, not on the grounds that they are inadvisable —that would be presumptuous—but on the grounds that they are impossible, unrealistic and part of make-believe.

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The Negro has been in other parts of this hemisphere for something more than a century longer than in what is now the United States (one need only look at Brazil, Venezuela, Cuba and other American nations), and, while other factors have played their part, a hundred additional years of common contact have also played their part. The problem, physically speaking, is of the essence of time and contact between the races, especially contact widely scattered over the face of the nation and amid all groups in the country. There are enough darker-hued folk in our population to make the distinction between Negro and non-Negro a line difficult to draw, and time will draw a veil over both. To assume otherwise is to assume that it is possible in a dynamic social structure, saturated with a common ethos, to keep forever—and forever is a long time—the peoples apart, when they go to the same schools, work in the same shops, believe in the same gods, wear the same clothes and die on the same battlefields. Those who believe that, project their special description of the nature of man and the meaning of social differences into the future. There is no single instance where a minority, placed like that of the Negro in the United States, did not in time—the long time—become a part of the majority. We say in time, for, biologically speaking, there is no great hurry; there is lots of time, and a thousand years are like unto a single day.

By widening the functions of the state, the New Deal has increased the number of issues involving the Negro—social security, housing, nutrition, child and woman labor, and now the war, the army and the war industries. The Negro has a "broader" and more varied field to defend. There is, however, the growing notion that there is no longer a Negro problem, but only a class problem, and that is "escapism" in a new form.

> The reason, of course, is that there is really a common tie and, therefore, a unity in all the special angles of the Negro problem. All these specific problems are only outcroppings of one fundamental complex of human valuations—that of American caste. This fundamental complex derives its emotional charge from the equally common race prejudice, from its mani-

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festations in a general tendency toward discrimination, and from its political potentialities through its very inconsistency with the American Creed (p. 75).

If, for example, we assume that for some reason white prejudice could be decreased and discrimination mitigated, this is likely to cause a rise in Negro standards, which may decrease white prejudice still a little more, which would again allow Negro standards to rise, and so on through mutual interaction. If, instead, discrimination should become intensified, we should see the vicious circle spiraling downward. The original change can as easily be a change of *Negro standards* upward or downward. The effects would, in a similar manner, run back and forth in the interlocking system of interdependent causation. In any case, the initial change would be supported by consecutive waves of back-effects from the reactions of the other factor (p. 76).

There is an apparent assumption of something static in this description of the relations between the races. But the opposite seems to be true. The Negro is not outside the general milieu of white society. It is impossible to isolate the Negro for special treatment, for separate standards, for greater or poorer opportunities. If the social structure is modified at any point, it is modified at all points, and the Negro's position is modified by it. It is not possible, for instance, to evolve new standards of health for the community without improving the health standards of the Negro community. What is required is a changed attitude, belief, practice, ideal, habit, system, involving public and private health. That automatically affects the health position of the whole community, the Negro included, and the author recognizes this fact (p. 169). The same is true of education; the same is true of public welfare. It is very dubious to this reviewer to assume, as seems implicit in the above quotation, that "prejudice" against the Negro would keep health standards for the Negro stationary, low, or even permit them to become lower, while the health standards of the rest of the community were improving. It may be true that these health standards for the Negro would progress at a slower rate, but it is still true that if the standards of health were improving, they would also improve for the Negro. Stand-

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ards of health are a matter of knowledge and habit, attitude and belief. By their very nature, these things transcend barriers of race; they are of a universal quality and pervasive in effect. What is true of health is true of education, of public welfare, economic well-being, employment, income, and so on. If the resources of the community increase and are multiplied, their consequence spreads throughout the community; if they diminish and become more restricted, then that too spreads throughout the community. Prejudice might affect the rate of change in either direction, but even this is something that may not be true, for the change is impersonal and makes itself evident unevenly and at different places in the structure. If the community were becoming poorer, then all groups in the community would be affected by the change, and, more specifically, in those employments, opportunities, income and standards that were first affected; and in that case all the people in that area, white or black, would be first affected. We might have, and we have had, "normal standards" for Negroes and whites at their respective levels, while in other areas—in mining, for example, during the early nineteen-thirties — all groups, both colored and white, might feel the effect of a depression long before it reached the rest of the community. Perhaps in each specific case the Negroes, because of their historical position, might be the first to suffer, but it is not true that "prejudice" would, in our kind of a dynamic society, complex and impersonal, make possible the decline in the standards of any group—not even the Negro—while the standards in the community as a whole were improving.

The author, however, has a full sense of the dynamic character (pp. 75-78) of American society and recognizes that change, when it occurs at one point, will, according to the "principle of cumulation", spread its influences in many directions. He recognizes that "panacea" at any point is impossible, but he still seems to feel that the Negro complex is a unit in the social structure in some way independent of the whole, but affected by it; that standards and opportunities for the Negro are something separate from these same influences within the white community. That seems to the reviewer to

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be unrealistic. The Negro began with lower standards when he left the status of slavery; he also began in a society very much poorer and less complex than the present. The changes in the position of the Negro represent total changes in the whole society. He has gained a great deal, probably in the total more than any other single group in the community, just because the level from which he began was so much lower. But to assume that there is some way of improving the position of the Negro in any field, even in that of voting, without in effect changing the situation of the whole community is to believe in "panacea". The poll tax, for example, disenfranchises many Negroes, but it also disenfranchises many, perhaps more, whites. If the poll tax is abolished, the vote will probably increase in the South, but not in proportion to the total number of voters who will be empowered to vote by the change. If the Southern voters increase in number it will be because a multitude of influences will have stimulated a greater interest in voting, and that will affect both the Negroes and the whites. It may be true that such a change will increase efforts to keep the Negro from exercising his franchise, but that will be evidence that the change in direction of greater participation in politics has already occurred. It will be discrimination after the fact and not before it, and it is bound to fail, just as any effort to keep the Negro from benefiting from changed attitudes toward public health or public education have failed. Only in a static caste system, where the separation is complete at all points, can the social groups live in comparative isolation. *To keep the Negro from sharing all of the benefits of the changes in social policy and attitude it would be necessary to keep him from sharing in any of the changes—a perfectly impossible position in an industrial society.*

The only issue is one of the rate of speed at which the changes become inclusive. The quality of the changes, or improvements, is involved in the rate and in the available surplus of energy and income which is diverted in that particular direction. If public housing takes a great spurt after the war, then the Negro will benefit most from that as will the rest of the community; if education, then he will benefit from

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education. Prejudice may affect, let us repeat, the rate at which he will benefit, but not the results of the spreading policy. In that sense there is no Negro problem. The problem is a moral one and not a material one. It lies in the conflict within the conscience of the white man and is made acute by the very fact that he cannot effectuate his prejudice fully in either direction. He cannot keep the Negro "down" and he cannot "uplift" him, as a separate entity. The Negro suffers from the fact that he is poor and that he lives in the poorest section of the country. Neither of these facts can be changed by itself. His income can increase only if the income of the community increases and he can share in the greater wealth of the South only when the South achieves greater wealth. He is not an isolated something, living in a vacuum, which can be depressed or inflated at will or by prejudice.

There is an implicit contradiction in Myrdal's study. He recognizes that the American creed—and, he ought to add, industrialism—makes inevitable uniform application of social policy to all groups, and, at the same time, argues that there is a homogeneous—increasingly homogeneous—isolated, segregated, self-conscious group called the Negro, which lives, and will continue to live, outside the rest of the social structure. But such an outcome would deny the force of the American creed and could, perhaps, be effectuated only in an agricultural society. It is not feasible, even if desired, in an industrial society, where the population is unstable, where population movement is fluid, and where skills are always changing in number and complexity. The author repeatedly, when describing specific policies, points out that we "will be compelled to extend to the Negroes the population measures taken primarily to build up the white population . . . a unity of purpose becomes established on the basis of the American creed" (p. 170). It simply remains true that at whatever level, whether in population policy, education, unemployment, social justice, the difference between the Negro and the white man is measured by a lag. The Negro falls in behind in the line, but he goes the same way. The difference is not a difference in kind, but in amount. He is not denied higher education. His diffi-

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culties in securing it are greater. He is not denied better housing. He gets it in lesser amounts and, perhaps, somewhat later than other elements in the population, and that not merely because he is a Negro, but also because he is poorer. He is poorer, not merely because he is a Negro, but also because he started and remains predominantly in a poorer section of the country, and because, having entered the industrial occupations later, the skills and competencies essential to advancement in industrial occupations are relatively less widely distributed among Negroes than among other parts of the population. It is not denied that being a Negro is a handicap, but it is not an absolute barrier.

The American creed makes differential treatment at any level, as a matter of public policy, impossible; what becomes a matter of public policy includes the Negro. That there are injustices and numerous denials of justice is a fact patent to anyone who knows what is going on. But that is not the point at issue; the important point is that they are recognized as injustices, recognized as something to be ashamed of, remedied, denied or hidden. That is why there is no caste system really, and that is why there is no Negro problem as such. There are only the white man's troubled conscience and the fact that, for the complex reasons of a money economy, the benefits of modern civilization tend to go first of all to those who can pay for them in taxes, or in cash. There is no denial, there is only insufficiency of opportunity. The distinction is important. It cannot be stressed too often that the apparent static character of the Negro problem, where it appears as a "problem" in fact, is descriptive only of that part of our economy which is agricultural, where income increases slowly or not at all and where the surplus available for social reform is small.

The pointing up of racial conflicts and injustices is important in a study of both the position of the Negro and the state of American culture. But the frictions are a healthy sign. They indicate a many-sided contact between the two races. The frictions are an evidence of the fact that the Negro and white man live in the same community and quarrel over the same

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values. As long as the two races are striving and disagreeing over the manifold issues of living in the same culture, then it means that they are engaged in the painful process of accommodation to each other and to the world. The real danger would be if the Negro managed to live in a vacuum where there was no friction between him and his white neighbors; then there would be real danger of the developing of a perpetual caste system. It is desirable from the point of view of the Negro that there should be friction at many points, over many individual issues, in every part of the country. It is desirable that nothing should remain static until the issues over which the friction arises have themselves ceased to trouble either the whites or the blacks. To want peace when the contrasts are so great is to dream of an unreal world. To expect either the white or the Negro community to show neither anger nor hate, neither fear nor violence, when their values are challenged and their aspirations are frustrated is to ask for the impossible. It is not specific evils that we must complain of—they are to be dealt with by the police and public authorities. It is the general direction which gives the evils their pertinence that is the significant issue, and, from that point of view, the friction is a good thing. It shows that the evils complained of are alive, troublesome and impelling. They force men to do something about them. They will do many wrong things about them, but, by the same token, many right ones. Our argument here is for an active rather than a passive policy in the matter, for the point that there is no solution to the Negro problem, because there is, as we said before, no problem with a big "P". There is only the infinitely complex and essentially contradictory structure of American culture, a universal credo sworn to by a folk caked in old prejudices and living in a world of limited resources.

In spite of its great merits and deep insight the study under discussion all too easily follows the traditional pattern of bringing out the Negro's ills and handicaps and proving over again what has so often been shown: that the Negro occupies the lowest rung upon the ladder in American life; that he is poor and more disadvantaged; that, measured by any test, he has

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less of the goods of the world and fewer opportunities; he is the poor, the denied, the oppressed in our world—and all of this can be shown up by a series of statistical tables, setting up a comparison between the Negro and the whites in terms of income, property, education, health, and so on. But the very basis of the comparison is a dubious one if the purpose is to set the place of the Negro in a changing and expanding American culture. The comparison breaks down because the Negro and the whites did not start from the same base. The Negro started with nothing at all and with the handicap of the ways of slavery upon him and his white fellows. The true comparison is with the Negro himself at the time of slavery. If we wish to know the direction that the Negro is going, then it is best to begin at the beginning: Negro education and Negro health, Negro opportunities and Negro professionals, not in comparison with the whites of the present day, but with the Negro at the time of the emancipation.

It is important to note that, in the school attendance between the ages of five and twenty in the Southern states, the percentage had risen from 1.8 in 1860, to 64.4 in 1940 (p. 942). This is infinitely more revealing than the fact that the schools for Negroes are poorer, that the school terms are shorter, that the teachers are less adequately trained, than in the schools of the white children.

A similar observation can be made concerning the comparisons in the North with the total white community. It would have been more relevant to the issues in hand, if it had been stated in terms of the Negro as a recent agricultural immigrant, with all of the handicaps of an agricultural immigrant, to an industrial environment, and if the comparison in terms of place, opportunity and achievement had been with the recent generation of Polish, Italian and Russian immigrants. The Negro might still have been proved underprivileged even by such comparisons, but surely the gap at any point would have been narrower than the one that is revealed by a straight colored-white comparison. But it is very doubtful whether the changes that have taken place are measureable in terms of statistical techniques.

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The milieu which makes the career of a Paul Robeson and a Walter White possible represents a total change in the temper of American life. The fact that those who defend the poll tax are bitterly and raspingly on the defensive is another illustration of the same point. For the thing important here is not the fact that the poll tax still survives, but that those who uphold it should do so in screeching tones and ill-tempered bombast, so revealing of their own insecurity that they have to shout to convince themselves of their own position.

Perhaps the most important change that has occurred in the relation between the Negroes and the whites is that the whites have lost faith in their own doctrines of racial superiority (p. 1003). The happy days when a Negro was a Negro rather than a man, the days when the beliefs in the inferiority of the Negro were supported by science, religion and common sense, have passed away, and now he who upholds the natural inferiority of the Negro has no authority to fall back upon except his own self-avowed "prejudice", which finds no support in the textbooks, or in the teaching of the church, or even in the agreement of some of his own best friends. The doctrine is not accepted any more by the people who claim intellectual status for themselves, or by those who aspire to intellectual status; the scientists, the moralists, the preachers, and even some of the politicians, are on the other side of the fence.

The shortcomings of the Negro are now said to be the results of an unhealthy environment, and those responsible for the poor environment—the whites, of course—are also responsible for the shortcomings of the Negro. The Negro's failings are the white man's fault. The shoe is now on the other foot. Instead of the Negro being deficient and, therefore, justifiably kept in a lower status, it is the white man's failure which makes a poor environment, out of which only handicapped Negroes can come. There may not be much comfort in this doctrine, but it gives the Negro a powerful leverage. The poor white man must now bear the burden of his own as well as of the Negro's failings. That this should have occurred in the United States, and in the South, too, is something of a paradox. But if the American community is going to believe in *environ-*

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mentalism, as it does, and as all of the social sciences of the recent past, even in some measure the biological sciences, have tended to do, then there is no real escape from the dilemma with which our conscience presents us. If the Negro is poor and handicapped, it is not his, but our, fault; the blame is on the white man and not on the Negro. That is a complete reversal of the older doctrine of Negro inferiority, and makes all of the operational techniques, so neatly fitting in a world of caste, unavailable when the caste system has lost its intellectual justification. From this point of view, it is the Negro who has the upper hand, for he has a moral claim, which a moral people cannot deny—certainly cannot deny with a good conscience. The white community in America has achieved a sense of guilt about the Negro because it has lost faith in the doctrines that made slavery and discrimination permissible and right. This is not a healthy psychological situation and may have other than beneficent consequences; but the ground has changed, and, in some measure, the rôles of the races have been reversed, with the Negro as the accuser and the white man as the half-hearted defendant.

Should discrimination and racial prejudice pass away, the problem would still remain substantially what it is. The Negro would be allowed to vote, but, in the South, the rural Negro would in all likelihood be no greater participant in politics than is his equally poor white, neighboring share cropper. His opportunities for education would be little improved, his income would remain substantially the same, and, as a class, his rôle in the world would not be much changed! True enough, his theoretical opportunities would be greater and, in practice, some fortunate accident and opportunity would enable the gifted and the energetic to escape out of his milieu, but the basic issue of the failure of the American credo to carry over in universal terms would still remain true. The problem is greater than that of mere prejudice and discrimination; it is a problem made by the concentration of the Negro in a poverty-ridden section of the country, wedded to a crop of unstable and declining prices, burdened by the tradition of the spiritually improverishing single crop, with practically no

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other outlets for new skills and no incentives to new enterprise. If that is the fact in the rural districts where most of the Negroes live, work and die, it is not much different in the immediate situation in the urban sections in the South, and but little different in the North. An acquaintance with the milieu provided by the mill village in the South, which has become the spiritual as well as the economic grave of so many poor Southern whites, will reveal that it is not merely a problem of color, it is also a problem of economic opportunity and industrial diversity. It is a major question whether the poor white who has become a mill hand has, in the typical Southern mill village, improved either his economic or spiritual environment. The reviewer, for one, long since has taken the position that the shift from the mountains and the farms to the mill villages has improverished and demeaned the opportunities of the Southern whites, even from the little opportunities made available by a proverty-stricken rural environment, and he sees no reason for changing that opinion.

To assume that the disappearance of prejudice would automatically improve the lot of the Negro is to assume that miracles take place in the workings of an economic system. That is also true, of course, in the larger cities; the rural Negro—like the rural white moving to a large city—suffers from the fact of his rural environment, especially when that environment is of the type represented by the rural South where the individual comes to town denuded of skill, enterprise, energy and ambition, and where the opportunities are limited and the places crowded. If there were no race prejudice, the exceptional individual would escape and, in fact, does so now, but the mass would have to live, toiling in an environment poor in resources and sharing the very small yield in terms of income, and smaller surplus in terms of social benefit, that the local industry makes available. This is not an argument against the arbitrary and degrading impact of race prejudice but it is an argument against the assumption that the elimination of fear, which controls the Southern attitude toward the Negro, would of itself universalize the benefits implicit in the American creed. The Negro problem would merely be merged

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in the larger and more basic problem of poverty in a poverty-ridden section of the United States; that would be better, of course, but it still would be almost equally appalling.

It follows from this that the easiest way out of the hate, poverty, fear and prejudice that gnaw at the bone and the flesh is the increase of opportunity, the diversification of interest, the multiplication of problems, the opening of new vistas and the making of new difficulties. If the South grows richer, and if the rural environment becomes more diversified, then there will be greater opportunities for both the whites and the Negroes, and the burden of fear will be lightened for both races. Race prejudice cannot be abolished. It can only die out in time. And it can do that only by concentrating on other issues. If and when the South ceases to feel itself discriminated against, abused and exploited, it may cease to feel so proud, so self-conscious, so bitter, so "uppity". It may then become more urbane, more tolerant, richer in spirit and richer in goods, more secure in itself and more unconcerned about the issues seemingly so important now, but in reality only an artificial wall against imaginary dangers—imaginary, but real in their influence and in the bitterness which they produce.

Unfortunately, there is no magic formula toward social felicity, not even in the preaching of the American credo. The human imagination is ingenious in devising subtleties of feeling and thinking that make the incongruous seem normal, and the unreal, real. The Southerner can be both a democrat and a practitioner of race discrimination in fact, even if he has a bad conscience over the matter. The way out is, not to concentrate upon the issue in hand, but to concentrate upon something else, concentrate upon opening up avenues for the good life for all of the people in the South, both white and black, and in time—in the long time—fears will diminish, memories fade, new practices and new attitudes replace the old, and the Negro will cease to be a Negro and become a man—just another Southerner, just another American.

FRANK TANNENBAUM

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TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY IN GERMANY?

WHETHER Germany is capable of creating a truly democratic society is debatable.* Yet, from whatever angle one looks at this issue, it is important for an appropriate Allied strategy to gain a clear understanding of the prospects for Germany's domestic development, after the collapse of National Socialism. Such an understanding will protect the United Nations against futile expectations or shortsighted measures which may foredoom Germany's democratic future.

In dealing with Germany's internal affairs, two chief tasks confront the Allied peace strategists: first, to promote the unfolding of a free democratic society; second, to counteract all those forces that have served as a social basis for National Socialism and that might again create a mass following for a similar movement.

The Emergence of Democratic Leadership

The legacy of dictatorship is a political vacuum; it cannot be filled simply by opening the concentration camps, by putting the fascist bosses behind the barbed wire and the anti-fascist victims into power. The latter will not be ready for such sudden responsibilities which demand different qualities from those of a heroically fighting underground. They are not prepared for the political tasks of the aftermath. In fact, one of the most tragic consequences of dictatorial rule is that it does not permit the preparation of an alternative government. There is no "His Majesty's Opposition" to take over. To expect a well-functioning new government the morning after is irresponsible wishful thinking.

Time will be needed for the revitalizing of political forces in a country just rid of the fascist plague. The difficulties of

* This article was written under the auspices of the Institute of International Studies, Yale University, as part of an analysis of the political and social reconstruction of post-war Europe. The author is indebted to the members of the Institute for valuable suggestions; he alone, however, is responsible for the content and conclusions of the paper.

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the Weimar Republic arose, in no small degree, from the fact that the democratic opposition in the Empire of William II was not ready, when suddenly called into power after the breakdown of 1918. The democratic forces of post-Hitler Germany are in a much worse plight. Democratic leadership does not develop overnight. Neither is it prudent to import democratic forces from the outside, if Germany is to develop a genuine and lasting democracy.

Time is past when a revolutionary élite could plot and prepare its future order on foreign soil, in London's Bloomsbury or in a café in Zurich, waiting for the hour to strike when the railroad would bring the exile home (even if in a sealed car) to take over the completely prepared revolution. Today one does not win by entering the revolutionary citadel on a white horse (as some romantics still dream), or on a taxi's top (as Lenin did in 1917).

Different from earlier autocratic régimes, National Socialism has cut deeply into the whole society and has affected profoundly, and perhaps permanently, every group. It may well be argued that only those who have lived and suffered under the totalitarian rule will know how to fight it and will be recognized as democratic leaders of post-Hitler Germany. Even the first victim of Nazi aggression, the Czech government of Edouard Beneš, found it necessary to declare solemnly from its seat in exile that the new government would be "composed mainly of people who have taken part in the struggle at home." Justifiable or not, the political exile will be easily exposed to attacks because he did not share the miseries of an underground existence during the dictatorship. He may be inclined to start where he left off, without appreciating the fundamental transformation his country has undergone since his departure. This fact will make it difficult for political exiles to play an active part in the aftermath. Expert advice they may well contribute. Yet, if they are to lead in the new Germany, they will have to gain respect and a following among their former compatriots. No doubt, the return of such exceptional leaders is conceivable. In case they succeed in this comeback, their

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foreign experience and world-wide perspective will be most valuable for the making of a new democratic society.

Count Sforza, past master of diplomatic strategy, knew very well why he had to play a waiting game in post-fascist Italy before moving into a batting position. His reputation as a leading anti-fascist outside Italy would not suffice. He had to build up his political capital on home ground. Successful though he was in this endeavor, the designated premier after the liberation of Rome became Ivanoe Bonomi who had not left the country and who had courageously fought fascism from within.

The Badoglio interlude, no doubt, operated in a political vacuum which allowed time for genuine democratic forces to grow. At least, to fulfill such a function is the one opportunity open to a transitional régime. The Allied governments, custodians of this delicate democratic growth in post-fascist Italy, cannot be the makers of democratic leadership, if they want a full-fledged popular government to arise in Italy.

The German situation, though more complex and different in many ways, is no less obvious. The Allied governments cannot make themselves the spokesmen of any, even the most respectable, former leader of the German Republic. To make anyone their chosen candidate will weaken his chance in the free competition for his people.

Concerning the Post-Hitler Government

It has been suggested that the United Nations ought to force upon Germany the type of government which the Allies might regard as the most comfortable partner in the future peace. The results of such action might be disastrous. For example, to make trade-union leaders, granted their unbroken anti-fascist stand, the sole trustees of Germany in the crucial transition period would definitely kill their chances in the long-term development, when the German government may again assume the rôle of a free agent in world affairs. Such a policy would make the union leaders in the eyes of the Germans the marionettes of the Allies, the "Quislings of democracy", and easy scapegoats for Germany's post-war miseries. What a

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godsend it would be for a nationalist Germany! The new stab-in-the-back theory would be born, and the Allies would be its godfather.

Any government that takes over the heritage of the defeated dictators must be ready to commit political suicide. Again the experiences of Weimar and its Eberts, Erzbergers and Rathenaus will serve as a warning of even more somber possibilities. What ambitious leader, therefore, will be eager to win this position which at best will make him the executor of unpopular tasks and, therefore, the executioner of his own political future?

Suspicion of the too eager office seeker may be in order. Certainly most of those who offer to take over the dictator's legacy are either naïve enthusiasts or, more often, unreliable adventurers eager for power. Should they seize temporary positions in the fast moving turmoil after the war, they will probably disappear as quickly as they arose on the political horizon. The balanced and farseeing statesman will move into the political arena only slowly and may not even avail himself of the opportunity in the immediate post-armistice period.

The most adequate political leadership in the transition period might be sought in the ranks of former experienced administrators, who possibly have no political past, certainly do not claim any political future, and, therefore, may be ready to offer services as a patriotic duty in preventing chaos and disorder. If there is to be a national government at all, a *Geschäftsministerium* of respectable experts, a ministry of undersecretaries, may thus be the natural government during the transition period with its limited sovereign controls.

Whether such experts will be easily available is doubtful. Probably even the "undersecretaries" will be too closely identified with the Nazi régime; in fact many members of this administrative class, next to the policy-making ministerial heads of the bureaucracy, became Nazis or at least made all the adjustments to the Third Reich. Thus it may well be necessary to go further down in the civil service, to the level of *Ministerialdirektoren,* in order to find "neutral experts" to form a reliable German government during the transition period. Pos-

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sible ministerial material may also be found among some mayors of large cities, though all communal administrations by now have been thoroughly Nazified, and the few great mayors of pre-1933, such as Adenauer of Cologne, will be too old and too long retired to assume active responsibilities of such importance.

If the United Nations decide on a government with a definite political character, they should insist on the broadest basis possible in order to make the largest groups share the unpleasant responsibilities of the transition period.

It has been suggested that the German government be abolished altogether and that the country be run temporarily by an Allied military government. Such a policy is inadvisable. Despite its limited functions, a national government of some kind will be necessary. A country as large and complex as Germany could not for any length of time be administered without some native central authority.

In any case, both during the transition period and afterwards, it is obvious that the German government will not be completely free from Allied control. Whether or not one recognizes the Atlantic Charter as the guiding principle for Germany too, it certainly would be a disastrous interpretation of "the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live", if Germany were allowed to establish a governmental system that is apt to duplicate the Nazi world aggression. The bitter lessons of Hitler's rise to power and his menace to the world have clearly shown that such an aggression starts with discriminatory legislation and total organization on the internal front, long before the dictators march on the world. For this reason the internal organization of the new Germany will be very much a concern of the victorious Powers. In fact, the prevailing doctrine of "non-intervention" deserves serious reëxamination in view of the close interdependence of internal and international affairs in our time.

Apart from necessary controls, the guiding maxim of the victors should be to help the vanquished to form an unhampered public opinion. This will take time. Political expression

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in the Third Reich has become clandestine. People will have to recover the habit of acting in the light of day. It might be advisable, therefore, to have national elections postponed until the political parties have had time to crystallize and to grow into responsible organs of political democracy again. If balloting takes place at an early date, the inexperience of the electorate and the post-war miseries of the defeated nation may give opportunity for demagogic appeals.

The Rebirth of Political Parties

Continually to watch the development of the German parties will be of the greatest importance for the Allies. Only in this way will it be possible for the victorious Powers to guarantee the security of the occupation army and to help eliminate Nazism, to distinguish between friend and enemy, to recognize what groups to trust, and to determine, in due time, what dangerous developments to oppose. Besides, the relations of the United States, Great Britain and Soviet Russia, main guarantors of the post-war order, will depend on such understanding and on the continuous adaptation to events and policies concerning the factions in Germany.

What political parties can be expected in the transition period? Will the old parties of pre-Nazi Germany be revived, or will the Nazi experience lead to the development of a completely new system? To attempt to predict the definite character, direction and strength of the political parties in post-Hitler Germany would be vain and misleading. True, the German party system, like that of other European countries, has shown a remarkable degree of stability throughout the decades. There has even been observed an amazing continuity of the multi-party system below the thin cover of an enforced conformity to the one-party state of Nazi dictatorship. In a nation where political affiliations had become a matter of *Weltanschauung* and political types, where one could easily recognize and spot the members of the different political factions in any street crowd, party differences still existed within the one and only permissible party. In fact, many new partisans of the Third Reich interpreted the purposely ambiguous party

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program the way they understood it. Thus, old beliefs and hopes may have strangely survived the deluge and may reassert themselves after the Nazi flood recedes.

Nevertheless, the total revolution of the Third Reich has so changed the political landscape that a completely new orientation will be demanded. Only a few features can be tentatively drawn, here and now.

To begin with, the Allied statesmen must not be misled by old, customary terms—National, Democratic, Socialist, Communist—which have changed in their meaning and content during this period of transformation.

Specifically, the German party system, with its traditional line-up of the parties from right to left, is no longer adequate. Originally well-defined ideological and sociological party lines are marred beyond recognition. A possible exception is the Catholic Center party which, thanks to the relative independence of the Catholic Church even under totalitarianism, may have a stronger power of recuperation than any other political group in Germany.

Unlike 1918-1919, this time the political parties may change, not their name, but rather their content. This, for instance, seems to be the case with the Communists. Following the new party line, they will undoubtedly emphasize national, if not nationalistic, sentiments. They have done so wherever they came to the fore, in Soviet Russia as well as in the Balkans and Italy. It would be wrong to see in this change nothing but opportunistic strategy. This new orientation, the last stage of a development over an extended period, takes cognizance of one of the most significant results of the last twenty-five years in Europe: the collapse of the internationals of all colors, red, pink, green and brown. (New and different international cross sections, however, may well be in the offing in the new post-war era.)[1]

The political and social development of post-war Germany, to be sure, must be viewed against the background of the whole

[1] *Cf.* the thought-provoking article of Arthur Koestler, "A Challenge to Knights in Rusty Armor", *The New York Times Magazine*, Feb. 14, 1943, pp. 5, 37.

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continent. There will be a resurgence of nationalism among the victims of National Socialism all over Europe. Despite the popular yearning for a vigorous international organization to end the global chaos, and despite the rising doubt that nationalism is the only organizing principle for future political order, nationalism will still be the most powerful force to be reckoned with in the post-war world. One of the main curses Hitler has brought on us is that, by trying to unify Europe in the wrong way, he has brought forth such a revival of nationalistic feeling that the clock of European evolution has been put back for years.

To be sure, this post-war nationalism will be different from its nineteenth-century original. The fury of total warfare and the humiliations of the New Order have unleashed in Europe a desperate and heroic struggle for bare survival, leaving almost no time or energy for political thinking in the pre-war sense. There is a deep, primitive nationalism emerging in underground Europe, instinctive rather than political. Self-conscious patriots fighting from their lonely posts cannot see the wider horizons of the war and they do not care to. It is this new rough nationalism of the guerilla fighters, the partisans, the *Maquis*, more than well-calculated programs of small party cliques, which will decide the political climate of the transition period.

What bearing these new movements, springing up everywhere, will have on the establishment of a post-war order, it may be still too early to predict. Despite their disquieting ferocity and their direct action, they need not necessarily lead to greater unrest. Perhaps they are a kind of grass-roots nationalism with none of the dangerous features of earlier national movements for aggrandizement. In fact, the common experience of partisans may be the basis for a new international solidarity, uniting fighters all over the world. Different though it is from the original expectations of many internationalists, a supranational feeling may thus become articulate, gain body and momentum, and enforce itself from below in these partisan groups.

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Soviet Russia seems to have sensed the strength and possibilities of these movements. They must be equally respected by the Anglo-American allies, lest we lose track of very significant forces which, if not recognized, may turn against the Western World.

The social radicalism of underground Europe has also undergone remarkable changes. Widespread and intense though it is, it is probably less systematic and less planned than the social movements of the first post-war era. Often patriotic motives are mixed in, clearly envisaging the Quisling collaborators (frequently among the "two hundred families") as the war profiteers in the nation's time of despair. National liberation and economic expropriation thus flow together into *one* movement of revolutionary upheaval.

That there are similar possibilities even for defeated Germany was high-lighted in the much discussed Moscow Manifesto. If taken as more than a tactical maneuver, it may indicate the development of a new front transgressing established party lines and combining hitherto divergent groups, both national and radical. The specific appeal of the Manifesto to the army officers reaches far beyond psychological warfare and its call to insurrection. It foreshadows new combinations with powerful possibilities. The specter of national bolshevism may haunt post-Hitler Europe.

Those familiar with the political factions of Weimar Germany will recall the beginnings of similar trends in some early revolutionary groups (i. e., the Hamburg revolutionaries of Lauffenberg), in the stand of the "Red Count" Brockdorff-Rantzau (the Republic's first minister of foreign affairs, who rejected the Versailles Treaty and turned toward Soviet Russia as Germany's first ambassador to the U.S.S.R.), and in the less articulate utterances of young national revolutionaries (such as Ernst Jünger).

Now, twenty-five years later, those reactions may be far more than isolated cases. Their importance is enhanced by the fact that German nationalism has continuously moved away from traditional conservatism and toward the social left, with an emphasis on a necessary mass basis and, consequently, an

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outspoken social program—and this despite the fact that the German nationalists are still commonly identified with the Junkers.

No doubt, the landed aristocracy—ruling class of old Prussia and the Bismarckian Empire—proved its staying power in the Weimar Republic which ended at the eastern gates of Berlin. The nobility remains well entrenched within the established services of army and bureaucracy and has even succeeded in infiltrating the National Socialist élite guard. Although the economic power of the Junkers is anything but negligible, it has continuously declined and consequently its political weight, also. The conservative party in the Republic, in fact, extended its social basis into the middle classes and capitalist groups of the big cities. Half of its mandates for the National Assembly of 1919 were won in the industrial west. Its first and most effective spokesman was Helfferich, the financial wizard of World War I; and, after a weak interlude under Count Westarp, the leadership of the party was in the hands of the industrialist, Hugenberg. The ideological dynamics of German nationalism, also, with its attraction for some of the German youth, whatever its import on the policy-making level may have been, certainly was not patterned along solely reactionary lines. It would not be surprising to find, after the collapse of the Third Reich, more ardently revolutionary forces in the "conservative" circles of young army officers than among great sectors of the industrial proletariat.

One group that should not be underestimated in the political power diagram of post-war Europe is the peasantry. National Socialism, as in so many other lines, has served as a Pandora's box. It has awakened and revolutionized the hitherto dormant agrarian sector. The consequences will be paramount in southeastern Europe where the peasant groups will play a leading part. But even in Germany the power of the peasantry must be reckoned with. Its early alignment with Nazism was based on cold opportunism. Significantly enough, the farmers seem to be the only class which, at least occasionally, has succeeded in collecting spoils from the permanent revolutionaries. They may survive the Third Reich as a strong social power. Despite

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restrictions, controls and requisitions under the New Order, the peasants certainly have not suffered so much as the urban middle classes. Air attacks have hardly touched them, and they have remained close to their soil. The recent experiences in North Africa further prove that agricultural production can quickly be restored. More important, the farmers all over Europe have become aware of their crucial position and power. No doubt, they will constitute an important, though politically unknown, factor.

In many respects the future position of the Social Democratic party is also unpredictable. A complete rejuvenation of its ranks will be a prerequisite for its effective leadership in post-Hitler Germany. Much less than in 1918, can the party afford to enter again the political scene with an over-aged leadership, now blamed, justifiably or not, for a crushing defeat of ten years' standing. In the cruel struggle for political control, the defeated party bosses cannot expect to stage a comeback, without radical reform—body and soul.

Reports from Germany throughout the last decade indicate that the party may have learned its lesson, and that a new dynamic group may emerge in many ways more "radical" than the Communists, who may have become "administrable" and less adventurous. The Socialists may constitute the uncompromising enemy of fascism, in whatever guise it may reappear. Thus the party may make itself the spearhead of a new and dynamic democracy far beyond its labor-class following. It will warn against any Fascist-Communist alliance for which there have been precedents in the Weimar Republic and elsewhere. Of course, such suspicion of disguised fascism entering from the left wing may easily lead to the renewal of the tragic struggle of the two labor factions; besides it may keep the Social Democrats from making a sober evaluation of future political opportunities and developments. In a stubborn resistance against powerful forces of post-Hitler Germany, the party may miss its great opportunity.

The great chance for the Social Democrats is tied up with a probable early recovery of trade unionism, traditional mass basis of the Social Democratic party. No doubt the emerging

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democracy in Germany will depend on the support of organized labor. Its long democratic tradition is the most promising element in a country with an otherwise weak political heritage. While the trade unions may thus be counted upon to play an important part in the post-Hitler era, the Social Democrats may feel insecure and shaken in their confidence to represent the proletarian masses any longer. They may have good reason for doubting their former strength. Yet it is important to remember that war and dictatorship interrupt the normal flow of public opinion. The party leaders in the government's camp, and even more so the chieftains of the clandestine opposition, lose their direct means of checking their power and prestige with the people. They depend exclusively on hunches. Often, an articulate, though insignificant, small outside group may be taken for "the voice of the people", especially since no other voices are heard in the wartime party truce or in the graveyard peace of dictatorial rule.

The experiences of 1918 are not without significance in our day. In fact, the ideological reactions after the last war are often accepted as definite proof for an unavoidable turn to extremism among the defeated. A careful scrutiny, however, might raise doubts as to the character of this post-war radicalism. The young republican forces of the Weimar Republic, as well as the Independent Socialists (U.S.P.D.) and the Communists, certainly misjudged the direction and strength of the left-wing radicalism. The masses who joined the Independent Socialists longed for peace and not for revolution. Any movement that made itself the spokesman of peace on the eve of defeat could count on a strong following, as the French Monarchists in 1871 and the Russian Bolshevists in 1917 had learned. The U.S.P.D. was the peace party par excellence in Germany in 1918. Its function and appeal were gone after the armistice was signed. The Communist party which soon became the focus of left-wing radicalism temporarily attracted fluctuating groups. Though a few Communist leaders, such as Rosa Luxemburg and later Paul Levi, showed a more balanced view of the true reaction of the social classes, the party mistook the movement of sectarian and marginal groups for a revolu-

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tionary situation. Untimely revolts thus furthered the early recovery of reactionary forces. The policy makers of another transition period should beware of similar miscalculations.

The coming armistice period, to be sure, will be very different from the last one. Comparisons must be weighed accordingly. In fact, many decisions will have to wait until a time when observation on the spot can make possible a more adequate comprehension of Germany's internal plight. In such a fluid development it is wise to be on guard against preconceived ideas and premature predictions. Only one fact seems to be sure: the rebirth of the political parties will be a slow and tedious process. To shorten this interregnum must be paramount in the minds of those responsible for the transition period.

Since political responsibility and leadership can be derived only from experience, the preparation for such political reawakening in post-Hitler Germany should begin at the earliest time possible. The natural start would be on the municipal level. Local government should be reëstablished immediately. This would create a limited area of democratic self-government. Germany may thus find a preliminary source for democratic leadership material in the respectable traditions of municipal government.

Step by step, the range of self-government may be extended from the municipal to the regional administration, until it finally can effectively function on a national level. Simultaneously, the Allied governments can retire gradually from active administration of the occupied area until a skeleton administration of controlling agencies will suffice. Thus the extension of German self-government may be granted as a reward for "good behavior". Such procedure would serve as a stimulus for the growth of a democratic spirit in Germany.

Mention should be made in this connection of the great regional differences in political opinions which have always prevailed in Germany. After the breakdown of the Third Reich and its rigid policy of centralization, the traditional predominance of Catholicism in the west and south, of agrarian conservatism in the western and eastern farm belt, and of the labor

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movements in industrial Saxony and the Ruhr Valley will probably again become manifest. They should be recognized in the well-measured differentiation of Allied procedures during the transition period.[2]

Important though these political measures in the transition period are, they will not be sufficient. The final emergence of a genuine democracy in Germany will require the establishment of an adequate social basis. The stability of the post-war order will depend as much on social security on the internal plane as on political security on the international front.

Functional Groups Restored

German democracy will depend, above all, on an early revitalization of the functional groups of society such as the democratic trade unions and employers' organizations, chambers of commerce, consumers' organizations, and peasant agencies. The churches, no less, will be most significant during the transition period, especially where they have successfully resisted the Nazi encroachment as seems to be the case with the Catholic Church. They all function in the municipalities and, at the same time, reach beyond them into the national sphere through channels that can be quickly reëstablished.

They can, no doubt, help in the recruitment of democratic leadership to an even greater extent than the activated municipal governments. In fact, one may argue that an infant democracy in a highly developed society can largely rely on the efficient operation of these functional groups, long before national political parties can fully emerge. The Allied governments, therefore, should encourage the immediate restoration of these social agencies. In this way they will attack the worst heritage of dictatorial government. National Socialism, with its enforcement of conformity (*Gleichschaltung*), has led to the total control of every social activity and to the doom

[2] For the significance of this regional factor in German politics, see Walter Koch, *Volk und Staatsführung vor dem Weltkriege* (Würzburg, 1935) and the forthcoming book of Arnold Brecht, *Federalism and Regionalism in Contemporary Germany*.

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of all free agencies in present-day Germany. Contrary to prevalent opinion, however, this destruction may not have a lasting effect. Old patterns of society may soon be restored. The free competition of social agencies will be one of the best guarantees of the restoration of normal German life and will be welcomed by the overwhelming majority of the populace.

The restoration of an unhampered public opinion in politics and social life, however, may not bring the final victory of democracy. In fact, it may easily invite a revival of another Nazi party if the lessons of recent history are not fully understood.

Attacking the Social Basis of National Socialism

To fight National Socialism effectively involves full recognition of its real driving forces. Destroying the symptoms, even eradicating its top men, without attacking its mass basis will not finish the perennial Nazi threat. Important were the much talked about Junkers, industrialists, secret army staffs, and other groups in the making of the Third Reich, but the raw material of German National Socialism was found in the frustrated middle class of inflation days, the rootless unemployed of the great depression, and the smaller, though articulate, group of young soldiers of fortune who did not find their way home from the battlefields of the last war and who led the march into the second World War. The greatest dangers for a stable post-war society will again derive from the very same groups which formed the mass following of rising National Socialism, and which will be the ready recruits for the possible rise of a new Hitler myth.[3]

[3] For a fuller discussion of these crucial groups in modern society and the rôle they played in the rise of National Socialism, see Sigmund Neumann, *Permanent Revolution* (New York, 1942).

Official party statistics clearly indicate the continuous prevalence of the lower middle class within the N.S.D.A.P. The percentage of white-collar employees, small independent bourgeois groups, and officials increased between 1933 and 1935 from 45.5 per cent to 53.8 per cent of the total membership, as compared with the small increase of manual workers from 31.5 per cent to 32.1 per cent and a decrease of peasant membership from 12.6 per cent to 10.7 per cent.

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The Unemployed—A Political Reserve Army

The peril of unemployment is obvious, especially since the sorry experience of the great depression of the late twenties and early thirties. The unemployed represent the political reserve army, ready for any demagogue's call. Steady employment in Germany will be an important safeguard.

The dangers of unemploment may partly be checked by the return of millions of women workers to their homes and of an equally numerous group of foreign war prisoners and laborers to their countries, thus freeing jobs for the returning soldiers and for the workers of dismantled war industries. Openings may further be offered by the demands on industry to rebuild bombed-out Germany. Also the Russian plans for German reparation payments in the form of a labor draft (difficult though these measures will be for the German economy) may to some extent relieve post-war Germany from this threat of unemployment. One may finally add that—at least in accordance with our earlier experiences—the unemployed, usually driftwood in any revolutionary movement, will hardly become the leaders of a revolution.

The Plight of the Middle Class

More dangerous, however, will be the plight of the middle class. The success or failure of modern democracy depends, above all, on the condition in which this crucial group finds itself. In Germany the middle class, unlike its counterpart in other Western countries, failed to win political power during the nineteenth century and, when, finally, the Weimar Republic offered a belated chance for the birth of a political middle class, it was hit by the social-economic crisis. It was this battered small independent middle class and the frustrated white-collar group which became the ardent champions of an aggressive National Socialism. To be sure, they did not reap the promised harvest in the Third Reich. While a certain percentage became the beneficiaries of the New Order, the majority of them suffered a further decline in status.[4] The rationing process,

[4] The most recent blows were administered by Fritz Saukel, General Deputy for Labor Supply, in his decrees of 1943 for the total mobilization of all re-

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necessitated by the war economy, completely undermined their position—a development welcomed by Himmler's organ *Das Schwarze Korps*.

Some interpreters of German society definitely conclude that National Socialism has succeeded in destroying the middle classes altogether and has made them ripe for communism. With the material available, it is impossible to make any reliable prediction concerning their staying power and their probable reaction after the breakdown of National Socialism.

If recent information, however, is correct, the middle classes are now among the most ardent opponents of the Third Reich, which has ruined their business, dissolved family life, and estranged the younger generation. They are violently anti-bolshevist and thoroughly nationalistic. Despite, or because of, their deterioration under National Socialism, they are probably the least changed groups in the totalitarian state. Privacy under law and order and the right to property and social differentiation are among their most cherished values. This mentality, incidentally, has also made deep inroads in the proletariat.

National Socialism, in its latest attempts to stay impending defeat, has significantly adopted a propaganda line which takes cognizance of these traits. According to official regulations, bombed-out victims of air raids are compensated in accordance with their social status. Nazi Germany thus, in the minds of the German middle classes (though not in reality), respects property and status. For the first time Goebbels' propaganda has succeeded in identifying, in the mind of the average German, the Western democracies with Soviet Russia in their "bolshevistic" plans concerning Germany.[5] The fear of bol-

sources for defensive warfare, including strict closing down orders. They hit especially the continuously declining retail trade (employing in 1939, 2.2 million, and in 1942, 1.9 million). For a comprehensive study of the systematic destruction of small business by the Nazi policies of pricing, concentration and rationalization, see A. R. L. Gurland, Otto Kirchheimer, Franz Neumann, *The Fate of Small Business in Nazi Germany*, Senate Committee Print, No. 14, 78th Congress, 1st Session (Washington, D. C., 1943).

[5] This Nazi strategy of gloom, a campaign of pessimism to stimulate participation and sacrifice, is significantly tied up with the definite promise: "After

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shevism and the effect of Allied bombing do not seem to leave any other alternative than to fight for "life and property". The result is a much observed strengthening of German "morale".

While this reaction may well be of a transitory nature, to be overcome by the final German defeat, it is indicative of the measures necessary later, if the Allied Powers believe it is still possible and desirable to rehabilitate the German middle classes rather than to discount altogether their future participation in European society. Whether the German burgher will again become the renewed champion of future nationalistic drives will depend on his fate in the transition period. To prevent a complete annihilation of these crucial classes, definite measures must be taken: guarantee of private property, including a curb on much dreaded inflation, rehabilitation of small and medium-sized firms (which, absorbed by the giant enterprises of war industry, could again become predominant in consumer-goods' industries of post-war times), encouragement of trade, employment of professional skills, some prospect of future opportunities, and increased participation in national and international affairs.

Even if such a regeneration of the middle classes should still be possible, it will not mean a simple return to pre-Nazi Germany. The convulsions of German society during the last thirty years have been too far-reaching, and further fundamental changes such as agrarian reforms, industrial reorganization and social transformations will be necessary before the social structure can find its adequate form. This is naturally a German affair. It should be created from within, and not by dictation by the Allied Powers, lest, fifteen years later, a nationalist reaction exploit this "foreign interference". On the other hand, the victorious Powers, in their endeavor to establish and guarantee law and order, must beware of becoming advocates of reactionary forces. Certainly the Allies should not

the war the middle classes will at once be reconstituted on the largest possible scale, economically and socially." Goebbels, February 18, 1943. *Cf.* Ernst Kris, Hans Speier, and others, *German Radio Propaganda* (New York, 1944), p. 202.

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prevent the continent from driving out "the poison in its system" and from making the necessary transformations.

The Revolt of the Militant Irregulars

The greatest danger of an upsetting dynamism will come, not from the unemployed and the middle classes proper, but from the militant activists and the everlasting warriors who once before became the articulate leaders of the Nazi revolution. Outcasts from civil society, they were largely recruited from the generation that came of age during the decade of the first World War. (Almost all Nazi leaders were born between 1890 and 1900!) The war became their formative experience and training ground. Fighting was the only craft they really knew. Wherever there was fighting going on—in Upper Silesia and the Baltic states, in Bolivia or China—they joined up as militant irregulars. They finally conquered the German state in 1933. Politics no longer was an instrument to prevent war; it became a part of warfare, actual and potential. No concept of civil government was left. Victorious National Socialism, led by a capricious and irresponsible generation of young irregulars, became a permanent revolution in internal politics and foreign affairs. Appeasement was impossible.

The aftermath of the second World War will bring to the fore an even larger group of those irregulars. Ten years of Nazi rule have augmented their ranks tremendously, systematized their revolutionary attack on civil society, and now extended their reign to the whole of Europe under a New Order.[6]

There is no room left for a civil society under the Nazis' New Order for total war; an equally decided underground's scorched earth policy must also forsake the accustomed patterns of pre-war society. Gone are the pillars of civil society with the wholesale destruction of property and the ruthless uprooting of millions of people by the oppressors; and with the countermeasures of the black market (the patriots' effective

[6] The intricate, semi-military machinery which has been organized by the Third Reich to guarantee this indoctrination of its permanent warriors is comprehensively analyzed in Alfred Vagts, *Hitler's Second Army*, (Washington, *Infantry Journal*, 1943).

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economic sabotage) and the spreading guerilla warfare, now approaching Germany herself. Almost all Europeans, and not simply a small marginal group as in 1918, have become "outcasts of society".

Planning for the Third and Final Assault?

In fact, one could easily perceive a devilish plan in the Nazis' systematic and complete plunder of Europe's material resources, in their mass murder, starvation, and "birth control" of the subject races—a war of attrition against Europe and the world. And while Europe starves, the *Herrenvolk* eats from the fat of the land.

Germany, too, has suffered stupendous losses in men and matériel on the battle front (largely due to her miscalculation of the Russian campaign). Yet she has managed so far to keep high her own status in health and nutrition, certainly superior to that of her neighbors.

Does all that not add up to a most favorable balance for Germany, even if defeated, leaving in the end the rest of Europe irreparably enfeebled—an easy prey for another Nazi knockout blow fifteen or twenty years hence? What would it matter to the perennial warriors if the second World War were lost, provided that it gave a sure promise of complete victory in a third and final assault? Fatalists in our day may find alarming evidence for such high-staked schemes heading toward an inevitable third World War. The Allies must take note of such possible shifts in power potentials.

In contrast to these somber prospects one should, however, point to certain more promising aspects of the post-war picture. The bitter experience of Nazi dictatorship may have awakened in Germany an ardent desire for genuine democracy and for human dignity, for family and group responsibility, for freedom and the rule of law. If presented with vigor and self-confidence, Western ideas may well find eager followers in a post-war Germany, at last striving for stability and peace.

Such pacification may, finally, be the result of fundamental changes in Europe's population structure. In fact, some comfort may be derived from the recent findings of circumspect

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demographic studies, which show that the balance of Europe's population will sharply shift eastward in the coming decades. Tied up with the equally definite eastward sweep of technology, education, and wider popular aspirations, such demographic changes are at least a factor which should diminish the likelihood of a future threat to world peace from Germany.[7]

If these analyses prove to be conclusive, the disturbing problem of world security would not present such insurmountable difficulties and might become an issue for a limited time only. The three united "peripheral Super-Powers" might well play a predominant rôle in controlling the European chaos of the transition period.[8]

Even granted such an historic change as "the passing of the European age", the erstwhile crater of world events is still active. Its eruptions must be controlled; its cataclysms will still have world-wide repercussions for a long time to come. The revolution of the second World War may well be a European heritage. Its mastery, however, is up to the nations of the world.

Toward Enduring Peace and Civil Society

Foremost in this settlement will be the assimilation of the returning soldier into the post-war society. It constitutes the number one problem all over the world.

Failure or success will spell war or peace for the future. The German example, past and present, serves as a supreme warning which must be heeded. It is in Germany alone that these developments of the uprooted irregulars have come to a

[7] Most impressive material in respect of this much neglected demographic factor in international affairs has been presented by the studies of the Office of Population Research, Princeton University. See specifically, F. W. Notestein and others, *The Future Population of Europe and the Soviet Union: Population Projections 1940-1970* (League of Nations Publications, 1944. II, A. 2). See also Frank W. Notestein, "Population and Power in Post-War Europe", *Foreign Affairs,* April 1944, vol. 22, pp. 389-403; and Dudley Kirk, "Population Changes and the Post-War World", *American Sociological Review,* February 1944, vol. 9, pp. 28-35.

[8] For a lucid analysis of the prospects for a post-war collaboration of the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union, see William T. R. Fox, *The Super-Powers* (New York, 1944).

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climax and have found definite political expression that challenges the world at large.

To assimilate the German youth will be the crucial task of the future. A careful check on the intensity of Nazi infiltration will be necessary. It has been uneven in respect of different age groups; some of these groups may be utterly lost, and their complete ostracism the only solution for the sake of world-security. Others may be recovered for European society, especially if they can soon find a place in civil life and an active part in European post-war reconstruction. Positive measures, as mentioned above in respect of the middle classes and the unemployed, will reduce their number. Only those renewed ties and responsibilities will prevent them from becoming again outcasts from civil society and a threat to world peace.

The return of a post-war society to patterns of peace will be a taxing problem for all nations after this total war. In the case of Germany, almost insurmountable barriers of long standing will challenge all our ingenuity. The Nazi war society must be exterminated. The annihilation of its leadership and its institutions, and even the strictest controls over the country, will not suffice. If its mass basis is not destroyed, Nazism will return in one form or another. What is imperative for the long-run peace strategy of the victorious Allies is to fit the uprooted masses of Germany into European society and to help create the conditions — economic, political, psychological — which may at last restore to the German people a healthy balance, not so much for Germany's sake as for the world's lasting peace.

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THE FRENCH SITUATION: A FRENCH VIEW

THE French situation appears today to many Anglo-American eyes more involved than it has been in this century. Four years ago, a few ready-made formulas, lavishly bandied about, seemed to hasty observers to explain everything: Maginot Line mentality, conservative general staff, political corruption, fascist plots, internal divisions. Later the Allies, without excusing it, understood the French military defeat better when they realized that, with the whole might of Russia pressing on the East, with the total mobilization of Great Britain and the whole weight of the most powerful industry in the world brought to bear on the Mediterranean and Atlantic fronts, the German foe was still far from beaten. But the political picture of the France of tomorrow remains confused. Bickerings seem to go on in North Africa among the French émigrés. Civil war looms on the horizon. The grim unity which one might have expected from a country tortured in its flesh and in its soul by the invader seems, to some observers, lacking. At a time when all eyes are fixed on the Norman beaches, the railway junctions and nerve centers of France, one cannot help being faced by a few questions. How deeply will the French people have been affected by four years of starvation, of suspicion, and of Nazi propaganda? After their immense sacrifices and their first outbursts of joy, will not French patriots be embittered at the wreckage of their homes, at the petty bargaining which may accompany the peace? What leader, what political régime, what social order will they want?

It is not impossible to give an answer to some of these questions. The reports on the French underground or on the Algiers Committee which appear in our daily press may occasionally be contradictory. Newspapers are compelled to focus their attention on events and on striking factual occurrences,

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that is to say, on what changes; but history is also made by static or slow moving forces, whose sudden emergence puzzles those who have been informed of only day-to-day events. An altogether new France has been shaped in the last three years. Of all the countries of Europe, not excluding Russia, France will probably be in 1945 or 1946 the most radically changed from what she was in 1939. Since her defeat and especially since the full development of her underground organizations, France has been living in fully revolutionary conditions. The memories most often glorified in her underground press have been those of her great Revolution: Valmy, Jemmapes, "Liberté, Liberté chérie", Public Safety, Revolutionary Courts, Jacobin spirit. The depredations systematically carried out by the Germans and the destruction caused by the war will, moreover, force France to rebuild practically *ab ovo et in toto*. Many irrational, hence unpredictable, elements will obviously intervene in that new French revolution. But a close reading of some of the French literature which has appeared in France and sometimes outside of France since 1940, and a little reflection on the underground press as it has reached America, should enable one to draw the main lineaments of a picture of the new France which will face us and may surprise us tomorrow.[1]

[1] Literature traditionally plays an important part in French life; the prestige of writers is second to none, and even economic and social ideas, to reach the general public, have to be interpreted or advocated by men of letters. A surprisingly large number of books have appeared in France since the defeat; intellectual life has remained very active. In *The Romanic Review* for April 1934 the writer has listed several hundreds of volumes of a serious character published in France between 1939 and 1942. The French underground press has received some attention in this country: see André Morize, *Resistance* (France Forever, Boston Chapter, 1943), and the three articles in *The New Yorker* (April 15, 22, May 6, 1944), in which A. J. Liebling has culled picturesque details from the secret newspapers of France. Extracts from those numerous newspapers have been repeatedly quoted in *Les Cahiers français* in London, especially in Nos. 28, 38 and 43. The most interesting and significant of those underground newspapers are: *Libération, Combat, Franc-Tireur, Lorraine.* Some are the organs of intellectual groups: *Lettres françaises, l'Université libre, l'Art français, Libre France, Fraternité.* Others represent the trade unions and the workers: *Les Informations sociales, C. G. T., Le Populaire, l'Humanité*

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I

The first unmistakable impression one draws from such reading, confirmed by all those who escaped from France in the last two years, is that France is more united today than she has been for a century. That unity is not unanimity, since collaborators and Vichyites probably still represent five per cent of the population. But there is unity among the other ninety-five per cent, in the voluntary subordination of all ideological or social differences to one common purpose.

Much has been made of the fierce dissensions which raged among the French before and in 1939-40. Some of those dissensions were normal and indeed healthy in a democracy; others were to be explained by the individualistic temperament of the French people and by the refusal of many Frenchmen to accept their past unreservedly. It is known that the French were for or against their Revolution of 1789, for or against Napoleon in a manner which could only baffle the American people, who never question their Revolution, or the English people, who have long ceased to take sides for or against Cromwell, for or against 1648 or 1688. But the real division of the French went deeper. A good many of them refused to accept the modern world. They distrusted industry, mass production, machinery, efficiency, workmen and their social claims. They clung to a sentimental worship of the peasant and of the artisan, to outmoded military conceptions, a conservative and illogical financial organization, a supposedly well-balanced but in fact deficient economy. The dilemma was a tragic one. Was France to fall to the level of Spain, obstinately averse to the modern world? Or was she to modernize her economy, to develop her industry, to fight for export markets and gradually to raise the standard of living and probably the number of her inhabitants?

(communist), *La Vie ouvrière, La Résistance ouvrière, France d'abord* (communistic), *La Voix de Paris* (communistic). Some are reminiscent of the Revolution or of the Commune: *Valmy, Le Cri du Peuple, L'Appel, Le Père Duchesne, L'Insurgé.* Many are chiefly patriotic: *Le Patriote, Le Gaullois (sic), La France unie, L'Unité, Résistance, Le Coq enchaîné, Pantagruel, Quatrième République, La France en Armes, La Flamme, La Marseillaise.*

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We believe that the dilemma has now ceased dividing the French. The Vichy government of 1940 endorsed the agrarian myth; it advocated a return to pre-Revolutionary traditions, to a paternalistic organization of *artisanat,* to the cultivation of the land, and to a traditional and classical education as opposed to a scientific and technical one. For some months, the French people in their distress agreed to blame their defeat on their abandonment of age-old traditions. The Royalist party exulted in that apparent victory of their doctrines, bought at the price of unprecedented national humiliation. But the French were not long in realizing that they were playing Hitler's game, giving up all claims to having any heavy industry, that is, to being a great Power, forsaking all hope of a military *revanche* upon their enemy, resigning themselves to becoming, as their victor had expressly wished in *Mein Kampf,* a country of twenty-five million people living contentedly but meagerly on their land and serving as a playground for the Teutonic master race in its *Kraft durch Freude* vacations. Underground newspapers soon pointed out the striking similarity between Pétain's declarations and the hypocritical articles published in the German press (notably in the *Deutsche Bergwerks Zeitung* of August 18, 1942), praising the French as an agricultural race, unfit for the "inhuman" mass production of modern industry. According to the safe principle that they should distrust systematically the patronizing or perfidious suggestions spread by Goebbels' office, many honest and conservative Frenchmen realized that they had been deluded and recognized that France had to give up her agrarian myth, or else to cease being a first-rate or even a second-rate Power.

It has been repeatedly asserted that France was divided in 1939 about the advisability of fighting the present war, and that many of her citizens welcomed a German victory as a safe rampart against internal disorder. There were, indeed, a few traitors or anti-Communist fanatics before June 1940 and more of them when their defeat had made them believe in German invincibility. It is, however, true to say that France accepted the war, in September 1939, in a spirit, not of enthusiasm (no country did, and France remains, with Great Britain, one of

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the only two which declared war of their own accord), but of stoic resignation. The hope for a victory was sincere and widespread; but the precedent of 1918 had taught the French not to expect much from such a victory. A deep lying anxiety darkened the thoughts of many patriotic Frenchmen. That anxiety was due, not to political fears or to cowardice or to the "softness of an over-civilized country", as newspapers were to allege later, but to biological causes. One issue, seldom discussed in public, has governed the internal, military and foreign policy of France for several decades, and that issue is demographic. France was conscious of her static population in a Europe which was increasing.[2] She knew that she represented only 8.35 per cent of the total European population in 1939 as against 14.62 per cent in 1801; that her growth had been only 48 per cent in 130 years, while Great Britain's had reached 400 per cent and Germany's 250 per cent in the same lapse of time.

The Allied victory of 1918 had left France dissatisfied because it had failed to give her security from another invasion

[2] The comparatively low figure of the population of France, with the second largest territory in Europe (Russia being of course the first), was not due, contrary to the common belief, to an abnormally low birth rate. France's birth rate was, in 1933, higher than that of several Western countries: 163 births per 10,000 inhabitants, as against 149 in Great Britain and 147 in Germany. But the decrease in the birth rate had begun much earlier in France, so that there was a comparatively smaller number of mothers between 15 and 50 years of age. Moreover, infant mortality was high in France; but the relative inferiority of France was in her reluctance to develop industry. Industrialization had been the chief factor which had increased the British and German populations. See F. W. Notestein and others, *The Future Population of Europe and the Soviet Union* (League of Nations Publication, 1944. II. A. 2), p. 63: "In the late 'thirties, France's net reproduction rate was higher than that of Austria, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, and Switzerland, and was substantially higher than that of Germany before National-Socialist pronatalist policies." See also the statistics quoted in Jean-Sylvain Weiller's article on "Natalité et renaissance française", in *Renaissance*, I, No. 4, 1944. The reproduction rate was 0.93 for France between 1925 and 1928, 0.92 for Germany between 1924 and 1928, 0.80 for Sweden, 0.78 for Great Britain. Extraordinary measures taken by the Nazis and the total employment due to rearmament raised the German reproduction rate from a low level of 0.70 in 1933 to 1.00 in 1940, that is, to an exact balance between the birth rate and the death rate.

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from the east. Yet the French losses had been staggering, and no man or woman, no schoolboy in France could forget them: 1½ million young men killed (out of a population of 39 million), the highest percentage of any nation which had taken part in the gigantic struggle (the corresponding proportion for the United States with their present population of 135 million would be 5 million young men killed); 4,266,000 wounded, some of them permanently disabled. The French naturally balked at the prospect of another such blood bath. Their hesitation is easy to understand, if not to condone, when one remembers what a bitter disappointment it was for them in the summer of 1939 to see Russia refusing to take up arms against Germany, and the United States reluctant to enter a conflict which, every Frenchman was told, was another sacred war for freedom and democracy.

France, in spite of the mildly reassuring assertions of her leaders about the impregnability of the Maginot Line or the sure efficacy of the British blockade, realized that she could not, with only limited British aid, vanquish a Germany which had twice her population and four times her industrial output. At the same time, she could not help feeling that, while the job indeed had to be done, this war was not primarily a Franco-German duel. The only truly Franco-German war in the last hundred and fifty years had been the War of 1870-71, and France had lost it. The War of 1914-18 was primarily a struggle for European and world supremacy between Germany and Great Britain, in which the French army had to be crushed first as a necessary prerequisite. As to the war of 1939, future historians will probably confirm the view of some French observers (who were neither appeasers nor Vichyites) who asserted that it was, in its essence and from the very first day, a conflict between Germany and the United States. The French army again was a screen which had to be disposed of first. The Russian mines, oil and wheat had to be seized, the British fleet captured or neutralized. But the true rival of Germany was the one Power which surpassed her in industrial output, in the production of steel, machine tools, plastics, which could surpass her in synthetic rubber, chemicals, opticals, etc. If Eu-

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rope were conquered first (and Germany came surprisingly close to a victory), a continent of five hundred million people ruthlessly organized and disciplined by the Germans would (with Japanese help and the probable good will of some satellites in Asia or South America) have turned to an economic siege and then an actual war against the United States. France felt once again that she would incur the heaviest sacrifice of men, risk destruction of her cities, her mines, and her fields, for a cause which was undeniably hers, but that of several other and richer nations as well as her own.

II

A momentous change took place in the reactions and the reasoning of the French people in the course of the year 1941. They recovered from the stunning blow of their defeat and became suspicious of the aged ruler who offered them, in the way of consolation and hope, nothing but a feeble caricature of fascism. They realized that, first with the resistance of England and the saving of Egypt, then with America's sudden entry into the war and the Russian counterstroke near Moscow in December 1942, the victory which the Germans had had within their grasp had escaped them. But their change of attitude did not come primarily from shrewd realistic weighing of the chances of the two adversaries; it was a spontaneous and instinctive outburst, the rediscovery by the French of their *patriotism*. The French, if they always remained at heart what Carleton Hayes has called them, "a nation of patriots", had not all conceived of or displayed their love for their country in the same way. After the Dreyfus case, to some extent as a consequence of it, an estrangement had separated the army from a large part of the population. The workmen looked upon the military men as upon a caste; the officers distrusted the working class and even industry as a whole. Communists and Socialists alike refused to vote the military credits. Two years after Hitler's seizure of power in Germany, the French Radical Socialists still opposed extending the term of military service to two years. Antimilitarism had become one of the dogmas of the French Left; nationalism was taken to be iden-

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tical with Rightist ideas, and even served as a label to the extreme reactionaries of the Monarchist group. Today the army leaders have learned that a military victory has first to be won in factories and assembly plants; that workmen are even more necessary to modern warfare than peasants, since the latter are traditionally better fitted to slow moving infantry service than to serve in tanks, airplanes and repair depots. Recent reports on the stubborn fighting kept up in the *Maquis* by heroic young outlaws agree that those patriots, often drawn from all social classes including workers and Communists, have welcomed the leadership of regular army officers. The army and the nation are again at one, just as they are in Russia. The French workers are not likely to assert again, after their long years of martyrdom, that wars are mere contrivances of capitalist profiteers imposed upon an unwilling proletariat. They have seen too many Germans too closely to believe that they were sheep led to battle by a minority of tyrannical leaders. One of the communistic underground newspapers in France is entitled *France d'abord*. Five years ago, the two words would have been the motto of *L'Action Française*, while the Communists were clamoring for the international union of the "proletarians of all lands".

Catholics and anticlericals, bourgeois and factory workers, officers and shopkeepers are united today in their passive or active resistance against the invaders. Their sons or brothers are perishing slowly in prison camps, their crops are confiscated, their goods are carried away, their land is devastated, and their love for their fellow citizens and for their country is again a reality felt in the flesh. At the same time, the French people have not been humbled by misery; hatred burns in their hearts. They may be powerless against tanks and airplanes, but they are far from remaining prostrate or submissive. Their reborn patriotism has given them a new consciousness of their unity and of their future strength. The Anglo-Americans have been surprised by recent manifestations of French pride; pride will probably be the chief characteristic of the liberated countries. That pride will be hypersensitive; it will

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sometimes appear rigid and self-righteous to the friends and saviors of France.

The most potent force in liberated France will be, not patriotism alone, but *nationalism*. Nationalism can be declaimed against as the source of all evils. It may be wrong of De Gaulle to play on it and to be so touchy as to resent any infringement on France's theoretical rights; but a leader who would not symbolize and express French nationalism today would misrepresent his country. The French underground newspapers bear witness to the extraordinary pride which they take in their sacrifices and in their daily resistance to their conqueror. The people of France have been able to observe the Germans very closely indeed; and they have lost all the respect which they may ever have entertained for the German qualities of order and honesty. They have found them all too human in their corruption and venality, often subhuman in their cruelty, certainly not supermen. On the other hand, the wound inflicted on the French by disparaging remarks from their allies has cut deep. An outcry of protests followed the ill-timed speech of General Smuts on November 25, 1943.[3] The current talk about a Directory of four big Powers settling and maintaining the peace of the world has been a rankling humiliation not only to the French but to most of the continental Europeans. In Belgium and the Netherlands, in Czechoslovakia, in Hungary, and in Rumania, many eyes are still fixed on Paris. Great as the prestige and the might of the British people may be after this war, many western and central European nations believe that Great Britain cannot rely solely upon American help but must align herself with France and smaller Western Powers, if a permanent stability is to be recovered in a war-ridden continent. The most Anglophile among the leaders of these nations do not conceal that there is little chance for British influence being deep and British ideas and precedents being contagious in western, central and even eastern Eu-

[3] Many of those protests came from British lips or pens: from Anthony Eden, H. G. Wells (in *La France Libre*, December 15, 1943), D. W. Brogan (*The Virginia Quarterly Review*, Spring 1944). Violent French protests appeared in the underground papers, *Libération* and *La France en Armes*.

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rope, unless those ideas are first filtered for them by French minds, rationalized and universalized by France. Excluding France from the small group of four "main Powers" to whom the peace of the world will be entrusted tomorrow was inflicting an unnecessary wound upon French feelings, offering an easy platform for impassioned and dignified protests by hypersensitive French leaders, arousing sympathetic fears among other continental European nations, leaving the door open to a dangerous game of rivalry and overbidding between the Anglo-American allies and the Russians, to whom the French, perhaps the Italians, the Yugoslavs, may alternately try to turn.

III

Much thoughtful attention is being devoted to foreign policy by suffering Frenchmen. Freedom from fear is an essential prerequisite to their reconstruction, and they firmly hope to obtain, after their tragic defeat of 1940, the security for which they clamored in vain after their victory of 1918. It need not be concealed that the French are afraid of a soft peace which will leave Germany with a potential superiority in Europe. Recent editorials in the London *Times*, blueprints for peace such as Edward Hallett Carr proposed, and numerous articles published in America by former Germans or anti-Nazi exiles pinning their faith upon a "democratic Germany" have been taken by the French as evidence of an unrealistic attitude which may well repeat the mistakes of 1918-38. The anxiety of the French is usually expressed on three scores. (1) Germany will win this war in Europe while losing it, if she emerges from it with a relative demographic superiority over her neighbors. The real test of the next peace will come, indeed, not in 1948 or 1950, but in 1970 or 1975. Europe has been weakened by starvation, organized murder and population losses to such an extent that Germany may then once more be the dominant Power west of the Vistula. (2) Germany will also win this war unless the concentration of European industry which she has organized on her soil is broken up, unless Europe is made relatively independent of German factories. If the fallacious

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claim put forward by some of the German exiles, for instance by Mr. Peter Drucker in *Harper's Magazine,* April 1943 (that Germany has now integrated the whole European economy with her own, so that to disrupt that integration would be to bring economic chaos to Europe, hence to ruin international trade), were to be listened to, Germany would, at the peace treaty, command an industrial, hence a military, potential far superior to the one she had in 1939, and would dominate central and western Europe. (3) Germany's third asset is her central location in Europe, which enables her to play the East against the West and inversely. Encouraging Anglo-American fears of Russia's power is playing the German game and allowing Germany to offer her services alternately to one or the other of the two groups, so that she would tip the scales in the new balance of power. The occupied countries of Europe (if one excepts the small ruling classes of Hungary, Rumania and Poland) have learned much in the last five years. They are no longer made hysterical by the Bolshevik bogey. The Russian peril is hypothetical and remote; the German peril has been an actual and a mortal one for conquered, pillaged and starving Europe. The emergence of Russia, as the strongest continental Power in Europe, is in their eyes the chief factor which may help solve the German problem in the East. Stalingrad, in the fall of 1942, probably tolled the knell of a whole phase of European history, the era of German hegemony which opened in 1870. It is now up to the West of Europe to evolve a constructive solution on the other side of the Rhine.

The thinking done by the French in France on these problems seems, from the accounts which have reached us, surprisingly constructive. A radical partition of Germany is seldom advocated. It was until 1940 the favorite solution proposed by the extreme Right, notably by the Royalists, who in 1940 were the first to accept the German victory as a "reality" and to subscribe to Marshal Pètain's policy of waiting (*attentisme*) and collaboration. Not only is such a solution discredited by the present about-face of its former sponsors, but the task of keeping Germany dismembered for several decades looms as a tremendous one, which the French are not ready or able to

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assume. The Anglo-Americans might undertake it if they thought fit, not the French, who would again incur the odium of the Germans, and perhaps of many other nations, if they proposed it. The reëducation of the Germans by foreigners is an equally impracticable task. A complete defeat, a drastic occupation, strict control of the radio, the press, raw materials, and synthetic manufactures are probably the best means of reëducation in the long run. Faith in a conversion of Germany to democracy, or the belief that democracy in Germany would necessarily mean peace, is similarly foreign to the French and to the nations which have been forced to live under and with the Germans in the present war. French and Belgian underground papers, many of which are obviously drawn up by literate persons whom their present plight has drawn to meditation of history, are fond of recalling the record of the Social Democrats during the War of 1914-18, long before the advent of Nazism: their calm acceptance of atrocities perpetrated by their soldiers in Belgium, the treatment of prisoners by the rank and file of the German people, their joy at the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, compared to which the Treaty of Versailles was mild and harmless, their failure to protest against the Treaty of Bucharest (which only a few Independent Socialists in Germany balked at). Quotations from Stresemann's memorandum to the former Crown Prince of Germany, sent on September 7, 1925, on the eve of the Locarno Pact, have been repeatedly given, as indeed they should in every country which entertains illusions about the foreign policy of the Weimar Republic.[4] Practically all the chief items of Hitler's program, including the "protection" of the Austrians and of the Sudeten Germans, the recovery of the Polish Corridor, the assertion of the "theoretical character" of Germany's renunciation to Alsace-

[4] This servile letter of Stresemann to the former Crown Prince was published in 1932, three years after the German minister's death, in Stresemann's *Vermächtnis* (edited by Henry Bernhard, Berlin, II, 553-555), and passed unnoticed, even after it was translated into English in *Gustav Stresemann: His Diaries, Letters and Papers* (edited and translated by Eric Sutton, London, 1937, II, 503-505). On this point, and on the lessons of the last peace, see the enlightening volume by the former British Commissioner in the Saar, Sir Geoffrey Knox, *The Last Peace and the Next* (London, 1943).

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Lorraine, were already advanced by the chief figure of the German Republic, who added that *finassieren* should first be used to secure such aims. A few weeks later, he agreed to "renounce" these claims, with his tongue in his cheek, when signing the Locarno Treaty. Indeed, many Frenchmen make no difficulty in admitting that the advent of Nazism was a boon to the world, for it revealed the true face of Germany to all nations, and eventually brought several continents into the fight against the enemy. A so-called republican Germany would have proceeded more gradually in her conquests, would have remilitarized the Rhineland, occupied the Polish Corridor, proclaimed the *Anschluss,* disrupted Czechoslovakia, appeased Russia with the good will of the whole world; she would have conquered the major part of continental Europe economically and "peacefully", probably recovered her former colonies, and only then would have attacked Great Britain, and subsequently America. With less brutality and less monstrous but more skillful lies, she might have reached the Pan-Germanist ends more slowly and more securely.

The French suggestions for the next peace can be summed up under a few headings: retribution and severe punishment of the war criminals (that is, of several thousands, perhaps tens of thousands, of political and military leaders); cancellation and revision of all contracts and agreements entered into in Europe since February 1938; restitution of all stolen goods whenever possible, and utilization of German labor to rebuild destroyed property, factories, locomotives, ships, etc., in occupied and victorious countries; disarmament and control of essential raw materials and factories for a number of years; reindustrialization of several European countries like France, Poland, the Balkan countries to some extent, so as to make them relatively independent of Germany; encourage the de-industrialization of Germany, which alone could eventually reduce her population; restore automatically and unquestioningly the Sudetenland to Czechoslovakia, Austria to the Austrians (with a Danubian federation to be organized), to France Alsace-Lorraine and the Saar district (the latter in legitimate and partial compensation for the destruction of French mines),

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East Prussia and the Polish Corridor to Poland, along with the larger part of Silesia; transfer in a few cases of the populations which would wish to remain German.

Only after such elementary conditions of peace are fulfilled will it be possible to integrate Germany in a new Europe, and to direct the fine German qualities of efficiency, discipline, energy, toward new and peaceful channels, within the framework of a European order, some day perhaps of a world order. Such an order is the ideal and perhaps Utopian goal toward which Europe should strive. The first step would be the forging of much closer ties (economic, financial, intellectual, some day perhaps political) between Great Britain, Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg, France, and one or several of the Scandinavian nations eventually. The western bloc or "Union of the West", which would later be enlarged and, with the possible inclusion of a peaceful and weakened Germany, extend to central and southern Europe, seems to be the formula on which the aspirations and the hopes of Frenchmen are pinned.[5]

IV

Grave doubts are currently expressed by friendly observers of France on the country's ability to reform politically. Will the French be in a position to remedy what many consider as their congenital disease? That disease can be diagnosed as threefold: instability of the executive, absence of a two-party system, extreme individualism which sharpens minor differ-

[5] General de Gaulle advocated such a union in his constructive speech to the Assembly in Algiers on March 18, 1944. It is needless to add that the whole of France outside of a few collaborators envisions its future as inextricably linked with that of Great Britain and the Low Countries, and more remotely with that of America. The scheme of a Latin union, dear to Maurras and Laval, is nowhere taken seriously. France would gain nothing economically and politically from being linked with Italy and Spain. Above all, such a scheme would certainly meet with the implacable hostility of England, since it would, between Spain and Morocco, Sicily and Tunisia, close the Mediterranean and block the passage to India. Admiration for Russia is great in France, but a formal Franco-Russian alliance will be resorted to only if the German peril remains great. As to an autonomous state for the Rhineland, the French seem to leave the issue to Great Britain and Russia, where some circles have advocated it. It is a European, and not a Franco-German, problem.

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ences and prevents Frenchmen from agreeing to disagree on details and from pursuing a higher purpose in common.

These three evils have been all too real and may indeed be hard to eradicate. Yet many thoughtful Frenchmen are convinced today that their countrymen are not temperamentally quarrelsome and uncoöperative, but were made so by difficult living conditions and the underlying conviction in their minds that their chief and true problems were not being solved by their politicians. The benefits of the two-party system are very doubtful, and will probably not be eagerly desired by the French. But the main solution of their political problem is easy. The task of the new régime in the France of tomorrow will not be political. The new leaders will be tested by their ability to solve the primary French issues, which are demographic, economic and social.

One thing is clear. During these fateful years of occupation, the republican régime will have struck even deeper roots than in the past. The very word Republic, after the utter failure of Vichy's undignified attempt at discrediting it, is again surrounded with a romantic halo, cherished with pride and affection. The underground newspaper *Combat* wrote, for instance, in January 1943:

> France is republican. She remains republican. She is more ardently republican than ever. And France knows why she is republican. Because the Republic means liberty and she lives in chains. Because the Republic means justice and she is satiated with injustice. Because the Republic means Christian fraternity and this mutual suffering has made Frenchmen remember that they are brothers. Because the Republic means a nation that is proud and mistress of her own destiny. . . . Because the Republic means that noble motto: "Liberty or Death."

But such ardent love is not blind to the faults of the former régime. The Third Republic left unsolved the urgent problems of the demographic situation of France, of her insufficient industry, of her backward agriculture. Before she can solve these problems, France will have to adopt a few political reforms, on which the agreement is general: a stronger execu-

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tive; a better organization of the legislative assemblies, of the judiciary power, and of the press; more social justice. *Défense de la France* wrote, somewhere in France, in May 1943:

> First of all, it will be essential to give greater authority and great continuity to the executive. This point seems fundamental. The legislative branch will have to limit itself to the exercise of its natural mission which is to make laws and control government action, but parliament will have to understand that its task is not to govern. Secondly it will be urgent to insure in France the independence and prestige of the judiciary by the creation of a Supreme Court whose mission will be to check the constitutionality of the laws and to protect citizens against any abuse from the legislative body. The Supreme Court will insure the morality of public life by trying ministers and high civil servants at fault. . . . The new order of the new Republic will be the order of individual liberty and social progress: the aim of the Fourth Republic will be to reconcile the rights of man and the duties of the citizen.

On the reform of the executive, two currents of thought have been discernible recently among the French. One favors a president on the American pattern, elected by the people and choosing his cabinet himself; the other clings to the traditional French system of a president with limited effective powers (although far more influential than is popularly believed), but with a prime minister whose office might easily enjoy the same degree of stability as in Great Britain on two conditions: realignment of existing parties (already partly accomplished in metropolitan France) and granting the executive the right of dissolving the Chamber of Deputies *without* the consent of the Senate. Such a practice of dissolution, accompanied by some guarantees to the electorate, would serve as a healthy safety valve in French democracy, and as a welcome indirect referendum. The first alternative of a president directly elected by the people will in all likelihood be eliminated. It is linked in French memories with the ill-fated precedents of Napoleon III and of Pétain as chief of state with plenary powers. It will be avoided all the more eagerly by the French nation if their most powerful symbolic figure is tomorrow an

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army general.[6] The legislative branch will again probably consist of a Chamber of Deputies and of a Senate—the latter profoundly reorganized and rejuvenated, made less narrowly representative of agrarian interests and more of economic forces, trades unions, producers and consumers. Women will vote in all elections. The legislative procedure in the Chamber will be simplified; committees should cease encroaching upon the executive; the right of a deputy to propose new expenses will be curtailed, somewhat along British parliamentary lines; and the vote of the budget, a traditionally protracted affair and a chronic evil during the Third Republic, might be secured every two years instead of yearly.

But France has propounded enough theoretical schemes of constitutional reform since 1789 to be aware that the harmonious and skillful logic of a constitution counts less than the spirit in which it is applied and lived. The true faults of France's political life were not due to any constitutional imperfections; they have been clearly brought to the limelight since 1940 and may prove easier to cure for having been loudly denounced. We would list them as follows:

[6] See the following typical quotations from the underground press, borrowed here from Louis Lévy's book, *France Is a Democracy* (London, 1943): "We have said, and we repeat, that we are entirely behind General De Gaulle in his fight for the liberation of the country; but that we should be against him if he were to contemplate after that liberation a dictatorship which we could no more accept from a general than we have accepted it from the Marshal" (*Franc-Tireur*, June 1942). *Le Coq enchaîné* on April 22, 1942 envisaged De Gaulle as a victorious general, leading his troops under the Arc de Triomphe, but added: "Who will be our Clemenceau that day, who will be our Poincaré? We do not know. But the people of France must make sure now that they are men of the people, safe and strong." Needless to add, in spite of perfidious hints and malevolent accusations which have alternately branded him as a Communist, as a bourgeois, as a Royalist, as an authoritarian, as a servant or as a foe of the Anglo-American Powers, De Gaulle himself has always rejected such charges and unjustified fears. His great asset since 1942 has been to keep closely in touch with the French underground and to voice its aspirations. On April 21, 1944, he declared to the foreign press correspondents in Algiers: "The French people would not accept a French dictatorship; nor would they, *a fortiori*, accept a foreign dictatorship, I can guarantee it. But the French want their government to govern them, and that is what we are trying to do."

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(1) The purely intellectual or ideological differences between individuals or groups were absurdly exaggerated, while the truer issues were not faced. Common sufferings have exploded many of these artificial divergences; the magnitude of the post-war tasks to be accomplished will bury many others. In the meanwhile, the educational system of France, which was on the whole admirable, should be reformed so as to encourage less critical spirit driven to an excess, a less markedly literary education, more attention to technical teaching and practical science, and, if possible, more development of imagination.

(2) France has gone through several revolutions since 1789 and through countless changes of cabinets since 1870; but she has had very few drastic reforms. Her social, economic, administrative and bureaucratic structure has remained virtually unchanged since Napoleon I. She needs less apparent and superficial change, and more profound reforms, including more opportunities for local self-government as a nursery for future statesmen.

(3) The French press needs urgent reforming. The underground papers are united on this point, and the attitude of many of the leading newspapers in 1940 and since has dealt them a deathblow. Some have proposed a board of censors which would not curb the freedom of the press, but would put an end to the shameful blackmail or outrageous insulting which soiled part of French journalism and would supervise the balance sheets of the newspapers. The stronger the executive, the more important will a responsible and influential press be. "The United States", as the British historian D. W. Brogan recently wrote, "is not a constitutional government, but a presidential autocracy tempered by editorials." Some immoral publications should similarly be curbed. More attention should be given by the press and public opinion to grave problems such as alcoholism, pornography, poor housing, and bad hygiene.

(4) The French had taken their Republic for granted ever since 1876; hence, they allowed it to be lavishly ridiculed and caricatured, bitterly attacked, and, worse still, gradually devitalized by the lack of any constructive thinking done by Republican parties. The only vigorous political thinking done in

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France for a century was against democracy and for "Rightist" ideas (Comte, Tocqueville, Le Play, Gobineau, Taine, Renan, Bourget, Barrès, even Georges Sorel, Maurras, Bainville, Thierry-Maulnier); the Left could boast only of politicians whose books were hastily written (Jaurès, Herriot) and of feeble formulations of a radical doctrine by Alain. The evil was grave in a country in which ideas play an important rôle in politics and in which a party soon loses its prestige if it has no logical and constructive body of doctrine behind it. It seems likely today that the fresh vigor of a reformed Fourth Republic will manifest itself in the field of theory as well as of action. Many articles in the underground press, thoughtful contributions in *La France Libre,* notably by Robert Aron, whose book *L'Homme contre les tyrans* appeared in New York in 1944, are of good omen in this respect.

(5) Finally, to borrow the words of another underground newspaper, *Franc-Tireur,* in May 1943: "The new republic must be a social republic. . . . Political liberty can only be restored by a social and economic 1789. . . . The indestructible foundation of liberty and equality must be laid by a national organization of production." The basis of French democracy was too narrow in the sense that the ruling classes remained, as a rule, static. Some professions, such as diplomacy, banking, army, navy, higher civil engineering and civil service, justice, etc., were practically limited to small hereditary groups. The cultural and social cleavage was unreasonably marked between those ruling classes and the leaders of trades unions, schoolmasters' syndicates, farmers' coöperatives, etc.; hence, enérgetic and progressive elements from the working classes instinctively turned against the social élite, and against the régime. They should, on the contrary, have brought new blood and broader vision to the diplomacy, administration, general staff and banking of the country, and would have stood united behind a régime which would not have deprived them of social influence and left them nothing but political power, threats of strikes and of revolution.

Such a sharp cleavage has now been erased by the ruin of the bourgeoisie in France and by the inflation as well as by the

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new social unity forged in resisting the enemy. Most of the industrial enterprises had, willingly or unwillingly, to accept German collaboration; their owners had to sell their shares to the Germans, whom the Bank of France supplied abundantly with French francs. These owners, who tried to rally around General Giraud in 1943, agitated to have their former property restored to them; the supporters of General de Gaulle argued, on the contrary, that they had already been compensated in French money paid by the state, and that their mines, factories and stores would, at the end of the war, become state property. It thus seems certain that post-war France will be characterized by state ownership of most of the means of production. This does not necessarily mean state socialism (the state may not try to work the mines, factories, etc., itself), still less communism, but certainly a much greater degree of collectivism than in pre-war France. Since France will need the aid of foreign Powers (especially of the United States) for many years to come, in order to have credits or loans, to import food, seeds, fodder, cattle, medical supplies, clothes and textiles, coal and machine tools, she will not be tempted by autarchy and is likely to repudiate the trade restrictions and trade quotas which did her, and Europe, much harm before 1939. But Frenchmen seem convinced that only a strict control by the state and a more socialistic democracy can put through the reforms upon which the continued existence of their country as an important Power depends.

V

The first of these reforms should deal with the *demographic* question. With freedom from fear of Germany assured, with a reorganized republic, and a greater degree of social justice, France will require that there be enough Frenchmen to rebuild their country. She is now convinced that, with a territory almost double the area of Italy and of the United Kingdom, larger than that of Germany, she cannot lag behind these Powers in population, without again inviting greed and invasion. Repopulation is not primarily a question of will power or a moral and psychological problem; yet such factors cannot be altogether neglected. Statistics published since 1940 have shown the astonishing fact that the birth rate in France, in

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spite of many adverse conditions, had become relatively higher, due to a stubborn will to live in French mothers, and to legislative measures passed by the Daladier government before the outbreak of the war. Some French companies, such as the Michelin tire factory, had already proved that a rising birth rate can be provoked by economic advantages. The government finally understood that large families must be compensated, for their greater sacrifices, by increased salaries, housing and clothing facilities, educational opportunities, free meals for schoolchildren, et cetera. But the demographic policy of the country will be accompanied by a liberal scheme of controlled immigration. Many foreign workers are likely to flock again to France when the rebuilding of the country and an industrial expansion take place, when an ambitious program for developing railroads, mines, agriculture and medicine in French colonies is carried out. French industrialists, who were reluctant to encourage industrial enterprises in the French Empire for fear of competition, and French extreme nationalists, who campaigned against the admission of foreign labor, have sorely lamented their shortsightedness in 1940.

The key to the slow rise of French population in the last hundred years, and to many other French problems, lies in France's insufficient *industrialization*. It has been clearly proved that, after the early stages of industrialization which attract hasty concentration of cheap labor in slums and cause a higher mortality rate, properly organized industrial communities soon show an excess of births over deaths, and a lower mortality rate than agricultural districts. Such was the case in France. Industrial "departments" (Seine, Nord, Bouches du Rhône) cut their mortality rate by 50 per cent within a century, while the rural "departments" of Normandy and Brittany retained a higher mortality rate. The urban death rate went down from 23.9 per 1,000 in 1881 to 13.9 in 1936; the rural death rate only from 20.6 to 17.2. The surprising jump in population which raised Germany from 28 to 70 million inhabitants between 1800 and 1936, and Great Britain from 9 or 10 to 45 million, did not take place in France, because France proved reluctant to accept industrialization. She now knows that a country which could oppose only 50

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soldiers to every 90 German soldiers, and 6½ million workmen to Germany's 26 million, was doomed to be defeated and overrun in 1940. It must not happen again. Germany must be weakened; France needs allies. But her surest guarantee will be in acquiring the means of waging a modern war, of being rich and prosperous in peacetime, of attracting allies, of raising her demographic potential—a more important and more efficient industry.

The French people are aware of that necessity. They have pondered over it after seeing themselves powerless to build tanks, airplanes and machine tools in 1940, after watching the Germans take over some of their factories and organize mass production in them. Difficulties will have to be overcome. The chief one is France's comparative inferiority in coal, her production being roughly one fourth of that of Great Britain or Germany. But it is confidently hoped that the ownership and exploitation of the Saar will alleviate this insufficiency, as will imports from neighboring countries and, above all, the continued development of French hydroelectric energy, the richest in Europe. France ranks second in the world as a producer of iron ore, and, although she lacks chromium and (except in Morocco) manganese, necessary for high-grade alloys, she could easily double or treble her steel output. She has ample resources of potash and bauxite, was an important producer of naval stores, of textiles and chemicals, had a locomotive industry and, until 1930, the best aviation and automobile industry in Europe. Cotton, wool, oil she must import, as do Germany and Great Britain. Other products she can draw from her colonies. Workmen, capital and markets will not be lacking after the war. The chief handicap to French industry, to French export trade, and to the development of forward looking banking was the reluctance of the country to effect her industrial revolution over again. That revolution is now imposed upon the French by circumstances as well as eagerly desired because of their determination to rank among the great Powers again.

The third French problem, indeed the hardest to solve in the face of routine and prejudice, will be the modernization of French *agriculture*. The worship of the peasant had become

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a religion in France. This sentimental attachment was partly sincere and indeed justified; it was also encouraged by politicians who saw in the peasantry a stable social element, made humble by their daily struggle against the soil and the weather, uneducated and unspoilt by modern doctrines of revolution or communism. At the same time, the general staff clung to the old conception of having the peasants constitute the mass and the core of the French army. The new character of war, in which mechanics, skilled technicians, aviators and quartermasters are at least as important as peasant-soldiers, has exploded that myth. A predominantly Leftist France is not likely tomorrow to be afraid of factory workers and to encourage the agrarian conservatism which Vichy attempted to favor and foster, to the delight of German industrialists. The facts are eloquent, and recent studies by Frenchmen and others have stated them bluntly.[7] France has too many people living on the soil; their standard of living is low and their output small. Many of them would have flocked to cities long ago if the "rural exodus" had not been discouraged by low taxation and high tariffs on foreign agricultural products. Foreign wheat, for example, shipped to Havre or Marseilles, cost only one third of domestic wheat, but carried a 200 per cent duty. Food products were thus made unnecessarily expensive to the consumer at large, in order to maintain a numerous rural population, while too many farmers, producing too little per capita, barely made a living. The urban population, having to pay dearly for food products and agricultural subsidies, incurred a heavy burden of taxation and clamored for higher wages. Higher wages in turn made industrial goods too expensive, and many French factories, unable to compete with foreign concerns, gave up their export markets. The country on the whole was impoverished, dissatisfied and weakened.

[7] Notably Robert Vacher in *La France Libre* (November 15, 1942, February 15, 1943); Pierre Maillaud, *France* (London and New York, 1943). The writer has defined this and other French problems in a booklet in French, *Problèmes français de demain* (New York, 1943). Most of the data concerning French agriculture are to be found in two excellent studies by Paul Lamartine Yates (the second written in collaboration with D. Warriner): *Food Production in Western Europe* (London and New York, 1940) and *Food and Farming in Post-War Europe* (London and New York, 1943).

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The solution is obvious. France would gain by a higher output per farmer, a smaller rural population, and a better reward for each farmer. The yield of French wheat, for instance, averaged 13 hundredweight per acre, as compared with 20.8 in Belgium and 25 in Denmark; a French cow produced an average of 380 gallons of milk a year, about half the yield of a cow in Holland or Denmark; the number of livestock units per 100 acres of farm land reached 24 in France, 37 in Germany, 47 in Belgium, 53 in Denmark. The average yearly output in dollars, per person working in agriculture, was $360 in France, $480 in the Netherlands, $620 in Denmark, $800 in Great Britain.[8] The practical means of reaching the solution are equally clear: better methods of cultivation, taught through educational propaganda (Denmark raised her farmers from most backward habits to the most efficient in Europe through practical education); replacing nonproductive crops (wheat "pays" in only four French "departments" out of 90) by dairy farming; better housing, better stables, better hygiene, pasteurizing of milk, control of animals' diseases, etc.; extensive use of fertilizers and machinery; above all, putting an end to excessive *parcellement,* the curse of French agriculture, regrouping scattered parcels of land, and cultivating them through coöperatives. The bitter humiliation of the defeat, the rigid rules enforced by the invader and his exorbitant requisitions, the forced labor in German farms for a million French peasants who are prisoners of war and their consequent familiarity with German methods have been the harsh lessons which have enlightened the French farmer on the disastrous consequences of his stubborn and conservative individualism. It will take the fervor of liberation, then the guidance of a strong régime with socialistic tendencies, and the necessities of competing with foreign food production, to bring about the agricultural revolution sorely needed by France.

Such are the main lineaments of France's blueprint for the future, on which most forward looking Frenchmen are ready to agree. There will be unforeseen difficulties, remnants of

[8] These figures are given by M. Lamartine Yates in works cited *supra,* n. 7.

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past dissensions, deep wounds left by yesterday's quarrels, and many obstacles of all kinds which the old skepticism of the French will half expect. Too Utopian a view of their future would surely bring only disillusion to the French, and their leaders are certainly not depicting the post-war era in blood-bathed and ruined France as a new Golden Age. But for the first time in forty years the French seem to be animated by *faith*. The need for a faith has been latent in them since Versailles; pathetically, it tried to attach itself to paltry figures like La Roque, Doriot, Pétain. De Gaulle is the symbolic name dear to the French today; but no one expects one man to hold in the palm of his hand the solution to all problems. The second encouraging element in the French situation today is that the French people have ceased looking back. They will not cry "back to normalcy!" when this war is over, since nothing can be normal again in impoverished France. Everything will have to be rebuilt from nothing. French nationalism had long been nostalgically fascinated by the past of France and eager to return to a bygone era which could not be revived in an industrial world and in a Europe where France was no longer the most populated country. Today, that nationalism is *looking ahead*. It is prompted by a popular *élan* which had been absent since the days of the Marne and Verdun. Most Frenchmen, in their gloomy and tragic martyrdom, have survived only because they fervently hoped to get together in order to build a better future. This may take, not one, but four or five "five year plans". The dynamic purpose and the determination to reach it seem to be present in the souls of French youth. They hope, and many foreign observers hope with them, that there will emerge from them and among them bold leaders with vision, breadth and imaginative wisdom. It was the misfortune of the country that, ever since Clemenceau, it had looked in vain for leaders worthy of Talleyrand's beautiful definition: "L'homme d'état doit avoir de l'avenir dans son âme."

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SOCIAL INSURANCE IN NAZI-CONTROLLED COUNTRIES

IN no other field of social legislation has progress been so rapid, in the two decades between the first World War and the present war, as in the field of social insurance. To most working people, the right to a fixed amount of insurance benefits, in the event of income loss, represented a method of public aid which seemed highly preferable to relief based on a means test. By 1933, therefore, all major European countries had enacted social insurance laws,[1] for both workers and salaried employees, covering not only old age and invalidity, but also sickness, accident and unemployment.

What has happened to social insurance legislation, as a method of assuring income maintenance, in Nazi-controlled countries in Europe? What situation will occupation armies and the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration find concerning institutions and principles in this field? To what extent has the concept of legal rights to fixed or predetermined benefit amounts and services been maintained in various areas and for various groups of persons?

The purpose of this article, based on a survey of German rules, regulations, orders and decrees[2] for Nazi-controlled areas, is to shed light on these general problems by answering certain specific questions: What insurance laws are in force in the countries under Nazi control? What methods of protection in case of income loss apply to the workers who have been removed from their native country and transferred for employment to Germany or to another occupied area? What

[1] For details see *International Survey of Social Services, 1933* (2 vols, Geneva, 1936); *An Outline of Foreign Social Insurance and Assistance Laws*, Federal Security Agency, Social Security Board, Bureau of Research and Statistics, Bureau Report No. 5 (Washington, 1940).

[2] In this article the term "decree" stands for *Verordnung*, and the term "order" stands for *Erlass*.

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policy has been adopted regarding benefit rights under pension insurance, acquired prior to the imposing of German control? Which funds and institutions carried responsibility?

In so far as these problems resulted from the geographical shifts of the labor force, they were, of course, inherent in certain characteristics of the social insurance systems and had been encountered, although under different circumstances, in pre-war Europe. In considering the various social insurance developments in Nazi-controlled European countries it is therefore useful to recall that the solutions offered in the pre-war period to the problems which arose from the limited national scope of the insurance systems, and from the requirements regarding continuity of employment and insurance under the system of any one country, were embodied in numerous bilateral treaties in regard to insurance which were concluded between different European countries.[3]

The policy regarding social insurance measures in the controlled territories varies with the degree of control exercised and the kind of treatment accorded the inhabitants of different areas. Although in some countries under Nazi control introduction of German social insurance law was only *one step* in the process of assuming complete control of the economic, social and legal systems of the invaded country, it was found that social insurance was also established as a *path maker*, foreshadowing the degree of control which Germany eventually intended to assume in the occupied areas.

[3] Bilateral treaties were concluded, for instance, between Germany and Czechoslovakia in 1931 (I. L. O. *Yearbook*, 1931, pp. 282-83); Germany and Poland in 1931 (*ibid.*); Germany and Austria in 1930, in force since 1931 (*ibid.*, p. 282); France and Germany in 1932 (*Yearbook*, 1932, pp. 215-16). France concluded treaties with Italy, Spain and Poland in 1934 *Yearbook*, 1934-35, vol. I, p. 259). A bilateral treaty on social insurance was concluded between Germany and Italy in August 1940 (*Reichsarbeitsblatt*, 1940, No. 27, Part II, p. 332); another treaty with Hungary is reported to have been concluded in July 1941 (*RABl.*, 1941, No. 21, V, p. 369).

Although these treaties differed as to details, depending on the systems in force in the contracting countries, they all implemented the same major principles: equality of treatment of the nationals of the contracting countries, regarding responsibilities, duties, maintenance of insurance rights, both acquired rights and rights in the course of acquisition while working outside the country of origin.

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Therefore, it has seemed appropriate to present these measures separately: (I) for occupied territories, (II) for areas and countries which have been annexed for the time being (*eingegliederte Gebiete*), and (III) for areas and countries which are being prepared for complete annexation. The discussion will be limited to insurance against old age, invalidity, and sickness; only casual reference will be made to unemployment insurance.

I. *The Occupied Territories*[4]

In view of the fate of the peoples under Nazi occupation in Europe, it seems strange and ironic to find statements asserting that the general policy of military as well as civilian government in occupied territories was to maintain existing laws in so far as they did not impede or contradict administration under Nazi control.[5] It would follow from such a policy that social insurance measures would be continued according to the laws in occupied countries at the time of occupation. Unless there were specific rulings to the contrary, the social insurance codes which were in operation in different countries prior to the war were maintained under Nazi control. It is this policy which accounts for the otherwise inexplicable fact that various changes regarding national social insurance legislation have been reported from France, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium and Norway after occupation of the respective areas in 1940, 1941 and 1942.[6]

This general policy, however, is qualified in several important respects, both with regard to certain areas and with regard to certain groups of persons. The national social in-

[4] As used for the purpose of this section, the term does not cover Luxemburg, Alsace, Lorraine and Yugoslavia. The situation in these areas seemed to justify separate consideration under III.

[5] *RABl.*, 1940, No. 14, V, p. 217, article by Stamm on social insurance development in the General Government of Poland; also *RABl.*, 1941, No. 3, II, pp. 47 *et seq.*, article by Bogs on German sickness insurance in the occupied territories.

[6] For France see *International Labour Review* (1942), vol. 46, No. 1, pp. 88-89, No. 3, p. 383, No. 5, p. 619; for Belgium, *ibid.*, vol. 46, No. 4, p. 497; for the Netherlands, *ibid.*, vol. 45, No. 3, p. 349.

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surance laws do not apply to workers transferred for employment to Germany or to their families; the national social insurance laws have not been maintained in certain occupied territories (Poland, Yugoslavia, Alsace, Lorraine, Luxemburg); the national insurance laws do not apply to certain groups of nationals in the country concerned.

With the mass transfer to Germany of foreign labor from France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, and the Polish and Russian occupied territories, the necessity for special insurance regulations became acute with regard to three major problems: (1) protection in the event of income loss because of sickness or accident; (2) care of dependent families remaining in the occupied areas; (3) protection of acquired insurance rights and rights in the course of acquisition under pension insurance. Involved in these three problems is the question concerning the agency and authorities responsible for carrying out the measures of aid which may become necessary immediately, in case of sickness or accident, and eventually in case of invalidity or death. In view of the fact that as early as August 1941 more than two million foreign workers were officially reported to be employed in Germany[7]—a number which in the meantime may have risen to three or four times this amount[8]—the importance of the various problems is evident.

With regard to the protection of foreign workers employed in Germany, in case of sickness and accident, the general policy was adopted that they were to be covered by German sickness and accident insurance and to be treated similarly to German nationals.[9] An exception was made in the case of eastern

[7] *RABl.*, 1941, No. 34, V, pp. 609-17; 1942, No. 1, V, pp. 5-15, and No. 2, V, pp. 23-33, article by Timm, "Der Einsatz Ausländischer Arbeitskräfte in Deutschland".

[8] Dorothy Thompson estimates that the number of foreign workers transferred to Germany for employment amounts to ten to twelve million. "Signals from Germany", *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 22, No. 2, January 1944, pp. 189-209.

[9] Order of February 5, 1943, *RABl.*, 1943, No. 7, II, p. 83. This order was preceded by various regulations during 1940 and 1941. That economic reasons were the basis for the regulations has repeatedly been stated (see article by Bogs, *RABl.*, 1941, No. 3, II, p. 47) and is furthermore indicated by the

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workers, that is, the workers coming from the occupied Soviet territories. Although the general principle implied that medical assistance and hospital treatment were to be provided without discrimination whenever needed, it seemed necessary to emphasize this fact in special instructions, orders and circulars.

In addition to the general policy with regard to insurance of foreign workers during periods of employment in Germany, special attention was paid to the problem in several agreements with occupied countries. These agreements took place in connection with the endeavor to enlist foreign workers on a large scale for work in Germany. Such was the purpose of the agreements which were concluded with Denmark,[10] Norway,[11] and France.[12] With the Netherlands, provisions for workers were made in two orders which were issued consecutively by the Dutch Minister of Social Affairs and the German Minister of Labor. As far as the agreements concerned the insured persons themselves, they regulated (1) their insurance protection while in Germany, (2) membership with the funds in the country of origin, and (3) protection in case of illness on return to that country, provided such return was in agreement with the German authorities.

Concerning benefits and services while employed in Germany, the agreements restated the principle of treatment on an equal footing with German nationals. Furthermore, the agreements provided that membership with the insurance funds of the sending country (France, Norway, Denmark) was to be continued, whereas contribution payments to these funds were to be stopped for the duration of employment in Germany. In the event of illness of foreign workers while at home, either temporarily during a vacation, or permanently with the con-

fact that reference has frequently been made to the decree of February 13, 1939 on protection of labor for tasks of particular political importance (*Sicherstellung des Kräftebedarfs für Aufgaben von besonderer staatspolitischer Bedeutung*). See *Reichsgesetzblatt,* 1939, I, S. 206.

[10] Agreement of December 12, 1940, *RABl.*, 1941, No. 8, II, p. 115.

[11] Agreement of April 30, 1941, *RABl.*, 1941, No. 14, II, pp. 178-79.

[12] Agreement of October 14, 1941, *RABl.*, 1942, No. 9, II, p. 184; also pp. 216-22, article by Bogs on the German-French agreement of October 14, 1941, on social insurance.

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sent of the German authorities, the various *branch offices of the German sickness funds* for the different countries were responsible for payment of benefits and services. These branch offices had been established by German sickness funds [13] for the various occupied territories, in Paris, Brussels, the Hague, Copenhagen, Oslo, Belgrade and Riga. They worked as liaison offices between the German sickness funds and the occupied territories. Unless otherwise decreed they were responsible for providing benefits and services in case of sickness (*Krankenhilfe*) to all persons in the occupied territories who were covered under the German insurance code.[14] On request, payments in case of sickness were to be made by the Danish, the Norwegian and the French sickness funds.[15] Scope of coverage, amount of benefits, and duration of services in Norway, Denmark and occupied France were regulated according to the German insurance codes, while workers from "unoccupied" France [16] were entitled to benefits and services to the extent provided by French law. The agreements also provided that foreign funds in occupied countries, which made payments on behalf of foreign workers covered by German insurance, should be reimbursed to the extent to which payments would have been made under the law of the respective country.

In the event of illness the families of workers transferred to Germany for employment were protected at first by various orders [17] and regulations, and later by specific agreements with different countries. The early attention paid to this problem was one part of the campaign to augment the German labor

[13] Certain German sickness funds had been made responsible for sickness insurance in occupied territories by orders of July 3, July 10 and August 22, 1940. See Bogs, in *RABl.*, 1941, No. 3, II, pp. 47-52; also 1943, No. 8, II, pp. 110-16, article by Bogs on regulations concerning social insurance provisions in the occupied territories.

[14] Order of December 24, 1940, *RABl.*, 1941, No. 2, II, p. 20.

[15] The Danish agreement of 1940 was supplemented by another agreement of February 24, 1942, providing that in case of sickness following an accident the German sickness funds were to be responsible as long as the workers remained in Germany, thereafter the Danish funds.

[16] The term refers to the part of France occupied late in 1942.

[17] July 3, 1940, *RABl.*, 1940, No. 20, II, p. 214; July 7, 1940, *ibid.*, No. 21, II, p. 249.

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force and to increase the willingness of foreign workers to enlist for employment in Germany.

The main order of September 28, 1940 [18] provided that family members (*Angehörige*) receive medical care, treatment, medicine and, if necessary, hospital treatment, in general to an extent equal to the benefits to which the families would have been entitled under the national insurance laws of the respective occupied territories. Furthermore, this order stated that, for the purpose of sickness benefits, periods of insurance with sickness funds in the occupied territories were to be treated as insurance periods spent under German law. Sickness benefits and services were to be granted by the German insurance funds through mediation of the various branch offices that had been established in the occupied territories. As far as possible medical assistance to family members was to be assured by the German federation of physicians of sickness funds. In occupied territories, with sickness insurance comparable to the German system and institutions, benefits and services might be provided by the national sickness insurance funds in the different occupied countries.

These general regulations were amplified and confirmed by the agreements with Denmark, with Norway and with France, which we have previously mentioned. Under these agreements [19] the national laws of the respective country determined the scope of coverage, the amount and the duration of benefits available for the dependents of workers transferred for work to Germany. For expenses incurred, the national sickness funds in Denmark, Norway and France were to be reimbursed from the German sickness funds within certain specified limits.

[18] *RABl.*, 1940, No. 28, II, pp. 353-54.

[19] The agreement with Denmark of December 1940 provided that Danish law determined the amount of benefits and services available. The agreement with Norway of April 1941 provided that Norwegian law determined scope of coverage, amount and duration of benefits for the family members. Through the agreement with France of October 1941 the bilateral treaty which had existed between France and Germany was explicitly abandoned. Care for family members was limited to the extent to which the family members were protected under the French system. French institutes were responsible for making available services and benefits.

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How were insurance rights under old-age and invalidity insurance protected during employment of foreign workers in Germany? Workers who came from France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Poland had been covered, in general, under comparable systems in their native countries. Treatment on an equal footing with German nationals implied the duty to make contribution payments under the various pension systems in Germany. The transfer to Germany raised, therefore, two problems mentioned before: first, the problem of protection of acquired rights and, secondly, the problem of protection of rights in the course of acquisition. Efforts to grapple with these difficulties have been reported for French and for Dutch workers up to June 1943.[20]

Regulations for Dutch workers appeared in a decree of the Dutch Minister of Social Affairs of February 20, 1941,[21] followed by an order of the German Minister of Labor of April 23, 1941.[22] Order and decree provided that Dutch workers who have been employed both in the Netherlands and in Germany are entitled to preliminary benefits, if they have fulfilled the eligibility requirements under the Dutch insurance law, as well as certain conditions specified in the decrees. These conditions were: official placement for employment in Germany after December 31, 1936; coverage under the German pension systems; and a record showing insurance periods both in Germany and in the Netherlands. Regardless of contribution payments made to the German funds, the insured Dutch workers have no claim against German funds; they are entitled to only one benefit to be claimed from the Dutch insurance institution.[23] For ascertaining claims and computation of benefits, insurance

[20] The *Reichsarbeitsblatt* from which information for this article was secured was available until June 1943; consequently the information is incomplete.

[21] *RABl.*, 1941, No. 13, II, p. 163.

[22] *Ibid.*, p. 162. See also article by Bogs on preliminiary regulations between Dutch and German pension insurance, *ibid.*, pp. 171-74.

[23] In the German order of April 1941 reimbursement of part of the payments made by the Dutch National Insurance Bank is provided in so far as the benefit amount was increased by inclusion of employment in Germany in insurance periods.

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periods in the Netherlands and in Germany are to be added together; benefits thereafter have to be computed as if the worker had always been employed in the Netherlands.[24]

The German-French agreement of October 1941 [25] was governed by almost identical principles, as far as old-age and survivors' insurance regulations were concerned. Though contribution payments to the German funds were required, no rights were to accrue from such payments to the German insurance institutes. The French workers who worked in Germany were entitled to only one benefit which was to be claimed from the French funds. Like the regulations for the Netherlands, the agreement provided for reimbursement of a limited amount of the benefits.

While workers transferred to Germany from the western and northern occupied territories, and even from Poland,[26] were covered under the German social insurance provisions during employment in the Reich, an entirely different policy was applied in the case of the *eastern workers*.[27] Under the order of June 30, 1942 [28] which provided for special employment relations (*ein Beschäftigungsverhältnis eigener Art*), workers from occupied territories in Soviet Russia were put outside the scope of German social insurance, while employed in Germany. This regulation was specifically restated by an order of the German

[24] The regulations applied also to German workers who had been employed in the Netherlands and returned to Germany (*Rückwanderer*). It seems noteworthy that this part of the regulations differs essentially from the provisions for the Dutch workers: German workers have been assured claims against both the German and the Dutch funds.

[25] This agreement was supplemented by the agreement of May 1943, *RABl.*, 1943, No. 17-18, II, not available for study. In computing benefits the French funds are required to add together insurance periods recorded under the French and the German systems and to treat the worker as if he had been entirely employed under the French law.

[26] Polish workers employed in Germany are almost entirely deprived of protection by labor legislation, but are covered by social insurance.

[27] The term refers to all non-German workers recruited after June 22, 1941 by German services for employment in Germany from eastern occupied territories other than Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Galicia, the General Government of Poland, or the Bialystock district. *RABl.*, 1942, No. 22, I, p. 434.

[28] *Ibid.*, p. 322.

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Minister of Labor on August 19, 1942.[29] However, since lack of care in case of illness might not only impair the working capacity of the workers themselves but also endanger other workers, eventually exposed to contagious diseases, a special scheme for medical assistance had to be devised.

Under this system provision was made for medical aid, treatment, medicines and, in case of need, for hospital treatment. It excluded cash benefits, with the exception of cases where workers received room and board; under such conditions benefits were to be paid to the employer. By decrees of March 1943 [30] assistance in case of accidents was also provided. Assistance in case of sickness as well as in the event of accidents was to be provided by the respective German insurance institutions.

The national social insurance law of the occupied country was not maintained in Poland.[31] In former Polish territories the insurance system was abolished and replaced by measures of assistance based on a means test.

In considering the various steps taken it should be remembered that, like the peoples of the western territories, Poland's industrial population had been protected by a comprehensive system of sickness, old-age, invalidity and survivors' insurance, for both workers and employees,[32] and furthermore by compulsory unemployment insurance. After an early decree of October 17, 1939 [33] had provided for the continuation of the existing Polish system, a fundamental change was made by a decree of March 7, 1940.[34] On the basis of this decree all claims and benefits from Polish social insurance were cancelled, regardless of the date at which they originated. Benefits and services from social insurance were replaced by measures of assist-

[29] *Ibid.*, No. 25, II, p. 466.

[30] *RABl.*, 1943, No. 10, II, p. 149. See also article by Bogs on sickness and accident insurance of eastern workers, *ibid.*, No. 11, II, pp. 163-70.

[31] The national insurance laws were also abolished in Alsace, Lorraine and the Yugoslavian territories; these measures are being discussed at a later stage.

[32] Social Security Board, *op. cit.*, pp. 16-17, 36-37, 50-51.

[33] Stamm, in *RABl.*, 1940, No. 14, V, pp. 217-19.

[34] *Ibid.*, No. 12, II, pp. 124-25.

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ance (*Unterstützungen*) of a limited amount. Originally this change in law applied to the entire population, Polish and non-Polish inhabitants. In order to reduce the severity for the German workers the decree provided for differential treatment regarding amount of assistance and other services between Poles and Jews on the one hand and German *Volkszugehörige* [35] on the other hand. The latter, according to the provisions of the decree of March 1940, were entitled to assistance fully equal to the amount of benefits to which they had been entitled under the former social insurance system. For the remainder, that is the majority of the inhabitants, assistance was to be granted according to very restrictive principles. Hospital care, in case of sickness, would be permitted only as an exception, if indispensable (*unumgänglich notwendig*) according to the special physical examination. Cash benefit after a means test might be granted up to the minimum amount previously provided under insurance law.

The changes and severe reductions in the amount of assistance for invalidity and old age provided under the decree affected particularly salaried employees whose average monthly benefits had amounted to about 100 zloties, the upper limit for assistance according to the new regulations being 60 zloties.

Although benefits as a matter of right were abolished, the decree maintained the other essential feature of an insurance system, contribution payments by workers and employers. Non-compliance on the part of the employers in notifying the authorities of all employment subject to the former Polish insurance system was threatened with heavy penalties. The funds raised by means of contributions were expected not only to be self-sufficient and self-supporting as far as assistance was concerned, but also to yield a surplus to the insurance institutes.

The existing German social insurance laws were in general applicable only in Germany proper; outside the country their application has been limited to Germans who are employed in

[35] By decree of January 29, 1940, persons were to be considered German *Volkszugehörige*, regardless of nationality, who professed to be German and whose claims were confirmed by descent, language, demeanor, education, and other circumstances. *RABl.*, 1940, No. 14, V, p. 218.

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an undertaking which has been extended from Germany into a foreign country. Maintenance of this principle during the war would have deprived of insurance protection in case of sickness all workers who were transferred to the occupation areas. To avoid such a situation, decrees regarding sickness insurance for these groups were issued on October 26, 1939 and September 12, 1940. The decrees and orders which regulated social insurance for *German nationals* and *Volkszugehörige* seem to have served a twofold purpose: (1) they provided medical care and treatment in case of illness for workers away from home; (2) through extension of the area in which German insurance provisions were to be applied they assured continuity of insurance periods and thus protected the insured persons against loss or impairment of benefit rights under the various types of pension insurance. The decrees of August 4, 1941 [36] and February 10, 1943 [37] provided for application of German law to German nationals and persons on an equal footing,[38] employed in occupied territories, in so far as they had not been employed in the territories prior to German occupation.[39] The term "occupied territories" as used in these decrees does not include Denmark, Rumania, the General Government of Poland, Yugoslavia (referred to as the territory of *Untersteiermark*), Alsace, Lorraine or Luxemburg.[40] Compulsory insurance provisions are to be based on the laws in force in the *Altreich*,[41] with the exception of insurance of per-

[36] *RABl.*, 1941, No. 24, II, pp. 319-20; see also *ibid.*, No. 27, II, p. 389, article by Bogs on social insurance in the occupied territories.

[37] *RABl.*, 1943, No. 6, II, pp. 72-73; also Bogs, in *ibid.*, No. 8, II, pp. 110-16.

[38] Persons on an equal footing are the *Volksdeutsche*, i. e., persons eligible for the *Deutsche Volksliste*. Excluded from equality are the nationals of the occupied country, Polish workers from eastern territories, eastern workers (*Ostarbeiter*), i. e., those eastern workers who were transferred to Germany from the eastern territories after June 22, 1941 (Order of Ministry of Labor of August 19, 1942), Jews and gypsies. Bogs, in *RABl.*, 1943, No. 8, II, p. 110.

[39] Persons employed in the territories prior to German occupation are subject to the national insurance systems in these territories.

[40] Bogs, in *RABl.*, 1943, No. 8, II, p. 110.

[41] The term refers to Germany prior to March 1938, i. e., prior to the annexation of Austria.

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sons who were previously employed in Czechoslovakia and Austria, to whom the provisions regulating these territories are to be applied.

Contributions which must be made include those required for the *Reichsstock für Arbeitseinsatz* (unemployment compensation fund). Sickness insurance benefits and services for German workers in occupied territories were to be provided by the branch offices of the responsible German sickness insurance funds which were established, as mentioned earlier, in the various territories after occupation.[42] Accident insurance benefits were provided solely by the occupational mutual assistance associations (*Berufsgenossenschaften*) whose competence has been extended into the occupied territories.

Likewise for matters concerning pension insurance the competence of the Reich salaried employees' and Reich miners' institutions and of four territorial insurance institutions (*Landesversicherungsanstalten*) was extended to cover the occupied territories.[43]

Because of the different policy applied to the inhabitants in the General Government of Poland, the legal status of German nationals and persons on an equal footing was based on special orders and decrees for that area. By the decree of June 17, 1940[44] and the order of October 19, 1940[45] German nationals in the Polish occupied territories were brought under the German insurance system. These early provisions were superseded by a decree of July 9, 1942[46] and regulations of October and November 1942[47] which provided for placement under the German social insurance system not only of German nationals but also of German *Volkszugehörige*[48] in the General Govern-

[42] *RABl.*, 1943, No. 6, II, p. 72; Bogs, in *ibid.*, No. 8, II, p. 110.

[43] Bogs, in *ibid.*, pp. 110-16.

[44] *RABl.*, 1940, No. 19, II, pp. 203-5.

[45] *Ibid.*, No. 30, II, pp. 376-77.

[46] *RABl.*, 1942, No. 21, II, pp. 431-32.

[47] *RABl.*, 1943, No. 1-2, II, pp. 15-17; see also *ibid.*, 1942, No. 27, III, pp. 499-502, article by Bogs on German sickness insurance in the General Government of Poland.

[48] See *supra*, note 35.

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ment of Poland. Insurance periods completed in Poland were to be recognized for computation of benefits; moreover, the decree of November 1942 provided that the scope of coverage, where it was broader according to Polish law, was to be maintained.[49]

II. *Annexed Territories*

Wherever a formal act of annexation established German control of the economic, the social and the legal systems of an annexed country, abolition of the existing social insurance legislation and introduction of the German social insurance codes were only one step in the course of the general policy, and usually a very early one.

In superimposing German social insurance law the intruders were faced with two types of problems: first, problems which arose from differences in legislation; secondly, problems which arose from the fact that persons with acquired benefit rights or rights in the course of acquisition were brought under the coverage of a new system.

As to the first type of problems due to differences in legislation, the introductory social insurance decrees were to take account of four major issues: (1) differences in the scope of coverage; (2) differences with regard to financing, that is, primarily contribution payments; (3) differences in amount of benefits and extent of services; (4) differences with regard to organization.

In considering the comparatively liberal attitude which seemed to govern the regulations for adaptation discussed in the following pages, two facts should constantly be borne in mind. In the first place, attempts were made, as far as the annexed territories were concerned, to win the good will of the individual inhabitant of these territories. This goal might well be impaired if measures were introduced at the outset which put a person materially on a lower level, for instance,

[49] Benefits and services, according to the decree of June 1940, were to be determined according to German law: insurance periods spent under Polish law were to be recognized for computation. Protection under accident insurance was to be restricted to workers employed in undertakings connected with the German administration in the General Government of Poland.

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by depriving him of benefits or curtailing them. Secondly, the German authorities knew that liberal social insurance provisions reduce the costs of other forms of public aid and provide funds for aid through an accepted system of contributions (earmarked indirect taxes); they are, therefore, in the interest of the governing authority.

These considerations may account for the fact that, in various orders and decrees regulating the application of the German code, scope of coverage and provisions regarding benefits and services were treated differently. The policy underlying the various decrees on scope of coverage was to maintain the existing scope where it was broader than the German coverage.[50] As far as benefits and services were concerned, the German code determined in general the standard of benefits arising out of claims which were not settled as of a certain date prior to annexation.

In regard to measures for overcoming legislative and administrative differences between Germany and the annexed territory, the various decrees and orders exhibit great similarity. Comparison of early and more recent attempts to solve the problem of protection of insurance rights reveals significant differences.[51]

The second type of problems bears some similarity to problems with which pre-war bilateral treaties were concerned, when nationals from one country secured employment in another country, and raises the question of the extent to which

[50] The wider scope of coverage in various branches of social insurance was due (1) to nonexistence of an upper wage limit for compulsory insurance; or (2) to a higher wage limit; (3) to the fact that in the younger social insurance systems exemptions from compulsory insurance were sometimes narrower.

[51] It should be mentioned in this connection that changes in the German social insurance system which have recently been made apply in the newly annexed territories. Although this policy seems to follow from the general concept regarding the inhabitants of these territories, on the part of Germany it seemed to require special mention and emphasis. As an example, the extension of sickness insurance to war widows and orphans in Germany by decree of April 20, 1939 (*RGBl.*, 1939, I, p. 791) may be referred to. It applies likewise to war widows and orphans in annexed territories (order of September 23, 1940, *RABl.*, 1940, No. 27, II, p. 340).

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the principles of such treaties have been followed in framing the laws on which transition was to be based.

In the following paragraphs social insurance provisions are presented for the following areas: Austria,[52] Czechoslovakia, the eastern annexed territories, and the western annexed territories.

The German invaders in Austria found this situation with regard to social insurance: a system of sickness insurance for workers and salaried employees; old-age and invalidity insurance for the latter, while for workers the provisions on old-age and invalidity insurance of the Act of 1935 had not yet been put into effect. Furthermore, a broad system of accident insurance and of miners' pension insurance was in existence.

The fact that the workers' old-age and invalidity insurance system had not become effective by 1938 was taken up in the first decree on social legislation for this area.[53] Article VI of a decree of March 26, 1938 provided for introduction of this branch of insurance, but other measures did not seem so urgent in view of the great similarity between Austrian and German law in this field.[54]

The final introduction of the German social insurance codes in Austria was regulated by a number of orders and decrees[55] which exemplify the application of the general policy and principles already outlined. First, they provided that the coverage according to Austrian law should be preserved for

[52] Early orders and decrees refer to Austria; later regulations refer to "Ostmark" and to the *Alpen and Donau Gaue* (Alpe and Danube districts).

[53] *RABl.*, 1938, No. 10, I, p. 86.

[54] Fischer-Dieskau, "Sozialpolitische Aufbau- und Angleichungsarbeit in der Ostmark", in *ibid.*, No. 22, II, pp. 245-49.

[55] Decree of December 22, 1938, *RABl.*, 1939, No. 1, IV, pp. 6-10; decree of February 9, 1939, *ibid.*, No. 6, IV, p. 85; decrees of February 5, 1940, *ibid.*, 1940, No. 5, II, pp. 59-64, 65-67. These decrees were supplemented by numerous orders and decrees so that, as of June 1943, the pension insurance system in Austria was based on twelve laws and decrees, twenty-two orders of the Minister of Labor, and two instructions of the National Insurance Institute (*Reichsversicherungsanstalt*). *Cf.* Arthur Rudolph, article on special regulations for pension insurance and the Alpe and Danube districts, *RABl.*, 1943, No. 17-18, II.

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compulsory sickness insurance, miners' insurance, and old-age and invalidity insurance of salaried employees, who had been insured as of December 31, 1938, if the scope was broader than under the German social insurance laws. The same rule applied to accident insurance, which in 1939 was much more comprehensive in Austria than in Germany.[56] Finally, sickness insurance for recipients of pensions from salaried employees' insurance and for pensioners of old-age assistance was maintained, a provision which implied that contributions were to be deducted from the benefits or pensions.

Secondly, the general rule was established that German law should determine the amount of benefits and services where claims were not settled as of January 1, 1939 and for all new claims after December 1938. Where claims were settled prior to January 1939 and where benefits were being paid, the benefit amount as of the date of transition was to be paid by German funds according to the provisions of the *Austrian law*. As far as benefits from pension insurance were granted, the place of employment, and not the place of origin, determined such benefits[57] in the Austrian annexed territories.

Benefits for salaried employees were more liberal under Austrian than under German insurance law. In order to bridge over the differences and to maintain the higher level of benefits, rates of contributions were changed and workers were put into a higher wage class (which implied payment of higher contributions). Protection of acquired rights in the various pension insurance systems was effectuated by establishing the rule that qualifying periods (*Anwartschaften*) were to be considered as having been maintained until December 31, 1938. As for waiting periods, insurance periods under the Austrian system and under the German system are to be added together.

With regard to computation of benefits for workers from pension insurance under German law, the regulations provided that periods of insurance under the compulsory sickness in-

[56] By an act of March 9, 1942 the scope of the German accident insurance system has been broadened. *International Labour Review* (1942), vol. 46, No. 3, p. 356.

[57] Rudolph, in *RABl.*, 1943, No. 17-18, II.

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surance system in Austria should be regarded as Austrian periods of previous employment (*Vordienstzeiten*). Supplementary regulations provided for simplified computation of benefits by making the assumption that fifty-two weeks of insurance were completed, where a four weeks' period could be proved within a certain year.[58]

The differences between the German and the Austrian law with respect to the distribution in the share of contributions to insurance between employees and employers were settled by the rule that the contributions should be shared equally in all branches according to Austrian law. Under the decree it was explicitly provided that contributions should also be made to the unemployment insurance fund (*Beiträge zum Arbeitsstock*).

As far as administration and organization were concerned, the following policy was applied, a policy which later was established in all areas where German law was introduced: (1) to dissolve and abolish insurance institutes in insurance branches for which Germany had central institutions, that is, for old-age and invalidity insurance of salaried employees,[59] and for miners' insurance and for unemployment insurance; (2) to adapt the existing decentralized insurance funds for sickness insurance to conform with German institutions. In order to carry out these principles it was decreed that the sickness insurance funds be transformed to correspond to the German pattern, part of the duties and responsibilities of the Austrian funds being transferred to the newly established territorial insurance institutes (*Landesversicherungsanstalten*); that in accident insurance the existing Austrian insurance bodies be dissolved and their duties be transferred to the German institutions (*Berufsgenossenschaften*); that duties,

[58] An exception to the rule that benefits and services for claims after December 31, 1938, should be determined according to German law was made regarding duration of medical care under sickness insurance: services of sickness funds might be extended to one year.

[59] In countries with insurance institutes for workers' invalidity and old-age insurance, such institutes were dissolved and replaced by the National Insurance Institute (*Reichsversicherungsanstalt*).

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rights and obligations of the Austrian pension insurance institutions be transferred to the German salaried employees' insurance institute (*Reichsversicherungsanstalt für Angestellte*) and the existing Austrian institutions for pension insurance of salaried employees be abolished; that the same policy be applied to the miners' insurance institute in Austria, and that a district institute of the German mining corporation (*Reichsknappschaft*) be established in Austria.

The financial aspects involved in superimposing German law were regulated in Austria by the decree of February 9, 1939 [60] supplemented by two decrees in February 1940.[61] The regulations provided for the distribution of the funds from the various dissolved Austrian insurance institutes among the German salaried employees' institute, the mining corporation, and the newly organized territorial institutes. The decree of 1939 provided that all funds of the Austrian insurance institute for salaried employees were to be transferred to the German salaried employees' insurance institute (*Reichsversicherungsanstalt für Angestellte*); likewise almost all the funds—except funds earmarked for sickness benefits—of the insurance institute for employees in agriculture and forestry, as well as for journalists and pharmacists, were to be transferred. Furthermore, 15 million Reichsmark of the funds of the workers' insurance institute were transferred to the newly established territorial insurance institutes and 1.2 million Reichsmark to the miners' insurance institute in Germany.

The policy which governed social insurance law in the Czechoslovak Republic differed according to the degree of control which Germany exercised in the various territories into which the country was broken up after occupation. The Czechoslovakian law was maintained for the Protectorate of Bohemia-Moravia and for the Slovak Republic; German social insurance laws were introduced into the *Sudetengau*. Workers and employees in the Czechoslovak Republic, as in Austria, had been covered, prior to the invasion, by sickness and old-age

[60] *RABl.*, 1939, No. 6, IV, pp. 85 *et seq.*

[61] *RABl.*, 1940, No. 5, II, pp. 59-64, 65-67.

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and invalidity insurance, the latter being in force for both workers and salaried employees. A bilateral treaty between Germany and Czechoslovakia assured equality of treatment under social insurance legislation to the nationals of the two contracting countries in the event of employment in the other country.

The discussion in the following paragraphs is concerned with the relations regarding social insurance between Germany and the Protectorate of Bohemia-Moravia; and with the measures applied for the *Sudetengau* and other annexed territories, formerly in Czechoslovakia.

Regulations for the Protectorate of Bohemia-Moravia were announced in two agreements of July 22, 1939[62] and March 14, 1940.[63] The first agreement, concerning the sickness funds for the two countries, regulated the application of benefits from German sickness insurance funds to certain groups of persons outside the Reich. It provided that benefits might be paid at the place of residence in Bohemia-Moravia to four groups of persons: (1) persons born in Bohemia-Moravia insured with a German fund; (2) families of such persons; (3) German nationals temporarily employed in Bohemia-Moravia; and (4) families of these persons. Payments are to be made by the national sickness insurance funds (that is, the Czechoslovak funds) on the basis of regulations regarding amount and duration of medical care and the scope of coverage governing these funds. For expenses incurred, the district funds in the Protectorate are to be reimbursed by the German funds on the basis of provisions established in the agreement.

An almost identical agreement was concluded, covering the German funds and the funds of the Slovakian Republic.[64]

The second agreement between Germany and the Protectorate of Bohemia-Moravia,[65] which was also the backbone of

[62] *RABl.*, 1941, No. 1, II, pp. 6-7.

[63] *RABl.*, 1940, No. 23, II, pp. 286-90, article by W. Dobbernack on regulation of social insurance in the former Czechoslovak territories.

[64] Agreement of September 20, 1939, *RABl.*, 1941, No. 1, II, p. 8.

[65] *RABl.*, 1940, No. 18, II, pp. 186-88.

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the introduction of the German social insurance codes in the *Sudetengau*, was concerned with the transfer of insurance benefits and qualifying periods of persons insured under Czechoslovakian law, and with the financial adjustment (*Finanzausgleich*).[66] With regard to administration of insurance benefits, it provided that they should be carried by German pension and accident insurance institutes for persons who either resided in the Protectorate on January 1, 1940, or had resided there on October 1, 1938 and had moved their residence to Germany thereafter. The insurance funds in the Protectorate of Bohemia-Moravia were responsible for payment of benefits to persons who lived in Czechoslovakia (*Sudetengau*) as of October 1938 but changed their residence to the Protectorate between October 1938 and December 31, 1939.

With regard to protection of benefit rights the agreement provided that each of the contracting parties recognized periods of insurance spent under the insurance system of the other country, as relevant for the ascertaining of waiting and qualifying periods. For all persons who, on the basis of the rules established in the agreement, did not fall within the competence of the German law, the social insurance institutions of the Protectorate of Bohemia-Moravia were held responsible. Benefits and qualifying periods were to be determined according to the regulations of the insurance law which applied in individual cases.

With regard to the "financial adjustment", the agreement provided for a proportionate division of funds corresponding to the distribution of territories between the social insurance institutions of the contracting parties (article 11). Transfer from Czechoslovakian to German funds was required for an amount of more than four billion Czech koruny,[67] this amount being allegedly calculated on the basis of the increased duties which fell on the German insurance institutes. This financial

[66] This agreement was supplemented by the agreement of November 5, 1940 which regulated in great detail the provisions on financial matters, *RABl.*, 1940, No. 32, II, pp. 394-401.

[67] The amount stated was 4,257 million Czech kč. (*RABl.*, 1940, No. 18, II, pp. 186-88). Since the official value of the Czech koruna was at that time .10 Reichsmark, the transfer amounted to about 425 million Reichsmark.

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adjustment should constantly be borne in mind in considering the terms of the comparatively liberal decree of June 27, 1940, regulating social insurance in the *Sudetengau*.[68]

The policy established in the decree of June 1940 in regard to social insurance in the *Sudetengau* embodies principles which are almost identical with those governing the Austrian decrees and orders. This is true with regard to the scope of coverage under sickness and accident insurance and under salaried employees' old-age and invalidity insurance, and with regard to the distribution of contribution payments between employers and workers, and finally with regard to principles governing the computation and determination of benefits for salaried employees.[69]

As to pension insurance for workers, employees and miners, the waiting periods which had been fulfilled under the Czechoslovak law, as of October 1939, were to be considered as having been fulfilled under Reich law for all insurance claims during a transition period. Qualifying periods which had been fulfilled on September 30, 1938 were to be recognized under German law.

Detailed provisions were formulated concerning computation of benefits for workers under old-age and invalidity insurance. Basic benefit amounts and children's allowances were to be determined according to German law; furthermore, the decree provided for recomputation of part of the benefits to be paid by German funds.[70]

Similarity in the benefit levels of salaried employees in Austria and Czechoslovakia resulted in similar methods of determining contribution payments: the salaried employees from Czechoslovakia were reclassified and put in higher contribution

[68] Decree of June 27, 1940, regarding final regulations for introduction of social insurance in the *Sudetengau* and Silesia, *RABl.*, 1940, No. 21, II, pp. 228-39. See also Dobbernack, in *ibid.*, No. 23, II, pp. 286-90.

[69] For the following see Dobbernack, in *RABl.*, 1940, No. 23, II, pp. 286-90, and No. 24, II, pp. 301-6.

[70] Differences in the level of costs of living in Germany and Czechoslovakia (as well as other annexed territories) resulted in entirely inadequate benefits; attempts at adjustments were made through a decree of December 10, 1942 regarding benefits from pension insurance. *RABl.*, 1942, No. 35-36, II, p. 602.

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classes than were applied to employees originally insured under German law.[71]

Special measures regarding the large number of claims of persons who were insured under Czechoslovakian law, and whose claims were pending at the time of transition, were established by order of May 4, 1940,[72] and several subsequent regulations. These decrees and orders defined the competence of insurance courts and agencies on the basis of the residence of the claimants as of certain periods of time determined in the regulations.[73] For persons who had resided in the *Sudetengau*, as of January 1, 1939, German insurance courts and adjudicating agencies were held responsible. Unless otherwise decreed, decisions involving procedure were based on the German law, while benefits were regulated according to the law in force in the Protectorate.[74]

From the outset the policy applied in the annexed eastern territories (*Ostgebiete*)[75] differed essentially from the policy affecting German legislation in Austria, Czechoslovakia and the western territories. In several executive orders on structure and administration in the eastern annexed territories, maintenance of existing legislation was explicitly announced, in so far as this would not interfere with the "incorporation" of the territories into Germany.[76] Further provisions made it clear,

[71] Dobbernack, in *RABl.*, 1940, No. 24, II, p. 304.

[72] *RABl.*, 1940, No. 14, II, pp. 144-45.

[73] *Ibid.*, pp. 154-56, article by Bogs on transfer of pending procedures on social insurance in the former Czechoslovakian territories.

[74] Order of December 14, 1940, *RABl.*, 1941, No. 1, II, pp. 2-3.

[75] This term refers (1) to the *Reichsgau* Danzig-West Prussia; (2) to the *Warthegau;* (3) to parts of East Prussia including former Polish territories forming part of this province; (4) the part of Poland incorporated in Silesia. Originally these territories were reported to include about 9 million Poles and not more than 600,000 Germans; the population of Wartheland alone included about 4,500,000 Poles and about 330,000 Germans. *RABl.*, 1939, No. 30, I, p. 482, and No. 31, I, p. 499; also article by Heller on improvements in pension insurance for the *Volksdeutsche, ibid.*, 1940, No. 35-36, II, pp. 454-55.

[76] Order of October 8, 1939, *RABl.*, 1939, No. 30, I, pp. 482-83; order of October 26, 1939, *ibid.*, No. 31, I, p. 499. This order, which established the introduction of German law in Danzig (par. 9), made it clear that the exclusion of German law applied only where Polish laws were in force.

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however, that this rule was to apply only to Polish laws. In pursuance of this policy the following steps were taken regarding social insurance in the annexed eastern territories: German social insurance codes were introduced, soon after the annexation, in Memel,[77] Danzig,[78] and in the part of Poland which had been included in Silesia.[79] Since the principles set forth in the decrees regarding introduction of the German law were essentially the same as those which had been applied in Austrian and Czechoslovakian territories, no further details are necessary. In other parts of the annexed eastern territories the Polish social insurance laws remained in force for some time. Polish law was furthermore applied to persons from Danzig who had not previously been insured under the Danzig social insurance system.

A uniform rule for contribution payments to the old-age and invalidity insurance system throughout the entire territory was established by a decree of March 27, 1940,[80] authorizing a contribution from the basic wage of 5.5 per cent for the eastern territories; the contribution was to be equally shared by employers and workers, except for low paid workers for whom the employer had to pay the entire contribution.

This bi-legal situation in the eastern territories implied that in the districts under German law all inhabitants, including Poles, were subject to German law, while in the other districts all inhabitants, including Germans, were covered under the Polish law. The benefits granted under Polish workers' pension insurance were lower than benefits under the German system, chiefly because of the difference in the wage level. As a consequence the Germans who either resided in, or were transferred to, the eastern, originally Polish, territories were at a disadvantage as compared with the insured persons in the *Altreich*. Since the Polish benefits soon proved to be inade-

[77] Decrees of May 9, and August 17, 1939, *RABl.*, 1939, No. 15, IV, p. 257, and No. 24, IV, p. 425.

[78] Decree of January 22, 1940, *RABl.*, 1940, No. 5, II, pp. 55-56.

[79] Decree of January 16, 1940, *ibid.*, No. 3, II, p. 32.

[80] *RABl.*, 1940, No. 10, II, pp. 105-6.

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quate[81] under the higher price level in Germany, there might have been serious repercussions on the political aims of the Nazis in the eastern territories, but conditions were changed by an order of the German Minister of Labor of December 4, 1940, which provided for improvement of pension insurance of the *Volksdeutsche*. By this order the differentiation on a *territorial* basis was supplemented by a further differentiation on a *personal* basis within certain areas. Geographically, the measure applied to the former Polish territories included in Danzig-West Prussia, the *Warthegau* and East Prussia. Personally, it applied only to the inhabitants of these territories who were eligible for the German *Volksliste* according to an order of September 12, 1940. For these persons, improvements in benefits from invalidity and old-age insurance were made with regard to both existing benefits "which proved to be insufficient" and to new benefits. For the former, supplementary benefits were provided; for the latter, benefits were to be computed according to the German insurance provisions for the basic amount and children's allowances; for increments, lump sums (*Pauschbeträge*) were provided, varying for different age classes and according to differences in the previous work history and residence. Furthermore, a simplified method was introduced in regard to waiting periods and qualifying periods of insured persons; its principles will be discussed later.

The order of the German Minister of Labor on December 4, 1940 foreshadowed the policy for social insurance in the eastern territories which eventually was put on a permanent basis for all insurance branches by a decree of December 1941.[82] This decree was one step in the process of Germanization to which the incorporated areas have been subjected and by which Poles and Jews were eventually deprived of essential rights still retained by the population of German stock. The decree of December 1941 put on a permanent basis the principle of discriminatory treatment of different groups of the population

[81] Heller, in *RABl.*, 1940, No. 35-36, II, pp. 454-55.

[82] Decree on introduction of German social insurance in the eastern territories, *RABl.*, 1942, No. 1, II, pp. 2-11; also Dobbernack article on same, *ibid.*, No. 3, II, pp. 50-56; No. 4, II, pp. 78-88.

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with regard to social insurance by excluding from coverage: (1) *Schutzangehörige;* that is, former Polish or Danzig nationals who are not eligible for registration with the German *Volksliste;* (2) stateless persons of Polish origin (*Polnischen Volkstums*); (3) persons who lived in the Olsa territory.[83] The decree applied to German nationals, and also to those who might register with the German *Volksliste;* to members from the Protectorate of Bohemia-Moravia; and to foreigners.[84] The general principle of discrimination has been qualified only with regard to contribution payments: they are to be raised according to German law.[85]

With regard to sickness insurance, as well as accident insurance, for the group of persons covered by the decree, the regulations conformed to the same general principles which have been found to govern the introduction of German law in the other annexed territories.[86]

With regard to pension insurance the decree departed from the principles followed in other areas in several respects. Following the pattern set in the order of December 4, 1940 regarding improvements for pension insurance of *Volksdeutsche,* the determining of waiting periods and qualifying periods was, in general, divorced from the actual work history. Instead it was based on two assumptions. The first assumption was that

[83] In this former Czechoslovakian territory the provisions in force for the *Sudetengau* are to be applied.

[84] For some persons of Polish origin an exception has been made with regard to coverage by the German codes. They are (1) persons especially selected for the German *Volksliste*; (2) persons who resided in the Reich on September 1, 1939 (*Alteingesessene Polen*). *RABl.*, 1942, No. 20, II, p. 408.

[85] *RABl.*, 1942, No. 3, II, p. 38; also *ibid.*, No. 14, II, p. 194. Contribution payments are required from *Schutzangehörige* and stateless persons of Polish origin, even though they are not entitled to regular benefits (*ibid.*). This contribution duty includes contribution payments for unemployment insurance.

[86] Sickness insurance periods under the Polish system were recognized as periods under German law. Benefits for new claims were determined according to German law; while existing benefits were continued according to the provisions of the Polish system. The same principles applied to accident insurance; they were supported by detailed provisions regarding the recomputation of benefits. All existing insurance institutions and funds for accident insurance and pension insurance were dissolved. For sickness insurance the existing funds were to be transferred on the basis of special regulations.

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a waiting period has been fulfilled for invalidity insurance if a person has reached the age of 25, and for old-age benefits if a person has reached the age of 60, provided the person has been previously employed and insured in the eastern territories. Only for cases which did not fall under the general assumptions were Polish insurance contributions to be recognized as equal to contributions to the German system. The second assumption concerned qualifying periods: they were to be considered as having been fulfilled as of a certain date (set in the decree) if persons proved that they had worked for 130 weeks (30 months, that is, half of the time) during the past five years. This departure from the original policy regarding protection of insurance rights has been described as an "administrative simplification and a liberal regulation for the insured person" and furthermore as a "new method which was needed because of loss of records and language difficulties." [87]

For the persons not covered under the German insurance law, the Polish insurance system remained in force until August 1942. As of August 26, 1942 [88] an order on measures of assistance for *Schutzangehörige* and stateless persons of Polish origin was issued, which put an end to the insurance system and replaced it—along lines similar to those in the General Government of Poland—by relief measures.

The list of annexed countries and areas which underwent changes in their insurance laws would be incomplete without making reference to Eupen, Malmédy, Moresnet. After annexation German social insurance codes were introduced by several decrees,[89] applying essentially the same policy as in the other annexed areas.

The insurance institutes which existed for employees' and workers' pension insurance were dissolved and their functions taken over by the German institutes. An exception was made for sickness insurance.

[87] Dobbernack, in *RABl.*, 1942, No. 4, II, pp. 78 *et seq.*

[88] *RABl.*, 1942, No. 25, II, p. 469. This issue of the periodical was not available for review when this article was written.

[89] Decree of May 23, 1940, *RABl.*, 1940, No. 16, I, p. 250; decree of November 11, 1940, *ibid.*, No. 34, II, p. 418; decree of May 9, 1941, *ibid.*, 1941, No. 16, II, pp. 204-6.

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III. *Quasi-Annexed Territories*

The national social insurance systems were replaced by German social insurance codes not only in the annexed territories but in certain occupied areas which were put under special civilian government.

The German social insurance codes were introduced in Luxemburg on October 1, 1940;[90] in Lorraine[91] and in Alsace[92] on January 1, 1941; in certain parts of Yugoslavia (*Untersteiermark*) in 1942.[93] In all these instances the German social insurance codes were superimposed on countries which at the time had not been annexed by formal act and were, even according to German interpretation, not "incorporated" (*eingegliedert*) according to the "principles of public law".[94] Social insurance legislation was applied as a path maker, a concept which was substantiated by the fact that one and a half years after the introduction of the German legislation in the western territories, in August 1942, a decree regulating the nationality status of part of the inhabitants of Luxemburg, Lorraine and Alsace was issued.[95]

In these three territories the decrees, introducing social insurance legislation according to German codes, were issued by the Chief of the Civilian Government and almost simultaneously supplemented by orders of the German Minister of Labor concerning the "coöperation of the German insurance institutions with the agencies and institutions of the occupied areas".[96]

[90] Decree of September 30, 1940, on social insurance in Luxemburg, *RABl.*, 1941, No. 4, II, pp. 54-55.

[91] Decree of October 19, 1940, on social insurance in Lorraine, *ibid.*, pp. 57-58.

[92] Decree of December 28, 1940, on social insurance in Alsace, *ibid.*, pp. 59-61.

[93] Decree of July 28, 1942, on social insurance in the *Untersteiermark*, *ibid.*, 1943, No. 4, II, pp. 46 *et seq.*

[94] Bogs, in *RABl.*, 1943, No. 8, II, pp. 110-16.

[95] Decree of August 23, 1942, *RABl.*, 1942, No. 29, II, pp. 514-15.

[96] Order of October 1, 1940, for Luxemburg, *RABl.*, 1941, No. 4, II, p. 56; order of December 24, 1940, for Alsace and Lorraine, *ibid.*, pp. 62-63.

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Although the similarity between the German law and the laws in the western areas was emphasized in submitting to the public the proposition of inclusion under the German system, the large number of orders and regulations which followed the original decrees exemplified the difficulties which had to be faced by the controlling power.[97] As of March 1942, eleven decrees had been issued for Luxemburg; and the development was similar for Alsace and Lorraine.

Although modified according to the differences in the national laws which were abolished, the policy and principles adopted with regard to scope of coverage, determination of benefits and treatment of previous periods of compulsory insurance were in general comparable to the policy and methods discussed with regard to Austria and Czechoslovakia. For Luxemburg the introduction of the German code implied the establishing of new branches of insurance; for example, miners' insurance and unemployment insurance.[98]

As was the case in the annexed territories, German social insurance institutions for the various types of pension insurance were made responsible for these insurance branches in the occupied territories; the existing foreign sickness insurance funds were to be adapted to the pattern of German funds; other foreign insurance institutions were dissolved.

In the Yugoslav territory the pattern applied in introducing German law differed with regard to the institutions: a special agency was established in Marburg on the Drava, which was to carry out the social insurance measures for the area.[99] In general, the introductory decree of July 28, 1942 went back explicitly to the decree regarding introduction of German codes in Austria, but with the important qualification that Yugoslav law was excluded from application where reference was made to former Austrian law. The decree, following the policy

[97] Bruno Rauecker, article on introduction of German social insurance codes in Alsace and Lorraine, *RABl.*, 1941, No. 1, II, pp. 13-16. Also Hoffmann, article on social insurance in Luxemburg, *RABl.*, 1942, No. 18, II, pp. 375-80.

[98] Hoffmann, in *RABl.*, 1942, No. 18, II, pp. 375 *et seq.*

[99] *Überleitungsstelle*, decree of July 29, 1942, paragraph 4, *RABl.*, 1943, No. 4, II, pp. 46 *et seq.*

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adopted in the annexed eastern territories, discriminated between *Schutzangehörige* and other persons: the former were to be subject to special regulations. Different in its method from the decree for Austria, the decree for *Untersteiermark* provided for a complete scale of contributions for different groups of insured persons and different branches of insurance. The total contributions thus provided vary from 10-11 per cent for agricultural workers to 21 per cent for salaried employees. A second decree of January 31, 1943 [100] supplemented the original regulations.

In the foregoing paragraphs an attempt has been made to present the development which has taken place during the war in the field of social insurance in Nazi-controlled European countries. The facts revealed in the legislative measures have significance from two different aspects: first, with regard to the *immediate* conditions to which the peoples in Europe were subject in the event of income loss because of sickness or accident; second, with regard to the *future* conditions which will be found after the occupied and annexed countries are liberated and their national governments restored.

With regard to the first aspect the following facts seem important: (1) Of the two different methods of public aid between which the Nazis could choose, the policy of relief, dependent upon a means test, was adopted whenever the treatment of the subjugated territory and people was intended to be severe and humiliating, as in the case of Poland and the eastern workers. Implied in this policy is the high value generally attributed to social insurance by European workers, a fact which it might be well to remember in view of the mass need for public aid which, at least temporarily, will be faced in post-war Europe. (2) In an endeavor to use all possible means for enhancing the transfer of foreign labor to Germany, insurance protection in the event of illness or injury during the period of employment in Germany has been assured to foreign workers. But such legal protection, as was con-

[100] *RABl.*, 1943, No. 8, II, p. 103.

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ceded, was by no means identical with actual protection. There is evidence that such protection was apparent rather than real. Neglect of the pledge to foreign workers is indicated in numerous instructions to sickness funds to be aware of their responsibility—in the interest of making full use of available labor. In order to provide adequate health service to French workers in Germany the General Commissariat for French workers in Germany was authorized to requisition doctors, pharmacists and dentists to be sent to Germany.[101] (3) The promptness with which social insurance measures were considered and acted upon, once a territory was subjugated, is another noticeable feature of present conditions. For large population groups who were dependent, either entirely or partially, upon benefits from some type of insurance for their livelihood prior to occupation or annexation, insurance may have seemed more expedient than aid based on a means test, both administratively and financially. All decrees covering improvements of insurance benefits should be viewed from an administrative and financial aspect, not from a humanitarian point of view.

With regard to the second aspect, future conditions concerning social insurance in Europe, the administrative changes involved in the introduction of German social insurance codes in annexed and occupied territories involve problems of far-reaching importance. Not unintentionally has the fact been repeated, in the preceding pages, that all national social insurance institutions have been dissolved—except sickness insurance funds—and replaced by German insurance institutes.[102] The practical result of this radical administrative change is that in many countries, complete rebuilding of insurance institutions from the bottom will be required, once hostilities have come to an end. The urgent need for rebuilding the tools of insurance administration will not be questioned in

[101] Act of April 28, 1943. *International Labour Review* (1944), vol. 49, No. 1, p. 49.

[102] The salaried employees' insurance institute and the mining corporation (*Knappschaft*) were put in charge of pension insurance for salaried employees and miners. The territorial institutions took charge of workers' insurance pensions.

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view of the fact that millions of workers have contributed from their wages under Nazi control toward building up insurance rights for old age, unemployment and invalidity.

Inasmuch as German insurance codes were introduced, the policy regarding recognition of insurance periods of waiting and qualifying (partly along the well-known lines of former bilateral treaties, partly in disregarding the actual work history data) and the policy of preserving the scope of coverage in the annexed countries have in general prevented elimination of groups which fell under the national insurance system or the loss of acquired rights from coverage. But little or nothing will be rescued for the future for the millions of insured workers in Austria, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Luxemburg, Lorraine and Alsace unless the full import of the destruction of their national insurance institutions is realized and plans for the rebuilding of these institutions are made in the immediate future, so that they will be ready to operate at the earliest possible moment.

Another urgent problem concerning future conditions needs consideration. It seems likely that the strain of work and general labor conditions in Germany's war production, in which most of the employable nationals of annexed territories were absorbed, will have seriously affected the rate of disability, invalidity and death among these workers. This means that the proportion of disabled persons and survivors of insured persons may far exceed the average proportion on which distribution and amount of contributions and benefits have been based in a pre-war pension system. Implied in changes in the basic conditions regarding invalidity and scope of survivors' insurance is the fact that detailed regulations concerning protection of acquired insurance rights may be of little significance unless supplemented by consideration of new methods for the financing of the insurance systems.

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ABRAHAM LINCOLN BECOMES A REPUBLICAN

THE passage of Senator Stephen A. Douglas' Kansas-Nebraska Act in 1854—with its repeal of the Missouri Compromise—marked a turning point in the life of Abraham Lincoln. At the time he was a leader of the anaemic Whig party of Illinois; and "his profession [of law] had almost superseded the thought of politics in his mind, when the repeal of the Missouri Compromise aroused him as he had never been before." [1]

Although he opposed the extension of slavery into the territories, Lincoln was essentially conservative on the slavery question. His conservatism becomes more accentuated when it is compared with the advanced anti-slavery views of his staunch friend and law partner, William H. Herndon.[2] By 1854 Herndon was ready to follow such radicals as Owen Lovejoy and Ichabod Codding into the Republican party, but Lincoln merely voiced disapproval of the Missouri Compromise repeal and called for election of "Anti-Nebraska" men to Congress, when he took the stump that year for Richard Yates for governor.[3]

The embryonic Illinois Republican party of 1854, started by Lovejoy and Codding, stood for anti-slavery extremism.[4] The central and southern regions of the state, settled largely

[1] John G. Nicolay and John Hay (ed.), *Complete Works of Abraham Lincoln* (New York, 1905, Gettysburg Edition), VI, 37.

[2] Joseph Fort Newton, *Lincoln and Herndon* (Cedar Rapids, Iowa, 1910), pp. 51, 72-126; Henry Steele Commager, *Theodore Parker* (Boston, 1936), pp. 250, 261-266; Herndon to Charles Sumner, March 6, June 20, 1856, Charles Sumner Papers, Widener Library, Harvard University.

[3] Bloomington (Ill.) *Weekly Pantagraph*, September 20, 1854, in Paul M. Angle (ed.), *New Letters and Papers of Lincoln* (Boston and New York, 1930), pp. 134-137.

[4] James L. Sellers, "The Make-up of the Early Republican Party", *Transactions of the Illinois State Historical Society*, 1930, p. 41. For Lovejoy's and Codding's part in starting the Republican party in October 1854, see Paul Selby, "Republican State Convention, Springfield, Ill., Oct. 4-5, 1854", *Transactions of the McLean County Historical Society* (1900), III, 43-47.

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by Southerners,[5] looked suspiciously upon the Republican party.[6] Lincoln had no intention of throwing in his lot with the new organization at this time. Herndon has recorded that "Mr. Lincoln was not a speculative-minded man; was, like Washington, severely practical; he never ran in advance of his age, and yet was always directing the ideas and feelings of men to purely practical ends, to something that would end in good."[7] But Herndon appointed himself Lincoln's political guardian.[8] During this campaign of 1854, as Lincoln stumped for Yates and preached Anti-Nebraska doctrine, Herndon protected him against all attempts to draw him into the Republican party. Lovejoy, Codding, and their associates had called their convention to meet in Springfield on October 4-5, to organize a state Republican party. Lincoln, who was in town delivering an Anti-Nebraska blast at Douglas, was invited to be one of the speakers.[9] Herndon later confessed: "Strong as I was in the faith, yet I doubted the propriety of Lincoln's taking any stand yet. As I viewed it, he was ambitious to climb to the United States Senate, and on grounds of policy it would not do for him to occupy at that time such advanced ground as we were taking. On the other hand, it was equally as dangerous to refuse a speech for the Abolitionists."[10]

Herndon saved Lincoln from the embarrassment of the Republican invitation by proposing that the future Great Emancipator leave town immediately, until the Republican convention was over. This Lincoln did at once, departing from Spring-

[5] John D. Barnhart, "The Southern Influence in the Formation of Illinois", *Journal of the Illinois State Historical Society* (September 1939), XXXII, 358-378; Solon J. Buck, *Illinois in 1818* (Springfield, Ill., 1917), pp. 93-95.

[6] Angle, *op. cit.*, p. 166.

[7] Herndon to ———, Jan. 15, 1874, in Emanuel Hertz (ed.), *The Hidden Lincoln, from the Letters and Papers of William H. Herndon* (New York, 1938), pp. 82-83.

[8] "William Herndon hated slavery and loved his law partner, Abraham Lincoln." Commager, *op. cit.*, p. 149.

[9] Selby, in *Trans. of McLean Co. Hist. Soc.* (1900), III, 43-47; Paul Selby, "Genesis of the Republican Party in Illinois", *Publications of the Illinois State Historical Society* (1906), No. 11, pp. 270 *et seq.*; Horace White, "Abraham Lincoln in 1854", *Trans. of the Ill. State Hist. Soc.*, 1908, p. 35.

[10] Paul M. Angle (ed.), *Herndon's Life of Lincoln* (New York, 1930), p. 299.

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field under pretense of having business in Tazewell County; he did not return until Lovejoy, Codding, and their fellow-abolitionists had disbanded their "Republican" convention.[11]

Lincoln himself later explained the incident:

> There was a call for a convention to form a Republican party at Springfield, and I think that my friend Mr. Lovejoy, who is here upon this stand, had a hand in it. I think this is true, and I think if he will remember accurately he will be able to recollect that he tried to get me into it, and I would not go in. I believe it is also true that I went away from Springfield when the convention was in session, to attend court in Tazewell County. It is true they did place my name, though without authority, upon the committee, and afterward wrote me to attend the meeting of the committee; but I refused to do so, and I never had anything to do with that organization.[12]

Shortly after the 1854 campaign Lincoln vigorously rebuked Codding for placing his name on the newly formed "Republic State Central Committee". He wrote:

> Allow me to say I have been perplexed some to understand why my name was placed on that committee. I was not consulted on the subject, nor was I apprised of the appointment until I discovered it by accident two or three weeks afterward. I suppose my opposition to the principle of slavery is as strong as that of any member of the Republican party; but I have also supposed that the extent to which I feel authorized to carry that opposition, practically, was not at all satisfactory to that party.[13]

The close of 1854 found Lincoln still a Whig.[14]

When the autumn balloting was over, Lincoln began enlisting support among his Whig associates in anticipation of the election for United States Senator to be made by the legislature shortly after the New Year. "It has come round that a Whig may, by possibility, be elected to the United States

[11] *Ibid.*

[12] Lincoln's speech at Ottawa, Illinois, August 21, 1858, in *The Political Debates Between Abraham Lincoln and Stephen A. Douglas* . . . (New York and London, 1926, G. P. Putnam Edition), p. 204.

[13] Lincoln to I. Codding, Nov. 27, 1854, *Works*, II, 264.

[14] White, in *Trans. of Ill. State Hist. Soc.*, 1908, pp. 35-38.

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Senate," he wrote to one leader, "and I want the chance of being the man. You are a member of the legislature, and have a vote to give. Think it over, and see whether you can do better than go for me. Write me at all events, and let this be confidential." [15] To another, Lincoln appealed: "Some friends here are really for me, for the U. S. Senate, and I should be very grateful if you could make a mark for me among your members. . . . Let this be confidential." [16]

Lincoln's conservative course was highly disapproved by advanced anti-slavery men in Illinois. One constituent in Rockford wrote: "I have spoken with our Senator and Representative as to Lincoln for U. S. Senator. They are not committed but one thinks L. is not enough anti-slavery. He wishes him—L—to take the ground of 'no further extension of slavery'—'No more slave territory.'" [17] The anti-slavery editor of the Galena *Jeffersonian,* Charles H. Ray, confided to his congressman, "I cannot well go in for Lincoln or anyone of his tribe. I have little faith in the strength of their anti-slavery sentiments." Ray wrote a second message, again emphasizing that Lincoln would not do for senator:

> I must confess I am afraid of "Abe." He is Southern by birth, Southern in his associations and Southern, if I mistake not, in his sympathies. I have thought that he would not come squarely up to the mark in a hand to hand fight with Southern influence and dictation. His wife, you know, is a Todd—of a pro-slavery family, and so are all his kin.[18]

The election took place during February 1855. Lincoln was not chosen United States Senator. The Anti-Nebraska Democrats of the Illinois legislature, regarding him as an Old-Line

[15] Lincoln to T. J. Henderson, Nov. 27, 1854, *Works,* II, 263.

[16] Lincoln to Charles Hoyt, Nov. 10, 1854, in *ibid.,* pp. 262-263. Other such letters have been preserved. See: Lincoln to J. Gillespie, Dec. 1, 1854, Lincoln Miscellaneous Collection, Missouri Historical Society, St. Louis; Lincoln to E. B. Washburne, Dec. 11, 1854, Lincoln Collection, Illinois State Historical Library; Lincoln to J. Harding, Nov. 11, 1854, in Emanuel Hertz, *Abraham Lincoln: A New Portrait* (New York, 1931), II, 656.

[17] A. S. Miller to Washburne, Dec. 18, 1854, Elihu B. Washburne Papers, Library of Congress.

[18] C. H. Ray to Washburne, Dec. 16, 24, 1854, *ibid.*

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Whig, refused to vote for him. Lincoln led on the first ballot. Had the Anti-Nebraska Democrats supported him, he would have been elected senator; instead, they continued to vote for one of their own, Congressman Lyman Trumbull. On the seventh ballot the regular Democrats voted for Governor Joel A. Matteson, Lincoln's arch-enemy and a man of ill repute. When it seemed evident that Matteson would be elected, Lincoln requested that his support go to Trumbull, to prevent a Matteson victory. On the tenth ballot Trumbull was elected.[19]

Trumbull's victory—made possible by the combined votes of the Anti-Nebraska Democrats and Lincoln's Whigs—was destined to prove a boon to Lincoln, for Trumbull accomplished much in effecting the "fusion" of the anti-Democratic and Anti-Nebraska factions into the Illinois Republican party. His triumph gave the Illinois irregular Democrats a spokesman in the Senate—one who could "frank" anti-slavery documents from Washington. Clearly the way was being made smooth for the union of Anti-Nebraska Democrats and Whigs.[20] This Lincoln conceded: "On the whole, it is perhaps as well for our general cause that Trumbull is elected—The Nebr. men confess that they hate it worse than anything that could have happened."[21]

Probably there was another way in which Lincoln indirectly benefited from his defeat for senator: not being a public servant who had to cater to the tastes of a fickle constituency, he could better engage in independent thought on slavery. In

[19] Lincoln to E. B. Washburne, Feb. 9, 1855, Lincoln Collection, Illinois State Historical Library; Joseph C. Howell to Yates, Feb. 11, 1855, Richard Yates Papers, Illinois State Historical Library; White, in *Trans. of Ill. State Hist. Soc.*, 1908, pp. 38-41; "Address of Gen. John M. Palmer", *Trans. of McLean Co. Hist. Soc.* (1900), III, 122; J. Gillespie to W. H. Herndon, Jan. 31, Sept. 19, 1866, in Hertz, *The Hidden Lincoln*, pp. 290, 309-310.

[20] *Congressional Globe*, 34th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 652-657, 693-694, 1369-1375; Trumbull to Palmer, July 31, 1856, in George T. Palmer (ed.), "Letters from Lyman Trumbull to John M. Palmer, 1854-1858", *Jour. of Ill. State Hist. Soc.* (April-July 1923), XVI, 31-32; Horace White, *The Life of Lyman Trumbull* (Boston and New York, 1913), pp. 56-58. This last is an excellent biography.

[21] Lincoln to E. B. Washburne, Feb. 9, 1855, Lincoln Collection, Illinois State Historical Library. The same views were expressed by Lincoln in his letter to "Messrs. Dole, Hubbard & Brown" (photostat), Dec. 14, 1859, Lincoln Collection, Chicago Historical Society.

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1855 he discerned that the South's peculiar institution might never be eradicated by peaceful means. "I think, that there is no peaceful extinction of slavery in prospect for us", he wrote a correspondent during this year. "The signal failure of Henry Clay and other good and great men, in 1849, to effect anything in favor of gradual emancipation in Kentucky, together with a thousand other signs, extinguished that hope utterly." The Declaration of Independence doctrine that "all men are created equal," he continued, was no longer a "self-evident truth," but instead a "self-evident lie." He added: "The Fourth of July has not quite dwindled away; it is still a great day—for burning fire-crackers!!!" "The Autocrat of all the Russias", he went on in this same letter, "will resign his crown and proclaim his subjects free republicans sooner than will our American masters voluntarily give up their slaves." He closed this communication with words that betrayed his bewilderment: "Our political problem now is, 'Can we as a nation continue together permanently—forever—half slave and half free?' The problem is too mighty for me—may God, in His mercy, superintend the solution." [22]

Despite his ever-growing concern over slavery in 1855, Lincoln did not affiliate with the Republicans. Many Illinois Whigs entered the new anti-Catholic, anti-immigrant Know-Nothing (or "American") party.[23] Lincoln was loath to surrender his Whig identity. So long as the Know-Nothings—one of the strong elements of opposition to the Democratic party—retained their own organization, Lincoln had no confidence that the Republican party (now called the "fusion" party) gave promise of growth. These views he expressed in August 1855 in a letter to Owen Lovejoy, who still persistently but vainly endeavored to induce him to foresake Whiggery and enter the Republican ranks.[24]

[22] Lincoln to George Robertson, Aug. 15, 1855, *Works*, II, 279-280, 280-281.

[23] John P. Senning, "The Know Nothing Movement in Illinois, 1854-1856", *Jour. of Ill. State Hist. Soc.* (April 1914), VII, 19.

[24] Lincoln to Owen Lovejoy, Aug. 11, 1855, in Gilbert A. Tracy (ed.), *Uncollected Letters of Abraham Lincoln* (Boston and New York, 1917), pp. 59-60.

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During 1855 Lincoln remained essentially conservative on the slavery issue. In August, he confided to a friend: "I confess I hate to see the poor creatures [fugitive slaves] hunted down, and caught and carried back to their stripes and unrequited toil; but I bite my lip, and keep quiet." Then he reiterated his loyalty to Whiggery:

> You inquire where I now stand. That is a disputed point. I think I am a whig; but others say there are no whigs, and that I am an abolitionist. When I was in Washington, I voted for the Wilmot Proviso as good as forty times, and I never heard of any attempt to unwhig me for that. I now do no more than oppose the extension of slavery. I am not a Know-Nothing,—that is certain. How could I be? How can any one who abhors the oppression of the negroes be in favor of degrading classes of white people? [25]

In the autumn of 1855 the impotent Republican party of Lovejoy and Codding made efforts to draw into its ranks the Anti-Nebraska Democrats and Whigs, but its platform was much too radical to become the basis for fusion.[26] Senator Trumbull, most distinguished of the Illinois Anti-Nebraska Democrats, shunned direct association with the Republicans.[27] Moreover, side issues, such as Know-Nothingism and temperance, still clouded the atmosphere.[28] The Old-Line Whigs, for their part, were too steeped in the past—in memories of Henry Clay—to consider fusion with the Republicans.[29] Such

This letter is printed also in Harry J. Carman and Reinhard H. Luthin, "Some Aspects of the Know-Nothing Movement Reconsidered", *The South Atlantic Quarterly* (April 1940), XXIX, 222-223.

[25] Lincoln to Speed, Aug. 24, 1855, in J. G. Holland, *The Life of Abraham Lincoln* (Springfield, Mass., 1866), pp. 145, 147.

[26] Mildred C. Stoler, "Influence of the Democratic Element in the Republican Party of Illinois and Indiana, 1854-1860" (MS., Dissertation, Indiana University, 1938), pp. 97-98.

[27] Lyman Trumbull to Owen Lovejoy (copy), Aug. 20, 1855, Lincoln Collection, John Hay Library, Brown University.

[28] *Ibid.*; Senning, in *Jour. of Ill. State Hist. Soc.* (April 1914), pp. 7-33; Arthur C. Cole, *The Era of the Civil War, 1848-1870* (Springfield, Ill., 1919), pp. 135-139, 141, 206-211.

[29] *Illinois State Journal* (Weekly Edition), Sept. 26, 1855, p. 2. Files of this newspaper are in the Illinois State Historical Library.

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apostles of Republicanism as Lovejoy and Codding, the Springfield *Illinois State Journal,* Whig central organ, emphasized, were "extremely ultra in their political views, and therefore not to be hearkened unto by the conservative, compromise-loving portion of the community."[30] Again the *Journal* cautioned: "In no point of view, in which it may be regarded, can we see any well founded reason for such a party, as under the name of Republican has been formed in some of the Northern States." The *Journal* concluded: "Let the opponents of the present [Pierce] administration organize upon a National [anti-sectional] platform, which will be wide and broad enough to receive, not only the friends of good government at the North, but the true and conservative men of the South—and their name is legion—and ere another twelve-month is over, the Pierce and Douglas dynasty will be numbered among 'the things that were.'"[31]

These editorials in the *Journal* are significant in a study of Lincoln's course, since this paper often reflected his views; indeed, his writings were often printed in it as editorials.[32] The close of 1855 found the *Journal* still uncompromisingly opposed to the union of Whigs and Whig-minded Know-Nothings with the Republicans. It advised its readers to "see the utter hopelessness of any attempt to cut loose entirely from the Whigs or Americans" in a futile attempt to organize into a party on the single issue of anti-slavery.[33] Lincoln was still a Whig, albeit with anti-slavery convictions of a conservative type.

When 1856 opened, thoughts turned to the presidential election in the coming November. Party organization in Illinois was still in a chaotic condition. All Democrats—"Nebraska" and "Anti-Nebraska"—seemed to consider themselves the true protectors of their party's principles. There were the "Americans", political driftwood on an anti-immigrant tide that, having carried them to the high-water mark, was rapidly receding. There were the Republicans, a small minority still

[30] *Ibid.*, Oct. 10, 1855, p. 2. [31] *Ibid.*, Nov. 28, 1855, p. 2.

[32] Statement of Dr. Paul M. Angle, outstanding Lincoln scholar and Illinois historian, in Angle, *New Letters and Papers of Lincoln*, p. 132.

[33] *Illinois State Journal* (Weekly Edition), Dec. 5, 1855, p. 2.

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led by Lovejoy and Codding, becoming more "respectable" than they had been the year previous. There were the Anti-Nebraska Whigs, who had learned to coöperate with some of their former opponents in the fight on Douglas. Other Whigs had entered the Democratic camp, believing this the effective way to battle for conservatism and combat radical sectionalism and anti-slavery extremism. Then there were the Old-Line Whigs, still clinging to the conservatism of their late sainted Henry Clay, hoping that the Whig ghost might be called from the tomb. Lincoln seems to have stood closest to the Anti-Nebraska Whigs, although having sympathy for the Old-Line Whigs. Nevertheless, many Whigs, Democrats and "Americans" in Illinois would have been willing to welcome the Republican party, which had swept all before it in neighboring Michigan and Wisconsin. When in February 1856 the combined Anti-Nebraska forces in Congress succeeded in electing Nathaniel P. Banks, of Massachusetts, as Speaker of the House of Representatives, they hailed this first national "Republican" victory and summoned Republicans in their respective neighborhoods to celebrate.[34] Truly, the idea of common cause for all Illinois Anti-Nebraska forces and enemies of Senator Douglas and President Franklin Pierce, regardless of former party ties, was assuming definite form.

In the meantime the bolder spirits among the national Republican leaders decided to strike. A president would be elected in November. Thus on January 17, 1856 a group of Republican leaders, who were assembled at Washington, issued a public summons to meet in Pittsburgh on February 22 for the purpose of setting a time and place for a national nominating convention to be held in June. In response to the call, incongruous groups—anti-slavery zealots, Free-Soil Whigs and Free-Soil Democrats, disgruntled Democrats, Whigs without a party, German-Americans, and some Know-Nothings—met in the Pennsylvania city on Washington's Birthday, 1856. There and then a national organization of the Republican party was designed and an agreement made to meet in convention at Philadelphia the coming June 17, to

[34] Cole, *op. cit.*, pp. 141-142.

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select Republican candidates for president and vice-president.[35] Neither Lincoln nor any of his closest associates attended the Pittsburgh gathering.[36]

Although Illinois anti-Democratic groups, save Lovejoy and his followers, were not strongly represented at Pittsburgh, there were those in Lincoln's state who realized the desirability of a tie-up with the national Republicans. Paul Selby, Whig editor of the *Morgan Journal,* at Jacksonville, made the proposal for a convention of Anti-Nebraska editors to meet at Decatur on February 22, the same day as the meeting of national Republican leaders at Pittsburgh. Some twenty-five newspapers endorsed the proposal.[37] Selby determined to induce Lincoln to attend. The result of his conference with Lincoln is perhaps told best in Selby's letter to Richard Yates, dated from Springfield, February 14, 1856:

> I have had an interview with Mr. Lincoln today, and some conversation in reference to matters we were talking about last evening. I wish you would endeavor to see him soon, at least before the Editorial Convention. He tells me he thinks he will try and have some business at Decatur at the time of the Convention. Can't you do the same? I think we all agree as to what is to be done at the Convention.
>
> He read to me a letter from the gentleman we were speaking of last evening for Gov'r. [William H. Bissell?] which contains the assurances you have been seeking for. This he will show you when you see him, but of course this is all in confidence. I write because I shall not probably be in Jacksonville before the Convention at Decatur.
>
> P. S. I wish you would see the Editors of the Journal here [in Springfield] and get them to attend the Convention. I saw

[35] Andrew W. Crandall, *The Early History of the Republican Party, 1854-1856* (Boston, 1930), pp. 49-61; George W. Julian, "The First Republican National Convention", *The American Historical Review* (January 1899), IV, 313-322.

[36] Paul M. Angle, *Lincoln, 1854-1861: Being the Day-by-Day Activities of Abraham Lincoln from January 1, 1854 to March 4, 1861* (Springfield, Ill., 1933), p. 112.

[37] Paul Selby, "The Editorial Convention of 1856", *Jour. of Ill. State Hist. Soc.* (July 1912), V, 343-349; *idem,* "The Editorial Convention, Feb. 22, 1856", *Trans. of McLean Co. Hist. Soc.* (1900), III, 30-43.

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> Baker [E. L. Baker, editor of the *Journal*?] today and he tells me he thinks he will be present but he is afraid of too much *ultraism*.[38]

It cannot be determined whether Lincoln and Yates met according to Selby's plan, but Lincoln did manage to have business in Decatur on February 22, 1856, when the Anti-Nebraska Editorial Convention met. The Convention adopted resolutions which subsequently became the basis for the platform of the Illinois Republicans—and Lincoln was consulted by the committee which drafted them. Essentially conservative in character, the resolutions did not take the extreme ground of the Republicans, but rather the moderate position of the Anti-Nebraska Democrats and Anti-Nebraska Whigs. The South's rights were recognized: slavery was to remain inviolate in the slaveholding states; the constitutional provision counting three fifths of the slaves as a basis for Congressional representation should be respected; and slaveholders should receive the protection of a fugitive-slave law. On the other hand, they insisted that in turn the South should respect the free states' rights, which were defined as the prohibition of slavery in Kansas and Nebraska according to the pledge given by the South in the Missouri Compromise and the restriction of slavery within the limits set up in 1850. The resolutions, in which the conciliatory Lincoln's hand is clearly seen, made no demand for repeal of the fugitive-slave law, no demand against the admission of new slave states, no demand for the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia. Upon such a program could Lincoln's Anti-Nebraska Whigs and Trumbull's Anti-Nebraska Democrats unite—and Lovejoy's and Codding's Republicans and George Schneider's and Gustave Koerner's Germans might asquiesce.[39]

The most important work of the Editorial Convention was its action in naming a state committee and its recommendation for the calling of a state convention at Bloomington on May 29.[40]

[38] Paul Selby to Yates, Feb. 14, 1856, Yates Papers.

[39] Stoler, *op. cit.*, pp. 101-102.

[40] Selby, in *Jour. of Ill. State Hist. Soc.* (1912-1913), V, 346.

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Lincoln continued to remain aloof from the Republican party. Although at Decatur he had given counsel to those who intended to form a state "fusion" (or Republican) party comprising all elements of opposition to the Democrats, he gave no early sign of entering the Republican ranks. Probably he was leaning toward Republicanism—but he was not yet of it in March, nor in April 1856. Still the Pittsburgh gathering of national leaders—held on February 22, the same day as the Editorial Convention at Decatur—had done much to move hesitant spirits. The Whig-ribbed *Illinois State Journal,* which often spoke for Lincoln, even began to print kind words concerning the Republicans.[41]

Meanwhile, Anti-Nebraska editors, in conformity with their agreement at the Decatur gathering to arrange a state convention, had issued a call:

ANTI-NEBRASKA STATE CONVENTION

A state convention of the Anti-Nebraska party of Illinois will be held in the city of Bloomington on Thursday, the 29th day of May, 1856, for the purpose of choosing candidates for the state offices, appointing delegates to the national convention and transacting such other business as may properly come before the body. The committee have adopted as the basis of representation the ratio of one delegate to every 6,000 inhabitants and one additional delegate for every fractional number of 2,000 and over but counties that have less than 6,000 inhabitants are entitled to one delegate.

W. B. Ogden,
S. M. Church,
E. A. Dudley,
Thomas J. Pickett,
R. J. Oglesby,
G. D. A. Parks,
Ira O. Wilkinson,
W. H. Herndon,
Joseph Gillespie,
State Central Committee.[42]

[41] *Illinois State Journal,* March 5, 1856, p. 1.

[42] Copy printed in *Trans. of McLean Co. Hist. Soc.* (1900), III, 25.

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It will be noted that Lincoln's partner Herndon was a member of the "State Central Committee".

The bona fide Republicans—those advanced anti-slavery pioneers of northern Illinois who in 1854 had adopted the label "Republican"—were perfectly content to support the program of the coming Bloomington convention without asking anything for themselves. They even proposed to give the entire control of the anti-Democratic movement to the conservative Whigs and the moderate Anti-Nebraska Democrats of the southern and central regions of the state.[43]

The Anti-Nebraska Democrats in various counties began selecting delegates to the Bloomington convention. Senator Trumbull, still their leader, believed that such a conclave would be politically safe for Anti-Nebraska Democrats to attend.[44] Gustave Koerner, German leader of Belleville and former Lieutenant-Governor, had only a month previously said farewell to the Democratic party.[45] Thus the Anti-Nebraska Democratic leaders, both American-born and German, would be at Bloomington on May 29 in order to coöperate with the Republicans in forming a single state Anti-Nebraska party to nominate candidates for governor and other state offices and to select delegates to the coming Republican National Convention at Philadelphia in June. But would the Whig leaders be there? Would Lincoln, still shunning direct association with any proposed state Republican party, be present at Bloomington?

Herndon was a member of the "State Central Committee". Outraged at the recent tactics of pro-slavery elements in Kansas,[46] Lincoln's friend and law partner was traveling through the state, addressing county Anti-Nebraska conven-

[43] Chicago *Tribune*, undated, in Alexander Davidson and Bernard Stuvé, *A Complete History of Illinois from 1673 to 1884* (Springfield, Ill., 1884), pp. 650-651.

[44] Trumbull to Palmer, May 21, 1856, in Palmer (ed.), in *Jour. of Ill. State Hist. Soc.* (1923-1924), XVI, 30.

[45] Koerner to the Editor, April 16, 1856, in Peoria *Illinois Banner*, clipped in *Illinois State Journal*, May 21, 1856, p. 4.

[46] W. H. Herndon to Sumner, "Private", March 6, 1856, Sumner Papers.

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tions in order to make sure that they would send delegates to Bloomington.[47] So far as an examination of the *Illinois State Journal* reveals, Lincoln was engaged in no such missionary endeavor.[48] Herndon, however, decided to force Lincoln's hand:

> Believing the times were ripe for more advanced movements, in the spring of 1856 I drew up a paper for the friends of freedom to sign, calling a county convention in Springfield to select delegates for the forthcoming Republican State convention in Bloomington. The paper was freely circulated and generously signed. Lincoln was absent at the time and, believing I knew what his "feeling and judgment" on the vital questions were, I took the liberty to sign his name to the call. The whole was then published in the Springfield *Journal*.[49]

The call to which Herndon referred was printed in the *State Journal* on May 14. It made no mention of the slavery controversy, except to acknowledge that the signers were foes of the Missouri Compromise repeal, but it summoned a Sangamon County convention:

> TO THE CITIZENS OF SANGAMON COUNTY
>
> The undersigned, citizens of Sangamon county, who are opposed to the Repeal of the Missouri Compromise, and who are opposed to the present Administration, and who are in favor of restoring the administration of the General Government to the Policy of Washington and Jefferson, would suggest the propriety of a County Convention, to be held in the City of Springfield, on Saturday, the Twenty-fourth day of May, 1856, to appoint Delegates to the Bloomington Convention.[50]

[47] For instance, Herndon addressed the Macon County Anti-Nebraska convention on May 10, and that of Menard County on May 26. See Decatur *Chronicle*, clipped in *Illinois State Journal*, May 21, 1856, p. 2; *Daily Illinois State Register*, May 27, 1856, p. 2.

[48] The present author has searched the files of the *State Journal* for this period. For Lincoln's activities during March, April and May 1856, see Angle, *Lincoln, 1854-1861*, pp. 113-126.

[49] Angle, *Herndon's Life of Lincoln*, p. 311.

[50] See the "call" in *Illinois State Journal*, May 14, 1856, p. 3. A facsimile of the "call", taken from the *Journal*, is opposite page 254 of Jesse W. Weik, *The Real Lincoln* (Boston and New York, 1922).

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This "call", as it appeared in the *State Journal*, bore the signatures of one hundred and twenty-nine citizens of Springfield and nearby territory. The name "A Lincoln" headed the list; that of "Wm. H. Herndon" was second.

Elaborating on the manner in which he had signed Lincoln's name to the call for the Sangamon County Anti-Nebraska convention, Herndon continued:

> No sooner had it [the call] appeared [in the *State Journal*] than John T. Stuart, who, with others, was endeavoring to retard Lincoln in his advanced movements, rushed into the office and excitedly asked if "Lincoln had signed the Abolition call in the Journal?" I answered in the negative, adding that I had signed his name myself. To the question, "Did Lincoln authorize you to sign it?" I returned an emphatic "No." "Then,' exclaimed the startled and indignant Stuart, "You have ruined him." But I was by no means alarmed at what others deemed inconsiderate and hasty action. I thought I understood Lincoln thoroughly, but in order to vindicate myself if assailed I immediately sat down, after Stuart had rushed out of the office, and wrote Lincoln, who was then in Tazewell County attending court, a brief account of what I had done and how much stir it was creating in the ranks of his conservative friends. If he approved or disapproved my course I asked him to write or telegraph me at once. In a brief time came his answer: "All right; go ahead. Will meet you—radicals and all." Stuart subsided, and the conservative spirits who hovered around Springfield no longer held control of the political fortunes of Abraham Lincoln.[51]

Between May 14, when the Herndon-inspired "call" for the Sangamon County convention was carried in the *State Journal*, and May 24, when the convention was scheduled to meet, there occurred a series of events that absorbed the interest of the populace and made Northerners more receptive to the Republican propaganda. The two most important were a continuation

[51] Angle, *Herndon's Life of Lincoln*, pp. 311-312. The same story by Herndon, in other words, is related in Ward H. Lamon, *The Life of Abraham Lincoln* (Boston, 1872), pp. 374-375. Lamon, who was Lincoln's law partner for a time, in all probability got the story from Herndon. The real author of Lamon's *Lincoln* was Chauncey F. Black. See Louis A. Warren (ed.), "Herndon—Master Myth-Maker", *Lincoln Lore*, December 23, 1940.

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of the troubles between anti-slavery and pro-slavery groups in Congress over the Kansas issue, and the physical attack on Massachusetts' anti-slavery senator, Charles Sumner, by South Carolina's congressman, Preston S. Brooks. One leader within the inner Republican councils observed: "The attack upon Sumner and the news from Kansas has engrossed the public mind to the exclusion of almost every other subject." [52] Indeed, it is difficult to imagine that the Republican party could have grown so rapidly, had it not been for a "bleeding" Kansas and an injured Sumner.

On May 24, pursant to the "call" in the *State Journal*, there met at the Court House in Springfield the Sangamon County convention of those citizens "who are opposed to the Repeal of the Missouri Compromise, and who are opposed to the present Administration, and who are in favor of restoring the administration of the General Government to the Policy of Washington and Jefferson." Neither Lincoln nor Herndon was present.[53] Lincoln's friend and former law partner, Judge S. T. Logan, "briefly and forcibly explained the objects of the meeting." The resolutions submitted by a committee of which Logan was chairman (and of course adopted by the convention) were exceedingly conservative and courted the support of those friendly to the Southern states. They labeled the Missouri Compromise repeal a wanton reopening of the slavery agitation; lambasted the Pierce administration for being responsible for the troubles in Kansas; and affirmed that "the slave states are entitled under the constitution to a fair and efficient fugitive slave law." Four delegates were appointed to the state "fusion" convention at Bloomington (the word "Republican" was studiously avoided) to be held on May 29 —the absent were "A. Lincoln", Herndon, Logan and one George R. Weber.[54]

[52] Allison to McLean, June 2, 1856, John McLean Papers, Library of Congress.

[53] "Lincoln and Herndon were not present", wrote the Democratic organ of Springfield, the *Daily Illinois State Register*, May 26, 1856, p. 2. Files of this newspaper are in the Illinois State Historical Library.

[54] Proceedings of the convention printed in *Illinois State Journal* (Weekly Edition), May 28, 1856, p. 3.

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On May 29 in Major's Hall, at Bloomington, there assembled the heterogeneous elements opposed to the Douglas-controlled Democratic party of Illinois.[55] Lincoln was present—as delegate from Sangamon County! He had at last decided to "fuse". An examination of the roster of delegates reveals that all segments of "fusion" were represented by their respective leaders. To name a few: Lincoln, of Sangamon, and Richard Yates, of Morgan County, Anti-Nebraska Whigs; Orville H. Browning, of Adams, representing the bolder spirits among the Old-Line Whigs; Norman B. Judd, of Cook County, and John M. Palmer, of Macoupin, Anti-Nebraska Democrats; George Schneider, of Cook, and Adolph Meyer, of Jo Daviess County, German leaders; Joseph Gillespie, of Madison County, and Ozias M. Hatch, of Pike County, of the expiring "American" (or Know-Nothing) faction; and William H. Herndon, of Sangamon, and Ichabod Codding, of Will County, out-and-out Republicans since 1854.[56] In the men nominated for the state offices, the various factions (all except those who had long borne the label "Republican") were represented on the ticket: William H. Bissell, for governor, was an Anti-Nebraska Democrat;[57] Francis A. Hoffman, for lieutenant-governor, was a German Anti-Nebraska Democrat;[58]

[55] On May 29, 1900, citizens of Illinois commemorated at Bloomington the state convention held there on May 29, 1856, which formally organized the Illinois Republican party and at which Lincoln definitely cast his lot with the Republicans of the nation. Sponsored under the auspices of the McLean County Historical Society, of Bloomington, this forty-fourth anniversary celebration brought together even a few white-haired men who were young delegates to the convention in 1856 and who gave their reminiscences. However, much historical research was done for the occasion, which has been of aid to the present writer in preparing this paper, and is printed in *Trans. of McLean Co. Hist. Soc.* (1900), Vol. III.

[56] Roster of delegates printed in *ibid.*, pp. 149-152.

[57] Charles P. Johnson, "William H. Bissell", *Publications of the Illinois State Historical Library*, (1904), No. 9, pp. 48, 54-56; John M. Palmer (ed.), *The Bench and Bar of Illinois* (Chicago, 1899), I, 441-446.

[58] J. H. A. Lacher, "Francis A. Hollman of Illinois and Hans Buschbauer of Wisconsin", *The Wisconsin Magazine of History* (1930), XIII, 334-342; F. I. Herriott, "The Germans of Chicago and Stephen A. Douglas in 1854", *Deutsch-Amerikanische Geschichtsblätter* (1912), XII, 392-396. During the canvass it was found that Hoffman, if elected, would be ineligible for the

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Jesse K. Dubois, for state auditor, was an Anti-Nebraska Whig;[59] while Ozias M. Hatch, for secretary of state, and James Miller, for state treaurer, were erstwhile Know-Nothings.[60] The selection of these candidates indicated that the convention had taken the advice of those who had prescribed a subordinate part for advanced Republicanism; for not a pure and simple Republican received a place on the ticket. "It was a coalition which the republicans were content to support with the hope of future reward,"[61] wrote one contemporary Illinois historian.

There can be no doubt that Lincoln completely overshadowed the other speakers at the convention. Those who heard his oration at Bloomington—the famous "Lost Speech"—were extravagant in their praises. It seems certain, too, that no trace of anti-slavery radicalism could be found in it. "Today, that 'Lost Speech' looks quite conservative", wrote one who claimed to have been in the audience at Bloomington. "His chief contention all through it", declared the auditor, "was that Kansas must come in free, not slave, he said he did not want to meddle with slavery where it existed and that he was in favor of a reasonable fugitive slave law."[62]

The Bloomington convention sounded the death knell of Illinois Whiggery. Even the *State Journal,* in presenting the nominees for state officers to its readers, abandoned its old form of announcing Whig candidates and referred to them as the "People's Ticket".[63]

lieutenant-governorship, not having been naturalized fourteen years, a qualification prescribed by the state constitution. He resigned his place on the ticket and the name of John Wood, an old Whig, was substituted.

[59] Helen L. Allen, "A Sketch of the Dubois Family, Pioneers of Indiana and Illinois", *Jour. of Ill. State Hist. Soc.* (April 1912), V, 62.

[60] Senning, in *Jour. of Ill. State Hist. Soc.* (April 1914), VII, 19.

[61] Davidson and Stuvé, *A Complete History of Illinois from 1673 to 1884,* p. 653.

[62] James S. Emory to ———, undated, *Trans. of McLean Co. Hist. Soc.* (1900), III, 94.

[63] Ameda Ruth King, "The Last Years of the Whig Party in Illinois—1847 to 1856", *Trans. of Ill. Hist. Soc.,* 1925, p. 145.

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Herndon was elated at Lincoln's final decision to attend the Bloomington convention and affiliate with the new anti-slavery party. He could now write Senator Sumner:

> My partner & Friend, Lincoln . . . is a good man, friend Sumner: He loves man—the rights of man; and would die for his rights:—his rights are all mankind's, is his philosophy.
>
> Lincoln is for human freedom. I am, and whenever you have occasion to abuse or speak against lawyers or lawyers offices, always in your mind,—if not in words, except us. We are both from Ky. [Kentucky]—both left the curse of slavery when young. So far as we have any influence in Illinois it shall *now and forever* be used to the utmost of our abilities. This I can say of myself, and have every reason to say so of him. I am *in* for the future *races,* as well as the ones now on hand.[64]

Lincoln emphasized that henceforth he would be a Republican by taking the stump for John C. Frémont, the Republican candidate for President, during the campaign of 1856,[65] but his personal preference for the presidential nomination had been the conservative, Whig-minded, Justice John McLean[66] of the Supreme Court. Mrs. Lincoln, of the Kentucky Todds, was quick to shield her husband from charges of ultraism. "Although Mr. Lincoln is, or was, a Fremont man, you must not include him with so many of those who belong to that party,—an abolitionist,"[67] explained Mary Todd Lincoln following the campaign.

At last Lincoln was a Republican; but throughout his metamorphosis from Whiggery to the new creed he had indicated his extreme reluctance to break old party ties.

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[64] W. H. Herndon to Sumner, June 20, 1856, Sumner Papers.

[65] John G. Nicolay, "Abraham Lincoln", *Trans. of McLean Co. Hist. Soc.* (1900), III, 98.

[66] Lincoln to Lyman Trumbull, June 7, 1856, in William H. Lambert, "A Lincoln Correspondence", *The Century Magazine,* February 1909, p. 619.

[67] Mary Todd Lincoln to Emily Todd Helm, November 23, 1856, in Henry B. Rankin, *Personal Recollections of Abraham Lincoln* (New York and London, 1916), p. 196.

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REVIEWS

How New Will the Better World Be?: A Discussion of Post-War Reconstruction. By CARL L. BECKER. New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1944.—vi. 246, v pp. $2.50.

Some years ago, when Carl Becker came to stay on the New Jersey coast, his former students would make frequent pilgrimages to listen to him talk. They would speak only enough to keep him talking, and when he would talk no more, they would leave. For days thereafter they would go over and over what he had said. Those of us who were not his students would wonder. Here was a teacher whose students did nothing but listen, and they continued passively to listen even after they had become masters of the historian's craft. Yet, listening, they did not lose their independence, were not mere disciples. They did not even expect others always to listen to them.

Reading Mr. Becker's essay on the post-war world, it is easy to understand why his students return to listen. His concern here is to show that men tomorrow will be pretty much as they were yesterday, that the better world we hope to make will in essentials be more like than unlike the world of 1939. Against the utopians who insist that the war will not have been worth while unless we begin afresh, he argues that it has never been possible to escape the past, and therefore will probably not be possible this time. To drive home his argument, he ranges freely through history, not for isolated facts, but to show how slowly men change over the centuries. It is said, for instance, that we must abolish nationalism; but nationalism is a tough plant, with roots deep in the past, and fruits which nourish us today. Is it likely that men will be able to uproot so powerful a loyalty, or be willing to surrender what has sustained us in the day of battle? Power politics, balance of power, and imperialism are expressions which idealists hate, yet power is the essence of political life, some sort of balance of power is essential in a world of national states, and every large national state has, and will have, imperial dependencies, except our enemies.

Instead of cursing what we are, and will be, Mr. Becker urges us to look steadily at the two closely connected evils of war and unemployment. To cure the second, we must accept the historical trend toward collectivism, either in the mild form which he calls social

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democracy, or in the virulent form of fascism or communism. The problem is not whether to accept collectivism, but whether we can escape its extreme forms. Similarly, by cursing the national state, power politics, and the rest, Mr. Becker believes, we risk disillusionment and a retreat to isolation. If the peoples of the world cannot become one big, happy family, they can by mutual forbearance become good neighbors.

Reading, one is carried along, without thought of interrupting to argue. But reflecting, we may, like Mr. Becker's students, dissent—not from his confidence that historical forces cannot be checked overnight. At times however, his eagerness to prove that men, and nations, of good will can easily compromise their differences leads him to oversimplify differences. Take one example. He believes that, for Britain and ourselves, the safety of the "Atlantic Community" is all that matters in Europe; the Russians are interested only in eastern Europe; the one possibility of trouble lies in a quarrel over the future of Germany. But historically has the balance of power for Britain meant only the independence of western Europe? If so, why did World War I begin in the Balkans, and World War II in Poland? Again, Mr. Becker assumes that the Chinese will welcome a strengthening of the American position in the Pacific. If his assumption proves wrong, what then? Here, and elsewhere, it seems to the reviewer that international politics is not always the fight of the morally right against the morally wrong. Very often the battle is between two deeply felt rights, and then the disposition to agree does not assure agreement. But, despite these reservations, it would be a rare privilege to make another pilgrimage to hear Mr. Becker talk.

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Bread and Democracy in Germany. By Alexander Gerschenkron. Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1943.—viii, 238 pp. $2.75.

In this carefully documented, illuminating study Mr. Gerschenkron analyzes the interesting problem of the relation between democracy and protection of agricultural products, particularly of grain, in Germany. The aim of the book is to show how "before 1914 the machinery of Junker protectionism in agriculture coupled with the Junker philosophy—the true forerunner of the Nazi ideology of our days—delayed the development of democratic institutions in Germany", and "how the Junkers contrived to escape almost unscratched

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the German revolution of 1918 and how this fact contributed to the constitutional weakness and subsequent disintegration of the Weimar Republic."

The economic history of this problem is well known. In 1879, when Germany introduced her new tariff, she formulated a definite policy for protecting her grain production against overseas competition. The production of rye obtained a privileged position in Germany. Similarly to most of the European grain-importing countries (for instance, France, Austria-Hungary), she did not readjust her agriculture, as Denmark and Holland had successfully done, but was determined to protect her cereal production. The German policy worked especially in favor of the big estate owners, the Junkers, who held very important political positions in Prussia. Moreover, this policy attracted also the major part of the German peasantry, although many economists tried to prove that protection of grain production was particularly unfavorable for the owners of small farms.

The German defeat in 1918 offered an excellent opportunity for breaking the political as well as the economic power of the Junkers. This opportunity, however, was not seized. As an important reason that this was not done the author mentions the policy of the Allied Powers. By continuing the blockade for a number of months and not sending enough food supplies, they did not mitigate sufficiently the food shortage in Germany. Thus the necessity of increasing the production of energy food strengthened the position of those who had maintained that this was no opportune time to carry out a land reform. In the meantime the Junkers had overcome their fear and began to entrench their position in the Weimar Republic, plotting against the young forces of the democracy. After 1926 a new era of agricultural protection started, steadily expanding its scope and degree, and including, even before the Nazi régime, the greatest part of the agricultural production. Politically not only the Junkers but also the peasants favored this increasing protection which promised them a sure market and high prices. The author's analysis of the position of the Junkers under Hitler is a further addition to the study of this question.

A few comments are needed to complete the explanation of this development. Mr. Gerschenkron's opinion of the policy of the Allies with regard to food supplies immediately after the war is correct. It should not be forgotten, however, that the leading political parties of the new republic were not well prepared for assuming leadership and responsibility especially in the economic field. Without experi-

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ence in this matter they were reluctant to introduce any really radical reforms, being afraid that such reforms might have unfavorable repercussions on the national economy. The author's statement that "the history of the German Republic is that under certain conditions a well established democracy may choose to destroy itself" can be understood only if he means the formal, legal prerequisites for the establishment of democracy. This reviewer lived in Germany during the years, 1919-1922. Not only among the Junkers was the idea of democracy and republic unpopular at that time; the same can be said of a great part of the middle class, the peasantry, and the university circles—not to mention the military class. Liberal elements represented always a minority. How else could it be explained that in 1925, after the first socialist president, Hindenburg was elected president? And his opponent was not a Socialist but a prominent leader of the Catholic party.

The problem of democracy in Germany is very complex indeed, and its correct analysis is necessary in order to determine the post-war policy of the United Nations toward Germany.

Dealing with the future the author arrives at the conclusion "that democratic reconstruction of Germany . . . . in insurance of world peace calls for a radical elimination of the Junkers as a social and economic group." It seems that on this point there will be general agreement. Outlining a program of agricultural policy Mr. Gerschenkron recommends a radical land reform and the expropriation of the Junkers without compensation which would involve more than three million hectares of agricultural land. To achieve the readjustment of agriculture and to place it on a competitive basis the author suggests a radical measure, namely, the introduction of a government trade monopoly which would include not only grain but the bulk of agricultural products in Germany. The mainspring of the whole mechanism would lie in the price policy of the monopoly. It could force a certain number of farmers to discontinue grain production for the market; it could, step by step, carry out the needed adjustment of high cost agriculture to the international market conditions. The author is well aware of all difficulties of such a powerful monopoly, the management of which would require "great practical skill and energy". Likewise he does not overlook the danger involved when such an important mechanism is run by bureaucracy. He would like to include a program of the German agricultural adjustment plan in the peace treaties and entrust its execution and supervision to an international economic agency.

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In his discussion of the problem of how to encourage the establishment of democracy in a new Germany, the author outlines some general ideas. In the chapter "Revenge or Reason" he warns against the repetition of "the moral burdens of the Versailles settlement" and the failure consisting "in the fundamental lack of readiness on the part of the Versailles powers to shoulder the responsibilities involved in the principle of international democratic solidarity." We have no space to discuss here the basic problem of how to deal with Germany after the war—many books have already been written on that subject. However, there will be many who will not agree with Mr. Gerschenkron when he calls for retributive justice for "those small privileged groups which must answer for the overthrow of democracy and the surrender of the country to the domination of Hitler." Especially those who have seen the Germans—soldiers and civilians—at work in the occupied countries will ask who are included in "those small privileged groups".

Mr. Gerschenkron himself states that the establishment of democracy in Germany depends on a great many factors, and in his book he purposely deals with only one aspect of the problem, namely, the position of the Junkers and the agricultural policy in its relation to democracy. His excellent analysis of this question will greatly contribute to the understanding of this particular problem and might be helpful in shaping the post-war policy.

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Germany after Hitler. By PAUL HAGEN. New York and Toronto, Farrar & Rinehart, Inc., 1944.—viii, 240 pp. $2.00.

Among political writers personally or professionally interested in Germany, the anti-Nazis in this country have, during the last few years, been in a better position than the pro-Nazis and the neo-Nazis. To say that they had the field all for themselves would be an optimistic exaggeration. However, they have had the ear of an anxious public which seeks the counsel of the experts on the problem of Germany.

It is this reviewer's conviction that the writers who were thus favored have not succeeded in making the best of this opportunity. Even now, while the Third Reich's fiendish policy of extermination is continuously reaching new peaks, the need for a thorough overhauling of the German social structure as a prerequisite for future peace has by no means been generally accepted.

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A large part of the literature on post-Hitler Germany is tedious and sterile because it uses pre-scientific methods, being either nescient or afraid of the specific political issues involved. The result can only be an increased bewilderment. For example, most discussions about whether "there is another Germany", or whether "*the* Germans are guilty or non-guilty", are bound to create dangerous confusion in public opinion, for they reduce a multitude of complex questions to alternatives which are nonexistent, utterly misleading and epistemologically untenable—as Keats said, "By thinking it a thing of yes or no, that housewives talk of."

Paul Hagen avoids such pitfalls. He faces the issues squarely, courageously, with a great sense of responsibility—and with no pretension of impartiality. He knows intimately what he is talking about, and whom he is talking against. His is a fighting book; it is, in the legitimate sense, a political pamphlet. To consider this as derogatory would merely show that we still suffer from the undesirable aftereffects of an overdose of debunking of "propaganda", and that, even in the fifth year of a war which is largely ideological, a strange prudishness in matters political still prevails.

Hagen's book centers on the need for and the chances of a German "revolution". For two generations, the ideas of the German Social Democrats about the necessity, the extent and, finally, the timing of a fundamental change in the Reich's social structure have been unclear and contradictory. This was one of the main reasons for the psychological frustration and increasing paralysis of the greatest German political party. The Hitler era, Hagen believes, has clarified the issue. The Germans who are not Nazis have, he maintains, learned by bitter experience that, with Hitler in power for more than a decade, democracy can never be established in Germany without revolution, that is, without a sharp and decisive break.

The word "revolution" has many connotations, and it must be noted that the house cleaning which Hagen advocates for Germany, and which he implores the Allies not to hinder, will be "revolution" only from the standpoint of Nazi legality. Because Hitler has been an intruder in Germany, the anti-Hitler "revolutionists", who have so much to avenge, could rightly call themselves "loyalists". They are revolutionists in the sense of the American Declaration of Independence. They intend to set up a new régime because they consider the existing system detrimental to the welfare of their own country and the world. It will be the termination of Nazism and, because the Nazi régime will not yield easily, it will, of necessity, be an act of force. Yet the abrogation of Nazism by force is the

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most thoroughly agreed-upon war aim of the United Nations (p. 81). In other words, Hagen argues, revolution in Germany at the end of the war will be a necessary result of the military victory of the Allies, and a concomitant to it. Most important of all: without it, the military victory will be useless!

The anti-Nazis will have learned, Hagen presumes (and he pleads with the Allies to understand this, too), that the fatal mistake of the Weimar Republic must not be repeated, but that the new republic must introduce essential economic and social changes. He is convinced that the coming German republic must seize upon the economic mainstay of the beaten enemy; and that it must introduce a democratic form of socialism:

> The democratic revolutionaries, that is, the German socialists, will, of course, interpret their "four freedoms" in accordance with their own conditions and their own needs. But in Germany these freedoms can be guaranteed only by a democratic-socialist society. State planning must be the servant and not the master of that new society. The democratic party or parties must be the devoted guardians of the democratic revolution. But, on the other side, there seems to be no basis for democracy without this "socialism"... [for history has proved that] in Germany, unlike the Western countries, the middle classes could not bring liberal emancipation (pp. 206-7).

Hagen is so much impressed by the dangers which threaten this democratic socialism in post-Hitler Germany that he considers as problem number one, not the anti-Hitler revolution of the German democrats, but resistance to it by the armed forces of the Allies. He quotes impressive evidence to show how the Allies, after the first war, systematically helped the militarists and reactionaries and hindered the democratic forces in Germany. The other problems discussed are: the nature of the forces for freedom which will emerge in Germany; the international position of Germany after two lost wars; and the possibility of creating new democratic movements in Germany.

As said before, this is a political pamphlet. Unfortunately, the war has produced few of the same caliber. Even readers who disagree with some of the author's basic assumptions will be impressed by his genuine idealism, his concern for international progress, and his sober analysis of the factors which will determine the fate of the next generation.

HANS ERNEST FRIED

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The German Army. By HERBERT ROSINSKI. Revised Edition. Washington, The Infantry Journal, 1944.—ix, 220 pp. $3.00.

In this second edition, more than half the text is rewritten or completely new. The first four chapters, covering the period from 1730 to 1918, have come over with little change from the first edition, published in 1939. Among these is the chapter on the Great War, the weakest in the book and most in need of serious revision. The survey is now brought down to the end of 1942, and the period after 1918 is treated at much greater length than in the first edition.

In this broad field, the topic of most interest (and of most value) to American readers at the present time is the building up of the highly perfected *Reichswehr,* and its vast expansion into Hitler's *Wehrmacht.* In some ways, this is treated more clearly in the first edition. In the new volume the author's interest seems focused rather on the political complications of the period after 1918; and the appearance of Rabenau's life of von Seeckt has brought him much new material of this sort. The development of the *Wehrmacht* is hurried over almost impatiently so that in place of concrete matters of basic importance, we have rather speculative discussion of theoretical (or even hypothetical) points.

In the first four chapters also there is this tendency toward a political and social perspective. It is not without interest, but in so brief an outline it tends to crowd out concrete points of fact which cannot possibly be overlooked in even a concise survey of the development of the German army.

A concluding section presents four "analytical chapters": "Coordination and Command", "The General Staff System", "Current Ideas of the German Army", and "German Strategy in the Present War". They are full of interest, but mixed and uneven in quality. (In these respects, they are typical of the book as a whole: one so marked by good qualities and sharp faults that it is difficult to sum it up properly.) The pattern and arrangement are intricate and often confused; and keenly discerning comments alternate with wildly erratic judgments and off-hand generalizations. The marked tendency to inflate simple ideas into broad abstractions often leads to collapse, when the author touches the factual record. His glowing tribute to Schlieffen, for instance, is accompanied by the conventional and quite erroneous misstatement of what the

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Schlieffen plan was. His discussion of this, and of the actual course of the opening campaign in 1914, can only be termed a caricature of history.

Can any other term be applied to the singular contribution which opens the discussion of "German Strategy in the Present War"? In all seriousness, the author informs us that the "basic motive" of Hitler's seizure of Denmark and Norway in 1940 "was in all probability primarily *defensive*" (the italics are his own). In 1940, he explains, the German fleet alone "was not powerful enough to dispute the entry into the Baltic. Then too the development of air power had alarmed German military leaders about a possible enemy occupation of sea and air bases in the inadequately defended Nordic countries. Such a step would serve to bring overwhelming sea and air power within a short range of the whole extended German northern flank." Poor Germany!

In reality, of course, the German U-boats and minelayers were quite strong enough to safeguard the entry into the Baltic, and there was no conceivable reason for the British fleet to attempt any such stunt. It had not cruisers enough to safeguard shipping in the North Atlantic, or the destroyers and other small craft needed to deal with the active campaign of the U-boats. "Overwhelming air power" was then overwhelmingly on the German side; and this known and certain superiority was a cornerstone of the campaign already planned against France. Unquestioning confidence in this superiority was the reason for venturing on the ill-fated Battle of Britain—a few months later. Yet the seizing of Norway was "primarily *defensive*"! This tortuous reasoning of the "military analyst and thinker" is merely a flat echo of the canned excuses Ribbentrop offered the foreign correspondents in Berlin on the morning of the attack.

This wolf-and-the-lamb interpretation of German war policy recalls all too vividly the themes offered us (so successfully) after the Great War by the editors of the *Kriegsschuldfrage* and the Allied historians who followed their lead so submissively. Is it an indication of a "Wave of the Future" which is to sweep forward the revisionist historians of the Hitler war? It is astonishing to have this dish set before American readers in 1944, by the *Infantry Journal* at Washington—with a glowing introduction by the Editor.

T. H. Thomas

Cambridge, Mass.

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Why the United States Fights Against Hitlerite Germany. (In Russian) By ALEXANDER A. TROYANOVSKY. Moscow, Pravda, 1942.—112 pp.

Fifteen thousand copies of this book by the former Soviet Ambassador to Washington were placed on sale in Moscow on March 23, 1943, at the time the Soviet government signed a treaty with Japan regulating fishing off the coast of Siberia. This coincidence may not be without significance in the light of the thesis expounded in this brochure; for, in a chapter entitled "War in the Pacific Ocean", Mr. Troyanovsky argues that the Japanese were tricked by Adolf Hitler into war with the United States and England. He speaks of the tripartite Anti-Comintern Pact of November 25, 1936, and contends that the renewal of the Pact on November 25, 1940, and the "special" agreement entered into by Germany, Japan and Italy on September 27, 1940, were directed primarily against the United States and Great Britain.

Thus the author implies that Russia and Japan have been, and are now, in a state of unresolved conflict. Yet it is to be remembered that the dictate of self-interest prompts the Soviet government to maintain the fiction of neutrality toward the American-Japanese war, a fiction similar to that of the United States prior to December 7, 1941.

In a scholarly fashion Mr. Troyanovsky discusses the basic principles underlying the foreign policies of the United States, supporting his argument by quotations from the writings of Presidents Washington, Monroe, Lincoln, Cleveland and Franklin D. Roosevelt. He comes to the conclusion that the United States is fighting Nazi Germany primarily because of Hitler's political and economic penetration into South America.

As examples of this penetration—which constituted a grave threat to the safety of the United States—Mr. Troyanovsky cites these facts. The Germans through Kondorsyndicate operated the airlines in Brazil. The same syndicate maintained connections between Buenos Aires and Santiago. In Colombia the airlines were largely controlled by the Germans. They also dominated the airlines between Lima and Buenos Aires, and between Lima and Berlin. Similarly, they controlled several large radio stations in Latin America.

In order to counteract the economic influence of Germany and in order to compensate the Latin American countries for their losses of German markets as a direct result of the present war, the Congress of the United States appropriated $500,000,000 to the Export-Import

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Bank for the purpose of providing credit with which to stimulate trade between the United States and Latin American countries. "However, even these far-reaching measures did not entirely displace the tendency of Latin American countries to continue to develop economic relations with Germany" (p. 38). Before 1942, Germans occupied a prominent place in the sale of industrial equipment, agricultural implements, electrical equipment, metal manufactures. Germans owned and controlled important coffee plantations in Brazil, Mexico, Venezuela, Ecuador and Colombia; cotton and sugar plantations in Peru; large steel foundries in Chile; oil wells in Argentina, Colombia and Mexico. Similarly, they were the owners of copper mines in Brazil and of breweries and hotels in many Latin American countries, while they played an important rôle in the medical supply trade of Peru.

It is interesting to note that in this volume the Russians are told that the conflict between Hitlerite Germany and the United States was an inevitable result of many years' strained relations dating back to the days of Chancellor Bismarck and Admiral Von Tirpitz. The German yearning for political power in order to dominate the world would have brought the two nations to a state of war long ago had it not been for lack of military feasibility and political expediency.

Moreover, according to Mr. Troyanovsky, the present war between Hitlerite Germany and the United States began on April 1, 1939, five months before England went into war with Nazi Germany. The occasion was the launching of the battleship Von Tirpitz. At that time Herr Hitler spoke at length concerning the necessity of establishing an effective link among German elements the world over and concluded with a threat to England's naval supremacy. In so stating the problem, Hitler threatened not only Great Britain but the United States as well. His effort to undermine England's naval supremacy was a direct attempt to restrict the freedom of action of the United States on the seas and, above all, on the Atlantic Ocean (p. 56).

A third reason why the United States fights Hitler's Germany is that fascism is the mortal enemy of freedom and liberty, of racial tolerance, of equality of opportunity. It is in defense of these democratic principles that the coöperation of the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the United States has become increasingly close in the hope of defeating a common enemy.

The former Ambassador contends that within the borders of the United States itself foreign fascists were not without influence. The

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German-American Bund headed by Fritz Kuhn, a naturalized American citizen, worked openly and without interference. Kuhn received substantial support from American magnates and capitalists. Mr. Troyanovsky lists the various nation-wide subversive activities that were carried on by this Bund. He points out that, according to the 1930 Census, 1,609,000 persons living in the United States were born in Germany. These people, both aliens and naturalized citizens, formed a powerful nucleus for the dissemination of vicious Nazi propaganda.

In the final chapter entitled "Strengthening of the Military Collaboration between the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and the United States", the author speaks briefly of Foreign Commissar Molotov's visit to Washington and the visits of Prime Minister Churchill and W. Averell Harriman to Moscow. He mentions the trip of Wendell L. Willkie, stating that it increased friendship between the United States and the Soviet Union. There is no reference either to the "United Nations" or to the "global war". Instead, an effective Anglo-Soviet-American coalition against Hitler is glorified. Mr. Troyanovsky closes his argument with a spirited statement expressing his belief that the three Powers will eventually defeat their common enemy.

CHARLES PRINCE

INDIANA UNIVERSITY

American Diplomacy in Action: A Series of Case Studies. By RICHARD W. VAN ALSTYNE. Stanford University, Stanford University Press, 1944.—xvi, 760 pp. $5.00.

Eschewing the strict chronological order, Professor Van Alstyne in *American Diplomacy in Action* has centered the story of American foreign policy on a few significant themes. The dominant theme is that of security. Under this heading, with various subdivisions, "Continental Security", "Isthmian Security", "Hemispheric Security", "Collective Security" and the "Freedom of the Seas", a large part of the American diplomatic past is studied, in what amounts to about two thirds of the volume. The other two major divisions of the work are "Expansion and the Concept of Manifest Destiny" and "Neutrality and Isolation".

There is much value in such an enterprise as the above. In a field which has been so assiduously worked as that of American diplomatic history, new syntheses are of the first importance. Suggestive interpretation is always badly needed. It will be helpful to the student

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to think in terms of lines of broad general tendency, rather than in terms of episode. Professor Van Alstyne has provided an opportunity for such thinking, and students of American foreign policy should be grateful to him.

Of course, any such analysis must have certain weaknesses as well as certain strengths. The study of diplomacy in this fashion inevitably involves some repetition; it makes it more difficult to interrelate episodes which are united in time, and which had an effect one on the other, and it subordinates some very important and interesting aspects of American foreign policy which do not fit into the categories that have been set up. To illustrate, the Jeffersonian embargo is one of the most striking examples of the use, by a single nation, of economic pressure as a substitute for war, but it receives less than a page in Professor Van Alstyne's work because it does not bulk large in his development of principle. Or to take another point, much of the expansion of the United States in the Caribbean is dealt with by the author under the heading of security; but by this method it is not related to the war with Spain, which forms, in fact, a kind of prelude to it, and this problem is taken up much later in the book, and, in a sense, in unrelated fashion.

It is possible, also, to cavil at some of Professor Van Alstyne's classifications. The word security is certainly made to cover a wide variety of questions. American interests in the Caribbean are indeed strategic, but they are not simply strategic. In a very broad sense a doctrine of collective security is involved in American relations with China, but it is difficult to pour quite as many facts into that particular mold as the author attempts to do.

On the other hand, this new synthesis is sometimes brilliant and suggestive. Among the very best pages in the book are those in which American foreign policy for the years 1914-1919 is related to the idea of security. In the perspective of 1944, it is interesting to ask how far considerations of security influenced diplomatic action in the course of the first World War. Certainly, at the back of the mind of Woodrow Wilson and of his principal advisers, Colonel House and Robert Lansing, the notion that German aggression constituted a threat to the American political and social order can be clearly discerned. The matter deserves much further study; but Professor Van Alstyne has treated it excellently. In the same way, his consideration of the Covenant, his emphasis on the Lodge-Knox view (which was distinctly *not* isolationist, at any rate at the outset), is provocative and useful. And no frame of reference could be better than his own in which to deal with events of the recent period.

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The reviewer believes that the sense of imminent danger, or in other words the concept of security, was central to the great events that unfolded in 1940 and 1941.

American Diplomacy in Action makes interesting reading. It is judicious and balanced in tone; but it does not avoid drawing conclusions where the facts dictate such a duty. It is not simply another diplomatic text, but a text with a fresh point of view, and with a contribution of its own.

Dexter Perkins

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The American Senate and World Peace. By Kenneth Colegrove. New York, The Vanguard Press, 1944.—209 pp. $2.00.

Professor Colegrove fears that an isolationist minority of the Senate will prevent ratification of the peace treaty at the end of the present war. A similar minority of the Senate defeated the Versailles Treaty and the League in 1919, and the same catastrophe faces us today. He urges the immediate adoption of a constitutional amendment making possible the ratification of treaties by simple majorities of House and Senate, instead of by two thirds of the Senate alone.

The two-thirds requirement, Professor Colegrove says, is undemocratic. The future peace is to be a people's peace, and he quotes approvingly Vice President Wallace's promise that it will usher in the century of the common man. The "basic definition" of democracy, he says, is "the rule of one half plus one or more of the citizens" (p. 49). And: "The democratic process . . . simply means that the government will express in action the will of the majority, without obstruction by a minority" (p. 50). He cites the commonly known fact that the Nevada Senators represent fewer voters than the New York Senators, and proves that, in unlikely circumstances, thirty-three Senators representing one twelfth of the electorate can frustrate the will of the other eleven twelfths (p. 13).

Professor Colegrove relies heavily on the Versailles Treaty. The Treaty with the so-called Lodge reservations was defeated, 57-39, on March 19, 1920. Of the thirty-nine dissenting votes, eighteen—not fifteen, as Professor Colegrove says—were cast by Republican and Democratic Irreconcilables, and the remaining twenty-one by men whom he calls stubborn followers of Wilson (p. 81), a description that would have surprised Senators Underwood and Cotton Ed Smith. Since eighteen, the greatest strength the Irreconcilables ever attained, is nowhere near a third of the Senate, Professor Colegrove's task is to

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show what, if anything, the two-thirds requirement had to do with the Treaty's defeat. Conventionally, he tries to blame Lodge, who was "almost pathologic", and had "a bias almost amounting to a disease" and a warped intellect (p. 85). Even granting Lodge these formidable attributes, by what black arts was he able to make twenty pro-treaty Democrats vote for rejection? In one paragraph, Professor Colegrove proposes "manipulation"; in another, he discouragedly says that the defeat of the Treaty was "astonishing", and "amazed even Lodge himself" (pp. 81, 82). The possibility that it came about, not because of the eighteen Irreconcilables, but through a complex of circumstances, among them a determination of certain Democratic and Republican leaders, but not Lodge, to take the League into the approaching presidential campaign, is not mentioned by Professor Colegrove and seems not to have occurred to him. The Senatorial leaders were able to produce the twenty-odd pro-treaty votes needed for defeat under the two-thirds requirement. No one can say whether they could have produced the ten additional votes needed for defeat by the simple majority that is Professor Colegrove's aim.

The important thing in Professor Colegrove's book, however, is his doctrine of the majority. There was a time when majorities and minorities did not, like uniformed and hostile armies, march against one another, but when the individuals composing them sought a mutual accommodation that would be tolerable to all. Professor Colegrove says that we are living in a new age, in which eighteenth-century institutions and principles are without validity. With diffidence this reviewer mentions another doctrine, that of the general will. It may be worth recalling, however, if only for its quaintness, and to illustrate the splendid development of political theory from Rousseau to Colegrove.

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The Road to Teheran: The Story of Russia and America, 1781-1943. By FOSTER RHEA DULLES. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1944.—vii, 279 pp. $2.50.

The number of books written with the intention of clarifying present events through an interpretation of their historical background is legion. In too many of them, however, the authors distort either history or present reality, or both, by trying to sift and adapt historical facts so that in each case the book may best suit its author's favorite recipe for solving some contemporary problems

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—political or otherwise. Foster Rhea Dulles has written one of the rare books in which the proper balance has been kept between the problems of our forefathers and our own. He has achieved this miracle by concentrating his attention on the fundamentals of history on one hand, and on the major issues of present reality on the other, without permitting himself to be led astray into the jungles of partisanship and petty conflict.

Dulles deals with two great peoples, whose historical destinies he has aptly outlined, as if they were two astral bodies (not in a theosophical sense, of course). From the beginning of his book to its end he emphasizes the similarity between Russia's position in the world and that of the United States as the underlying factor in the history of both countries as well as in the history of their interrelations. "The vast extent and great natural riches of the territories of the United States and Russia are the primary factors behind their emphasis upon national security rather than overseas empire." The story starts with a vivid picture of a revolutionary America seeking recognition from a conservative Russia; it concludes with a conservative America granting recognition to a revolutionary Russia.

Within the general framework of diplomatic relations much attention is paid to American public opinion with all its changing moods. Brief but pertinent characterizations of the leading personalities on the diplomatic stage—chiefly on the American side—add greatly to the readability of the book. From the reviewer's point of view, there are, however, some lacunae in Dulles' story. Thus, for example, there is no mention of the joint resolution of the Senate and the House expressing "deep regret" concerning the attempt on the life of Alexander II in 1866, nor of the sending, in this connection, of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, G. V. Fox, to Russia as the special envoy of Congress. One likewise may wonder why the colorful personality of that erratic scholar, Jeremiah Curtin, secretary of the American legation in the 1860's, has been completely ignored. Furthermore, too little attention has been paid by Dulles to Russia's domestic background and Russian public opinion. What information he gives on it is not always adequate. For example, the Duma period hardly can be characterized as that of "reaction" and "absolutism" (p. 95). Contrary to the author's opinion the Duma was not "stifled"; it was precisiely the conflict between the Tsar and the Duma at the time of the first World War which initiated the Revolution of 1917.

GEORGE VERNADSKY

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Dominion of the North: A History of Canada. By DONALD GRANT CREIGHTON. Boston, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1944.—vii, 535 pp. $3.50.

This book confirms the impression, created by his original monographs of the past decade, that Professor Creighton is one of the best historians at work in North America. Here, for the first time, the recalcitrant, centrifugal stuff of Canadian history has been synthesized, instead of being merely sorted into pigeonholes or thinly generalized. Even a relatively uninformed reader must feel that the author has handled his materials with great powers of understanding and of explanatory exposition. The expert will recognize his mastery of the studies published during the past twenty-five years which have so effectively reinterpreted Canadian history. Occasionally, anomalous materials drive him to resort to mere art in arrangement, but for the most part a strong and efficient logic pervades the book. He writes excellently and manages to use ironic wit, vivid incidents, apt quotations, and brief portraits in an unhurried way without upsetting the proportions of his work. There are more compendious single volumes of reference for Canadian history, but there is no near rival in terms of unified historical interpretation.

The theme, as was almost inevitable, is the survival of Canada as an independent nation separate from the United States, and the author is quite frank in a nationalism which casts a critical eye on the threatening forces, external and internal. Thus the excellent third chapter on New France serves as the taproot for successive later discussions of the profound dichotomy within the Canadian nation; the attitude toward even a stupid or bullying Great Britain is more friendly than that toward the really dangerous United States; the chapter on the creation of a transcontinental Canada is probably the finest in the volume; for once Sir John Macdonald and Sir Wilfrid Laurier receive something like evenhanded treatment for their rather different services in nation building; and the treatment of the distribution of federal and provincial powers, whether in the light of Privy Council absurdities or of regional particularisms, is sardonic and almost passionate.

This single-minded approach exacts its price. Applause for victories over "continentalism" means under-emphasis on the North Americanism of Canada and on the beneficent aspects of its interlocking with its neighbor. In fact, the reader can find the Union of South Africa in the index, but not the United States. It may be that grateful reliance on Great Britain to offset the United States

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explains why Creighton falls into the not uncommon Canadian error or inadvertency of describing the Balfour Declaration of 1926 on the legal and constitutional equality within the British Commonwealth of Nations as if it applied only to the overseas dominions and not, as it was phrased, to "the group of self-governing communities composed of Great Britain and the dominions." It apparently has something to do with his impression that the treatment of the persons and property of the losers in the American Revolution was "markedly" different from what happened in the English Civil War, and with his belief that American emigration to the Canadas almost ceased in 1812, whereas it continued to excite comment until 1837, at least.

Should the publishers be persuaded to bring out a revised edition, it would seem desirable to provide a railway map, and also to improve the physical map which, by its inadequate representation of the western mountain ranges and omission of important waterways in the Northwest Territories, seems to reflect the use of an older base than that used for the map of present-day Canada.

J. B. BREBNER

The Establishment of Constitutional Government in Bulgaria. By C. E. BLACK. Princeton, Princeton University Press; London, Oxford University Press, 1943.—x, 344 pp. $3.75.

Post-war consideration of types of government for the Balkan states, perhaps with republicanism in the ascendant and federalism on the horizon, is inevitable. For this reason, any scholarly study of modern constitutional development in one of those states must be doubly welcome just now.

Bulgaria's new opportunity to form her own government came with Russia's military successes over the Ottoman Empire in 1877-1878 and with the permissive authority of the Congress of Berlin. At the moment, she stood under Russia's friendly military occupation. Before, she had been a mere Ottoman province, subject to the whims of successive pashas, her geographical nearness to Constantinople placing her under direct rule and precluding any preliminary evolution of self-governing simultaneous with Serbia's and Rumania's.

Bulgaria acted promptly. She built, from the ground up, an autonomous régime, and imported Prince Alexander of Battenburg. Her early years of constitutional development reflect primarily the views of her own constitution makers, together with Alexander's interpretation of the monarchical functions. This period, 1878-1885, is the one covered by Mr. Black's study.

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The Tirnovo Constitution of 1879 was Bulgaria's first autonomous organic law since the late Middle Ages. Framed largely without foreign interference, it borrowed heavily from the experience of existing limited monarchies, especially Serbia. The mistakes made at first in the principles and practices of government were to have been expected; yet the Principality established, within these few years, several relatively permanent features of its system, including an imposing legislature, a departmentalized executive, and Liberal and Conservative political parties.

Considerable powers were delegated to the legislature at a time when the country was almost without experienced legislators. As a result, there were major difficulties in reaching a constitutional settlement. Prince Alexander insistently sought to increase his own authority; and he almost attained his object, partly by playing upon partisan factions in his ever-changing ministries, partly through Russia's agreement to approve constitutional modifications if he followed legal methods. Failing to win revisions, however, Alexander became dictator in 1881 with the support of the all-powerful military. His policies eventually alienated much of Russia's support, while he never retreated from his interpretation of his princely prerogatives. Constitutional stability began with the restoration of the organic law in 1883. It was finally achieved, however, only after two further developments—Bulgaria's union with Eastern Rumelia, and Alexander's enforced abdication.

Mr. Black is preoccupied with political opinion inside Bulgaria during the immediate period. The debates of the constitutional assembly, the subsequent views of leading ministers, legislators and political editors, all are followed in detail and, commendably, from Bulgarian sources. The account might be made more nearly complete by a summary of the parallel (though somewhat different) constitutionalism in Eastern Rumelia. The larger perspective seems slighted also in two other respects: only a few pages sketch the highly important policies of the European Powers. Conceivably, the failure to establish a Senate or the proposed Council of Twelve (pp. 60, 109) might be elucidated by studies of Serbia's constitutional experiment of 1835 and its difficulties. A half-century earlier, indeed, Serbia had had a similar opportunity—one likewise within the Ottoman Empire, and one with similar problems and identical sponsoring power. In spite of this the study within its limits is a satisfactory analysis.

VERNON J. PURYEAR

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

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The Italian Conception of International Law. By ANGELO PIERO SERENI. New York, Columbia University Press, 1943.—xii, 402 pp. $5.50.

This carefully written account of Italian thought on the nature and subjects of international law will be welcomed by students of international law, and be found useful as well to historians and political theorists. Although the writings of some of the Renaissance scholars and of some modern jurists have been available in English or French translation, there has heretofore been no systematic presentation of Italian thought and writings at hand for those not fortunate enough to be able to use the Italian language. This has been regrettable, for out of the laboratory of the relationships of the Italian states with one another, and, in the past century, of Italy's associations with the other states of the world, there has grown up a rich and diversified literature on international law. Dr. Sereni's clear and thoughtful analysis places the essentials of this literature at the ready disposal of the scholar and jurist.

The greater part of the book is devoted to a doctrinal study of Italian concepts. Four periods of development are treated: the Renaissance, the Period of Foreign Ascendancy, the *Risorgimento,* and the Contemporary Period. In the Renaissance Period the principal contributions of the Italian jurists lay in the evolution of the doctrines of the just war, and the concept of sovereignty. The *Risorgimento* Period witnessed the rise of Mazzini's and Mancini's doctrines of nationalities, placing emphasis upon nationalities rather than states as persons and subjects of international law. The Contemporary Period has seen this idea, as well as the natural law basis of international law, displaced by the doctrines of positivism and etatism. Dr. Sereni believes, however, that notwithstanding widespread acceptance of positivism, and its perversion by the Fascists, the humanistic elements of the doctrine of nationalities remain deeply rooted in the Italian heart.

One chapter only is devoted to fascism and international law (chap. xiv), and this chapter is both brief and disappointing in content. The author maintains, and seemingly quite correctly, that the pragmatic acts and ex post facto theories of fascism are the antithesis of the principles upon which a community of nations governed by law and order must rest. But he fails to buttress his argument with any real excursion into the writings and mouthings of the fascist fanatics. The reader leaves the chapter with an unsatisfied feeling, wishing that

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Dr. Sereni had done more to let the Fascists condemn their deeds and so-called principles out of their own oracles. It is the author's thesis that fascism represents only an aberration in the history of Italy and that its works and propaganda will not last. Therefore he sets himself the task of discovering the more enduring conceptions of the law which he believes are based on love of justice and freedom and are upheld by a long line of jurists and statesmen.

The last section of the book contains an abbreviated analysis of Italian practice in international law and legislation during the past fifty years. The author excuses the shortness of his treatment (52 pages) on the ground that Italian practice has been much less important than its theory, having little originality, while many fascist practices were outright violations of the law. Notwithstanding the brevity of the treatment, students and practitioners will find the contents of this section enlightening and useful.

The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Division of International Law, is to be complimented for its further service to international law and understanding through underwriting the publication of Dr. Sereni's study.

NORMAN J. PADELFORD
FLETCHER SCHOOL OF LAW AND DIPLOMACY

The Early History of Deposit Banking in Mediterranean Europe. Vol. 1. Part I: *The Structure and Functions of the Early Credit System;* Part II: *Banking in Catalonia, 1240-1723.* By ABBOTT PAYSON USHER. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1943.—xxi, 649 pp. $5.00.

The American contribution to the economic history of Spain in the late Middle Ages and early modern period is probably second to none. Much work still remains to be done; but, if the Iberian peninsula has ceased to be a Cinderella of economic history, this is due largely to the painstaking and intelligent research of such scholars as Merriman, Hamilton, Klein, Smith, Haring and Usher. Now Professor A. P. Usher has added to his own contribution by devoting to Spain more than one half of his new volume, Even in chapters not concerned primarily with Spain, Spanish banking receives the larger share of the attention, with Italy only in the second place. Happily, Professor Usher promises a second volume devoted to Italy, the pioneer country for all sorts of business techniques.

On Spanish banking, so far, we have had only a few notes by Andrè Sayous, two short essays by Negre y Cases and Peris y

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Fuentes, and an exploratory essay by Usher himself. This is enough to say that the new work of Professor Usher opens a window on a subject on which very little hitherto had been known. The documents included in the volume would be, by themselves, more than enough to recommend the book to the attention of all historians of economics and trade.

The first part of the book (pp. 3-233), however, has a much wider scope than Spain. It aims at giving a general picture of the early deposit banking in Mediterranean Europe. Some correlated problems are studied in excursuses on the fairs, public debts, and currencies. Let us say at once that the picture given is well rounded, comprehensive and enlightening. The chapter on currency, in the reviewer's opinion, raises a number of minor objections which can be stated only in the most hurried way. While the word *regale* is mediaeval, the notion of sovereign monopoly of currency was transmitted by the Roman Empire to all the barbarian kingdoms, with the possible exception of Merovingian France (p. 193). The circulation of gold was far from negligible, at least in Italy, Catalonia, Provence and England, much before the thirteenth century (p. 195). The *consensus civium* for alteration of the monetary standards was necessary in Mantua as early as 945 (pp. 195-96). The date 1172 for the earliest Genoese groat and the derivation of that coin from the English penny are hypotheses open to challenge (p. 205). The earliest Genoese golden coins are as early as, or earlier than, the florins, which were preceded also by Frederic II's *augustales* (p. 206). But the whole history of coinage is highly controversial. So, too, are some points on which Professor Usher's analysis seems a little vague; as, for instance, the all-important issue of the development of the concept of the bearer (pp. 94 *et seq.*)

Other controversial issues have been avoided; as, for instance, deposit banking in the twelfth century, on which the wrathful and largely unwarranted criticisms of Sayous oppose the theses of Di Tucci and Reynolds. This and other important aspects probably have been left for the announced second volume. The first volume can be regarded as an excellent piece of work, and henceforth will be an indispensable reference for every scholar interested in economic and legal history.

ROBERT SABATINO LOPEZ

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Co-operative Organisations and Post-War Relief. International Labour Office, Studies and Reports, Series H, No. 4. Montreal, International Labour Office, 1943. Published in the United Kingdom by P. S. King & Staples, Ltd., London. Distributed in the United States by the International Labour Office, Washington Branch.—173 pp. $1.00; 4*s*.

Global relief and rehabilitation necessitated by a global war is a huge undertaking. Its efficient administration obviously calls for the utilization of all existing agencies which can aid in the task. *Co-operative Organizations and Post-War Relief* is a convincing study by the International Labour Office of the adaptability of the vast network of coöperative enterprise to any plan of post-war relief and rehabilitation.

The factual basis for this thesis is presented in the first half of the volume. Here the reader will find a succinct statement of the philosophy of coöperation and a brief survey, supported by statistical data of coöperative activity throughout the world. The coöperative movement is viewed as "a planned economy with a social content", representing "a successful attempt to ensure in economic life freedom from obsession with profit, the abolition of exploitation of man by man, and the dignity of self help combined with mutual aid—a revaluation of man himself." The term "coöperation" is used in a very broad sense and includes producers' as well as consumers' coöperatives, agricultural marketing and purchasing associations, health coöperatives, insurance groups, credit unions—in short, every type of financial, commercial and personal service transaction conducted on a nonprofit basis.

Following this descriptive survey the reader will find about a dozen cogent arguments for the utilization of the vast coöperative network in a program of post-war relief and rehabilitation. These may be grouped under the following headings: (1) availability of existing organizational machinery; (2) ready access to sources of supply; and (3) the nature of coöperative enterprise.

The coöperative movement represents an association of some 71,000,000 people, mostly heads of families, in thirty-five countries. The members are organized into societies which are united horizontally and vertically into national federations which in turn are loosely associated in the International Cooperative Alliance and the International Cooperative Trading Agency, Ltd. It comprises ventures varying in size from a village store to huge manufacturing undertakings and international trade commitments of the national wholesalers.

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Annual transactions running into many billions of dollars, and involving hundreds of thousands of personnel, including employees, managers, and highly specialized executives, are the component parts of this economic enterprise. It would be sheer waste of time, money and effort on the part of any relief agency not to utilize this available machinery to reach the very people whose needs have been supplied by the coöperative movement for almost a century.

The problem of securing sources of supplies and providing for their efficient distribution among the needy will be a difficult one. Here again the coöperative movement can be of inestimable help. About 30 per cent of the agricultural goods of the United States and Canada are marketed by coöperative associations. Most of the dairy products from Australia, New Zealand and the Scandinavian countries are similarly handled. What is more, many of the large European coöperative wholesalers, especially the British and Scottish, have maintained close economic ties with coöperative marketing associations outside of the United Kingdom. Hence, any post-war relief agency can have at its disposal an available source of supplies and an efficient method of channeling these supplies to the points where they will do the most good. To attempt to duplicate this machinery by *ad hoc* agencies would be sheer folly.

Aside from its organizational adaptability, coöperative enterprise has a long history and experience in administering relief to people in want. After the last war, during serious labor troubles, in time of stress, and during the blitz in England, coöperative organizations, notably the British Cooperative Wholesale, have administered relief on a vast scale. By outright donation, and credit extensions to tide over a difficult period, coöperative machinery has been effectively used not only to supply immedate relief but, also, in the words of Governor Lehman, "To help people to help themselves." The coöperative movement, because it is a permanent institution, can be used effectively as a bridge from the period of relief to that of resumption of normal economic activity.

The International Cooperative Alliance in London and the Cooperative League in this country have offered their services to the Allied American governments respectively in a program of restoring normal conditions in countries which have been the special victims of this global war. It will redound to the credit of any post-war relief agency to welcome and make use of the vast machinery and experience of the international coöperative movement.

EDWARD M. COHEN

BROOKLYN, NEW YORK.

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Man the Measure: A New Approach to History. By ERICH KAHLER. New York, Pantheon Books Inc., 1943.—x, 700 pp. $5.00.

Outlines of history may be divided into three classes: those which are concerned essentially with the course of events, with what is unique in each period; those that emphasize primarily the regularities of history, the way history follows and exhibits principles; and those, finally, which can only be called "theologies" of history and which in a sense combine the characteristics of the first two kinds, that is, they are written mainly to show that the rules which history displays have changed from time to time according to some irresistible law of God or Fate, and that the future will therefore be fundamentally different from the past. It is to the third of these types that the present study belongs.

The process, according to Mr. Kahler, by which the principles of human conduct change, is an evolutionary one. Man has not always been what he is today. Originally the species would seem to have arisen "in the gradual evolution of organic nature." Later, man evolved into something essentially different from the animals by developing an "exclusively human feature", which is "*man's faculty of going beyond himself,* of transcending the limits of his own physical being." Subsequent changes in human nature have proceeded in the same direction: "the whole development from the animal to the highest of human goals is simply a development of the primary faculty of discerning and transcending, those acts of spirit which make man human." This does not mean, however, that man has achieved a soul in the sense of an immortal soul. The author states specifically that "the term spirit... is not meant to carry any value overtones with it." It is merely an evolved human capacity, "man's faculty of overstepping his own being." Yet it is the highest achievement of man's evolution, or of history, up to now, and the steps in its attainment are the very ones by which the past led to the present and may here be traced and understood.

The periods into which history falls are defined by the author:

> The first period, from the condition of primitive man to the end of antiquity, comprises the process of man's detachment and discernment of an outer world from an inner world. This implies the disintegration of the primeval, corporal community and of the primeval conformity of man with the universe, and, correspondingly, the formation of the human individual.... The second period, from the end of antiquity to the Renaissance, includes the completion and emancipation of the human

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individual, his final deliverance from a superhuman rule and the setting free of the human intellect. The third period, the modern era, means the process of man's transcendence toward a clearly conceived, objective world of nature and toward a conscious organized human community.

To this outline the content and the argument of the book on the whole conform closely. Those who are persuaded that the world is moving inevitably toward a new age in which the highest human values will be sought and expressed in and through one or more "collective orders" may find the story of man, as here presented, convincing. Others are likely to be more or less skeptical, if not violently hostile. Believers in a supernatural order, such as Jews and Christians, will scarcely fail to be repelled by a system which equates religious beliefs with superstitions and relegates all forms of worship to the childhood and youth of the race. But it is the philosopher of history who will, perhaps, ask the most legitimately disturbing questions. If man's present human qualities have "evolved" from something radically different, how can we have history, and how can we know this evolution has taken place? The language of the past could convey no certain meaning to us. Again, historical knowledge can be based only on *reliable* evidence. If man and his institutions are evolving *inevitably,* how can it be that at any particular time in the past there was such a thing as character, the human integrity without which reliable historical evidence may be lacking? An automaton can be neither an honest man nor a liar.

In other respects the author's work is less open to criticism. There are distinct traces of racial, national and religious prejudice; but on the whole there are a far greater objectivity and a much clearer grasp of the various phases of history dealt with than the main theses put forward might lead one to expect. The necessary compression makes the style at times overly vague; and there is a serious lack of clear and fixed definition. But the quality of most of the book argues that the author is both honest and able; and certainly he is informative, interesting and provocative.

DONALD J. PIERCE

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The Theme of Plato's Republic. By ROBERT G. HOERBER. Saint Louis, Eden Publishing House, 1944.—ix, 119 pp. $2.75.

This dissertation deserves a review, not because of its intrinsic merits, but as an example of a new method of interpreting Plato which seems to be spreading, and even to be adopted in courses on Plato in some colleges and universities.

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Plato obviously did not believe in liberal democracy or left-wing socialism; he believed in a strictly aristocratic type of government, but not in the rule of the wealthy over the poor, or in the arbitrary rule of the various types of modern fascism; he advocated some kind of communism for his ruling class, but was opposed to anything resembling a dictatorship of the proletariat. In other words, his political ideas do not coincide with any of the conventional patterns of today. It therefore requires a certain effort to understand his political philosophy.

There are two easy ways of avoiding this effort which are becoming popular. One can declare that Plato was a propagandist who concealed sinister aims behind his paradoxes; or one can say that he did not mean his ideal state seriously and that, in fact, it was meant as a parody, or as a symbol for something else.

The author of the present book follows the second road. He begins by trying to show that the ideal state is not the main theme of Plato's *Republic* and that Plato did not believe in the actual realization of this state. This is not in itself a bad approach; for the discussion of the ideal state is clearly integrated with the discussion of other problems. Plato says himself that the ideal can never be realized in this world, so that the best we can hope for is to come as near to it as possible. It would have been an excellent thing if the author had tried to show in detail how the discussion of the ideal state is correlated to the discussion of justice, of human nature, et cetera, and how far Plato, in the different stages of his development, thought that the ideal might be realized under various circumstances.

But the author goes much further. He tries to show that Plato cannot have meant his ideal state seriously because his description of it is insufficient, inconsistent, and often self-contradictory. In his opinion we must therefore conclude that Plato meant to use the ideal state merely as an "illustrative parallel" to his analysis of the human soul. How a political construction which is inconsistent and not to be taken seriously can reasonably serve as an illustrative parallel to an analysis which is consistent and meant to be taken seriously the author fails to explain.

Of the author's reasoning two examples may suffice. On page 23, he contends that Plato cannot have taken the ideal state seriously because "Plato considered it practically impossible to keep the proposed state unified." In support of this contention he quotes a passage from the *Republic* in which Plato says that it will be ex-

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tremely difficult for a state of the kind he advocates to be destroyed, but that *since nothing in this life is everlasting even this state will not last forever,* and that therefore, after long periods of time and under especially unfavorable circumstances, discord may arise even in this state and start it on the road to ruin.

On page 33 the author contends that Plato contradicts himself when he advocates a kind of communism for the ruling class in his state and yet in another passage objects to a cancellation of debts and division of lands. "For," the author says, "communism is by far the more extreme development (*sic*)." It does not matter to him that in one case the cancellation of debts and division of land are a means by which a demagogue tries to win the support of the people for the establishment of a tyrannical and arbitrary rule, while in the other case it is the purpose of the community of possessions to secure a disinterested ruling class which cannot be corrupted by greed for money and other property.

Since Plato's ideas do not agree with our conventional patterns of thought, one may contend that it is not worth while to read his works, because he is too remote from our problems. In the opinion of the reviewer, it would be more correct to say that Plato's work, even if one does not agree with his results, is worth a very serious effort to understand it, for it makes us see aspects of the political problem to which we have blinded ourselves because we are too much accustomed to thinking in fixed patterns.

If one makes this effort, he will soon discover that Plato is not so remote from us as it may seem at first sight. To give just one instance: in most ancient states, democracies and oligarchies alike, though not in some Hellenistic monarchies, the leading statesmen and administrators had to be men of independent means, because they were not paid for their services. When the outlay was heavy, they often either ruined themselves or had to make up for the loss by doubtful or even illegal means. In order to avoid those evils Plato demands that the rulers in his state be supported by the community. Inasmuch as the members of governments and administrations in modern states are paid from public funds, Plato's demand to that extent is presently fulfilled almost everywhere. That he went further and advocated a kind of communism for his rulers is due to special historical reasons which cannot be discussed in a review. It would, however, be an interesting task to find out how far Platonic ideas have — often quite unconsciously — been realized in various modern states. The attempt, for instance, of some European rulers

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of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to educate their future officers and administrators in special institutions, where they were carefully imbued with ideals which would make them serve their country or their sovereign for honor rather than for adequate monetary rewards, has certainly some affinity with Platonic political ideas, though there may have been no direct influence.

It is, then, difficult to see what can be gained by writing a book which, with the flimsiest of arguments, tries to prove that Plato's political ideas must not be taken seriously. In fairness to Dr. Hoerber's teachers, one must say that, according to the preface, they seem not to have agreed with his results. But one still wonders why they did not point out to him the absolute inadequacy of his arguments.

KURT VON FRITZ

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The Church and the Liberal Society. By EMMET JOHN HUGHES. Princeton, Princeton University Press; London, Oxford University Press, 1944.—xv, 307 pp. $3.00.

This volume is a history of what its author regards as the main current of the social thought of the past five centuries—Liberalism—and an indictment of the doctrine as well as of the society it has produced. To Mr. Hughes the most distinctive feature of the Liberal Society is its exclusion of all authoritarian controls from the sphere of economic activity: therefore to the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries is assigned its rise, to the nineteenth its fullest realization, and to the twentieth its decline. Its origin is to be found in the propagation and wider popular acceptance, in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, of the view that production for profit and the acquisition of wealth by the individual was an end in itself and should be free from all restraint—a negation of the social thought of the Middle Ages which regarded sustenance as the criterion of prosperity and asserted the sovereignty of religious ethics over economic activity. This, then, is the economic significance of the Renaissance; that of the rise of the autonomous national state and of the Reformation is that these made impossible the successful resistance by the Church to the attack of the economic individualists. Moreover, the leaders of these states and of the religious revolt were in spite of their partial antagonism to economic liberalism its handmaids.

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From the age of Calvin to that of Napoleon, the achievements of Liberalism were its relatively successful attacks upon the idea of a providential God and upon the authoritarian state—twin forces which had, since the dissolution of the medieval order, served as restraints on economic activity. Not only has the author penetratingly and lucidly evaluated the rôles played in this achievement by Descartes and Spinoza, Newton, Locke, Voltaire and Rousseau, and a host of others, but he has examined the Puritan, American and French revolutions as realizations in the political sphere of the economic implications of the thought of these men. What is refreshing in the author's treatment of these risings is that his dissatisfaction with their success does not derive from his respect for what they overthrew but rather from his regret for what they failed to accomplish. The nineteenth-century achievements of Liberalism were the development of a rounded *rationale*—utilitarianism—and the realization of a full-fledged free economic society, as examples of which Mr. Hughes holds up for examination Victorian England and the United States after the Civil War, with their oppression of humanity in the name of freedom.

In seeking redemption from this social calamity—the accumulative economic product of five centuries—in Marxism, there is, in the opinion of the author, no hope. Not only has it twice in our generation recoiled before the forces of nationalism, the very core of which is economic liberalism; but, like fascism, it is simply a variety of Liberalism, since at its root is the conception of man as an economic animal. Economic reform can be no more than administrative unless we have an ethics, and to have a true ethics we must recommence to consider man as a religious animal. The only organization in our Western civilization equipped to lead such a movement for reform is the Catholic Church. Although the ethics which her moral theologians evolved in the Middle Ages was displaced by a coalition of forces—partly because of her own inner corruption—in the centuries of the rise of Liberalism, she reformed and preserved her fundamental tenets. Not until the nineteenth century, however, did she buttress her defense with a comprehensive condemnation of Liberalism (Pius IX) and open a counter-offensive of substantial proportions (Leo XIII and Pius XI). But to be effective this offensive must be persistent, it must condemn the evils in the existing economy however dependent it is upon that economy for financial support, and its intellectual leaders must reassert its

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ethical synthesis in the terms not of medieval but of existing society. It is with this hope that Mr. Hughes envisions the Church in our century as the propagator of a truer liberalism which he calls "democracy".

A. Paul Levack

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The Vatican and the War. By Camille M. Cianfarra. Literary Classics, Inc.; distributed by E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., New York, 1944.—344 pp. $3.00.

This is one of the most recent books on papal policy in the contemporary world. The author admits that it is "far from being the work of an expert," adding that "it is only the chronicling of a reporter's experiences." He cannot be accused of undue modesty, for his book adds little or nothing of value to our knowledge of Vatican affairs. Seven years of service as *New York Times* correspondent in Rome, with what were undoubtedly excellent Vatican contacts, might well have brought forth something more substantial. After ninety-odd pages of intimate, rambling and sometimes gossipy detail on the death of Pius XI and the election of Pius XII, the author attempts to weave the story of Vatican policy into the tangled skein of world politics of the late thirties. This is not an easy undertaking, the more so since the Vatican, in its effort to remain neutral in conflicts between secular governments, has carefully cultivated the arts of secrecy and evasion. But that it can be done with substantial success has been demonstrated by D. W. Binchy in *Church and State in Fascist Italy* (Oxford University Press, 1941) and by Sherman Hayden in "Foreign Policy of the Vatican", *Foreign Policy Reports* (January 15, 1944), to mention two of the more conspicuous recent examples.

Mr. Cianfarra fails to measure up to their achievement. His treatment is discursive, often casuistical, and is altogether an uncritical apology for Vatican appeasement. He is quite right in saying that Vatican policy was motivated by three important considerations: to guarantee the life of existing ecclesiastical bodies while extending the work of the Church; to set barriers in the path of "atheist Bolshevism"; and to preserve the peace. And it is also true that the pursuit of these objectives led the Papacy along the dangerous path of collaboration with fascism and Nazism, at least to the extent to which this was believed likely to serve the immediate interests of the Church. This Mr. Cianfarra finds quite understandable and, pre-

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sumably, beyond reproach. Thus, for example, while admitting that the Vatican had become alarmed at Nazi anti-Catholicism by 1936, he explains that the Pope stayed his hand because he "found in the Hitler régime a powerful ally against Communist expansion," and because he feared "the socialist ideology and anti-clerical policy" of the "Communist-supported Popular Front Governments both in Spain and in France." Again, "Italy's and Germany's aid to Generalissimo Franco . . . allied the Papacy with Nazism in Spain, against the Loyalist Government and its supporter, Russia—the paramount reason for Vatican caution in its dealings with anti-Bolshevist Germany." Similar reasons are advanced to explain the usually good relations between the Papacy and fascism and the Vatican's approval of the Rome-Berlin Axis.

Undoubtedly, makers of Vatican policy often thought in these terms but the wisdom of hindsight should caution Mr. Cianfarra, at least, against using words and phrases which we know well enough express less than half truths. Apart from this, all of the essential facts, such as we know them at present, are assembled here to show the relations between the Vatican and the Powers at war: the efforts to prevent conflagration before it ignited; the Vatican's conspicuous approval of Italian neutrality while it lasted; its expressions of good will to the Low Countries when they were laid low; Pius XII's enthusiasm for Marshal Pétain in the early days of Vichy; the fears of what Soviet Russia would do, set at rest somewhat, once Russia had been attacked, by the consoling thought that post-war Russia would be too preoccupied with restoration to try to communize the West; the pronouncements against maltreatment of subjected peoples; and, finally, the Papal peace plans. All of this will be found, interlarded among reminiscences and choice bits of scattered information, without benefit of critical interpretation.

C. Grove Haines

Syracuse University

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BOOK NOTES

The American people and future historians will be indebted to Mr. Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., for his unofficial report on the operation of lend-lease—*Lend-Lease: Weapon for Victory* (New York, The Macmillan Co., 1944; xiv, 358 pp. $3.00). His straightforward, and even intimate, account of our rôle in the "Arsenal of Democracy" before and after our belligerency is a distinct contribution to public information and understanding. It is an example to be emulated. Instead of restricting himself to an anticlimactic report on what was accomplished, Mr. Stettinius has here given an interesting narrative in which he skillfully presents the setting and urgencies in which vital decisions had to be made. The reader is taken through the dramatic stages of the war in which foes of the Axis appealed to us for material aid. One is constantly reminded of the forbidding realties and prospects in which fateful actions were taken. This is current history as it developed, not as it will appear in retrospect to those of short memory or of deterministic hindsight. Unintentionally the narrative discloses the important place of opinion and decision in human affairs. The book contains scattered items of new information, but in a sense the whole story is new in that it presents for the first time a well-organized narrative of the American process of becoming and being realistic about a war we wished to disown. The urgency and magnitude of our aid to Britain, Russia, China and others fighting the Axis are well told. Economists and historians will find the account illuminating and the setting indispensable to any explanation of this peculiar period in American history. Few parts of the story extend beyond late 1942 or early 1943. No appraisal of the value of our aid to others or to ourselves is seriously attempted. Reverse lend-lease is portrayed as an offset of growing importance. Predictions of the final balance and the ultimate settlement are appropriately omitted. It is to be hoped that a second and possibly a third volume will appear. They would be helpful in creating an enlightened opinion for the eventual reckoning. Failure to make a liberal and farsighted post-war settlement will not diminish the contribution lend-lease has made to victory, but such a failure can greatly increase the eventual cost of a program cleverly conceived and courageously executed.—ROBERT D. CALKINS.

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As a posthumous publication, *The Geography of the Peace,* by Nicholas John Spykman (New York, Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1944; xii, 66 pp. $2.75), was edited from the author's notes by Helen R. Nicholl, research assistant, Yale Institute of International Studies; and the maps have been drawn by J. McA. Smiley. It has an introduction by Frederick S. Dunn, Director of the Institute. *The Geography of the Peace* may well be considered as a sequel to the author's *America's Strategy in World Politics* issued in 1942 by the same publisher. Like the earlier work, it is built upon the philosophy of power politics as the motive force in foreign relations. International institutions for arbitration and adjudication have been established and rules of international conduct have been agreed upon. Still, in the last analysis each sovereign state decides for itself what its action should be in the face of a conflict insoluble by the institutions set up and under the rules of conduct avowed. Once more the great nations of the world are involved in war either to defend or to augment their existing power status. The power status of a nation depends upon various factors, such as geographical environment with all that this implies: a plentiful supply of resources to be defended, or a lack of such a supply to be remedied. The author discusses a set of alternatives as the basis of the new peace. The first is one that would dispose of power politics altogether and substitute "co-operation and mutual forbearance". The second suggests a kind of superstate with an international security force in place of the conventional armed forces of individual states. The third alternative is that of collective security recognizing the need for force but avoiding the "wishful thinking of the proponents of the world state." Discounting the three the author advocates a fourth alternative in the form of an international policy based upon the factors given by geographical environment. He develops his alternative of peace and comes to the conclusion that "the United States must recognize . . . that the power constellation in Europe and Asia is of everlasting concern to her"; that "balanced power on the Eurasian continent is one of the objectives for which we are fighting"; that "Russia and Great Britain . . . will also find their security threatened by the establishment of any hegemony in Europe and Asia"; that "neither of the three can afford to stand . . . isolated against the rest of the world"; and that "their co-operation will serve their own best interests." The author concedes that "some day we may have the kind of world order that is being envisioned by many of our writers today" and that "we may eventually achieve the organization of a world state and abolish the independent sovereignty of nations"—

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but he warns, "the element of force in political matters will not be eliminated." The text is illustrated by charts and maps and supplemented by a useful index.—JOHANNES MATTERN, The Johns Hopkins University.

Wartime Labor Relations, by John H. Mariano (New York, National Public and Labor Relations Bureau, Inc., 1944; vii, 216 pp. $2.75), is described on its cover as "A current up-to-date compilation of facts showing what we face in the way of solving wartime labor relations problems." Its publisher further declares that the volume represents "an original piece of labor prophecy to be found nowhere else." Actually, the book is a curious hodgepodge of facts and philosophy. In essence, the author maintains that there can be satisfactory labor relations only "if adequate recognition is given to the role of capital, the practices of management, and the fair participation by labor of the surpluses which its effort creates and makes available for distribution." There can be little argument against this thesis. But the presentation is badly organized, with much overlapping and repetition, and the author's style is difficult and confusing. In general, he declares himself opposed to a socialistic or communistic state; he favors a system of private management, protected, however, against abuses by either capital or labor; he deplores the overlapping jurisdictions of governmental agencies dealing with labor; and he proposes what he calls an eclectic system of labor relations policy. Eclecticism, he says, is not a theory or a policy. "It is a combination of fact, method, procedure, doctrine, principles, practices. All melted into a working arrangement. . . ." This reviewer is impressed by the fact that the good ideas in the book are almost hopelessly obscured by the poor planning and presentation. —DALE YODER, University of Minnesota.

The extensive making and revision of national and international constitutions which succeeded the last war promises to be repeated at the end of the present war, and it is in anticipation of this that the International Labor Office has recently published a collection of *Constitutional Provisions Concerning Social and Economic Policy* (Montreal, International Labor Office, 1944; lix, 755 pp. $5.00; 20*s*.) Included in this collection are instruments (or references to instruments) of some 450 countries and other governmental units grouped by continents and ranging from Andorra and Aden to the U.S.S.R. and the Vatican. The "constitutional provisions" are those which have appeared not only in constitutions, as that word is

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popularly understood, but also in letters patent, royal instructions to governors and commanders-in-chief, decrees of governors-general and of the Sultan, and, of course, orders in council and mandates. In addition, the pertinent articles of certain international declarations of policy and constitutional instruments are included, such as the League of Nations Covenant, the I.L.O. Constitution, the Atlantic Charter, resolutions of the International Labor Conference of 1941, the Mutual Aid Agreements of 1942, the International Wheat Agreement of the same year, and the Final Act of the United Nations Conference on Food and Agriculture. The difficulties involved in compiling, on a world-wide scale, constitutional provisions relating to so broad a field as "social and economic policy" are obviously considerable. The nine principles expressed in Article 41 of the Constitution of the I.L.O. and the questions covered by the conventions and recommendations adopted by the International Labor Conference would have placed convenient metes and bounds upon a compilation devoted simply to labor questions. It was desired, however, to give an undertaking of this sort its maximum usefulness as a tool for draftsmen of constitutional provisions, and, the relationships of labor questions to economic and social questions being what they are, the scope of the work was correspondingly broadened. The result is that the volume has an interest and practical usefulness which are quite unique among publications dealing with international affairs. The most characteristic feature of the new national constitutions of 1918-1919 was their recognition of the principle that one of the first duties of government was to provide "every honest worker . . . an adequate means of decent and self-respecting existence." That point of view has been quickened and broadened in more recent years. A volume of this kind testifies to that. An extremely useful undertaking, it sets "a new standard of geographical comprehensiveness for the study of comparative constitutional law" (p. xxiii). It will be not only a tool for the interested lawmaker in his cultivation of constitution gardens but a germinating influence in itself.—SMITH SIMPSON, Washington, D. C.

Management in Russian Industry and Agriculture, by Gregory Bienstock, Solomon M. Schwarz, and Aaron Yugow, edited by Arthur Feiler and Jacob Marschak (London, New York, Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1944; xxxii, 198 pp. $3.00), published under the auspices of the Institute of World Affairs affiliated with the New School for Social Research, presents a well-rounded, if somewhat sketchy, picture of the status, problems and activities of

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the managers of Soviet industrial plants and collective farms. The authors, all of them left-wing exiles from Russia since 1922, display familiarity with official Soviet sources on which their book is based, and (with some minor exceptions) a judicial spirit and objectivity not often to be found in recent writings on the U.S.S.R. The inadequacy of available material, the small size of the volume, and also perhaps the not altogether successful attempt to segregate management from other aspects of the Soviet economic scene are no doubt responsible for the fact that the study under review, useful as it is, provides little novel information. Most of the topics dealt with by the authors had been discussed in greater detail, for instance, in the four excellent volumes by L. E. Hubbard or in Mr. Yugow's own *Russia's Economic Front for War and Peace.* Management, moreover, cannot be made intelligible unless presented against the broader economic background. The authors therefore are justified in overstepping the limits suggested by the title and in giving a comprehensive account of the organization and working of the collective farms; they show good judgment in devoting some of the space allocated to industrial management to such questions as planning, costs, profits, prices and taxation. The general impression which emerges from this study is that, in spite of the emphasis put in recent years on the autonomy of industrial plants and the studiously maintained fiction of collective farms as independent voluntary associations of peasants, both industry and agriculture are dominated by state and party bureaucracy to a degree which precludes any real autonomy. In spite of the authors' guarded optimism the problem of management in the U.S.S.R. would seem to remain unsolved and, as Mr. Marschak puts it in his useful Introduction, it is still in the stage of trial and error. Mr. Schwarz's attempt to supply a sociological interpretation of the growth of a new managerial class is not very convincing. Mr. Marschak rightly observes that "no ultimate validity can be claimed" for the hypothesis advanced by Mr. Schwarz "until further studies and events have provided more solid ground."—MICHAEL T. FLORINSKY, Columbia University.

German Radio Propaganda: Report on Home Broadcasts During the War, by Ernst Kris, Hans Speier, and Associates (London, New York, Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1944; xiv, 529 pp. $4.00), has grown from four years of study of the mass of material which, by medium and long wave broadcasts, has gone to the German people from their government during this war. The authors are Germans, Austrians and Americans, associated in the Research Project on

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Totalitarian Communications of the New School for Social Research. Using the valuable "Daily Digests of Foreign Broadcasts" issued by the British Broadcasting Corporation since 1939, they have written a competent, careful and well-integrated study. In their first section they deal with the general background of Nazi home propaganda (including notes on its structure, technique and limitations), the organization and content of home broadcasts and the "battle for credibility". Part two discusses the images which the Nazis have drawn and the changes which have been made in these as the war has progressed. These include the German leaders, the German people, and the German soldier, the political and the fighting enemy, enemy leaders, neutrals, and *Festung Europa*. The final section traces the course of propaganda in actual situations of anticipation of action, stalemate, victory and defeat. A great deal of sound statistical analysis of Nazi broadcasts has gone into this study to good advantage, and there are numerous interesting charts. The book is not without faults. The developments up to and including the invasion of Norway, for instance, have not been evaluated with sufficient objectiveness; certainly it is hard to agree that the *Altmark* case or British mine laying in Norwegian waters were "minor" incidents at that time. It would have been desirable to get a more detailed discussion of the pre-Pearl Harbor treatment of the United States on the Nazi radio. Considerable objection can be raised, finally, to the authors' sanguine assumptions about Allied counter-propaganda. It has been only in the more recent period of the war that the Allied radio can be said to have acquired anything like a strong position. Even now it may be doubted that a mere propaganda of facts, which for all practical purposes means a recital of German defeats and Allied victories, is the effective weapon which, as the authors insist, will undo the work of some of the more telling Nazi propaganda.—ALEXANDER F. KIEFER, Flushing, N. Y.

The rôle of foreign capital in Latin America has been under the spotlight for a decade or two, but less attention has been given to the migration of technology—sometimes in the wake of the capitalist, sometimes separately. Dr. J. Fred Rippy has in earlier writings been somewhat critical of the capitalist, but in his latest book—*Latin America and the Industrial Age* (New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1944; x, 277 pp. $3.00)—he does belated justice to the "grand epic" of "the joint mastery by Latins and Anglo-Saxons of the Latin American physical environment" (p. vii). This shift of interest from the financial to the technological coincides with a sig-

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nificant change in the Latin American scene: the accumulation of local industrial capital renders foreign investment less urgent, but there is great need for the special skills required in the establishment of new manufacturing industries. Dr. Rippy describes this volume as a series of introductory essays on the history of technological progress in Latin America. The treatment of the subject is partly topical, as "The Arrival of the Steamboat in Latin America", and partly regional, for example, "The New Technology in Argentina". Special attention is given to pioneer contributions made by citizens of the United States in promoting and constructing railways and electric power plants, installing telephones, and applying modern mining and metallurgical methods to the production and reduction of minerals. Perhaps the chief defect from the standpoint of the student is the failure to distinguish more clearly between the economic functions of the various pioneers—entrepreneurs, engineers, promoters, laborers, investors, scientists, etc. Dr. Rippy apparently recognizes the problem but his treatment tends to obscure the significance of each and the interrelation between them. He also ignores the rôle of the immigrant as distinguished from the "foreigner", largely, no doubt, because he has concentrated his attention on British and Americans, who tend to cling to their original citizenship. In his conclusion, Dr. Rippy intimates that he considers this theme of the joint technological conquest of the continent as providing a better medium for cementing the "Pan American structure" and of winning the friendship of our neighbors than "reciting their poetry" or "praising their music and art." But need the economic exclude the cultural approach? In fact, they are closely allied, since the coöperative program authorized by Congress provides for the mutual exchange of scientists and technicians as well as of educators, administrators, librarians and artists.—GEORGE WYTHE, Washington, D. C.

Students of public affairs will be grateful to Edward A. Fitzpatrick for assembling, in his *McCarthy of Wisconsin* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1944; viii, 316 pp. $3.50), the significant materials concerning the life and times of the distinguished founder of the Wisconsin Legislative Reference Library. Charles McCarthy was born in Massachusetts, the son of Irish immigrants, became a famous athlete at Brown University, studied history and political science at the University of Wisconsin, became an adopted son of the Badger State, a member of the faculty of the University, and a friend and counsellor of a surprisingly large number of the

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most interesting people of his generation. As an early "brain truster" in the LaFollette administration, McCarthy, nearly always in close collaboration with Professor John R. Commons, was influential and instrumental in framing much of the social legislation for which Wisconsin became a kind of experimental laboratory in the first two decades of the twentieth century. As his reputation grew, his advice was sought far and wide. To McCarthy all legislation was a process of social invention, based on painstaking research and the coöperative effort of all branches of the government in consultation with the social groups affected by the prospective statute. In the interests of a devout passion for democracy he went so far as to advocate measures providing for the recall of the president of the United States. Not the least valuable of the qualities of this volume is the fact that it is well seasoned with pithy questions from the oral tradition of a philosopher who produced no extensive statement of his political theories. (*The Wisconsin Idea* was written in two weeks.) As a protégé, and associate, Fitzpatrick participated in the career which he describes and is therefore remarkably well equipped to write with sympathy and understanding about one of the warmest, most beloved, and most useful public servants of our time. It is to be regretted that he has concerned himself almost exclusively with the public life of Charles McCarthy. In the opinion of the reviewer, Fitzpatrick does not acknowledge adequately the indebtedness of McCarthy and his friends to the elder LaFollette whose political achievements made possible the work of a great number of technicians.—E. E. SCHAATTSCHNEIDER, Wesleyan University.

Professor R. S. Longley of Acadia University, in *Sir Francis Hincks* (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1943; vi, 480 pp. $3.00), has presented a straightforward, unadorned account of an Irish-Canadian who played an influential and sometimes leading part in Canadian politics from 1835 to 1854 and from 1869 to 1873, and who served for fourteen years as a British governor in the West Indies. He was ambitious, and particularly able in finance, but his career was clouded by political expediency and by justifiable doubts of his financial probity. His principal contributions to beneficial Canadian development were in the achievement of responsible parliamentary government (notably the creation of the Lafontaine-Baldwin alliance); in the strengthening of Canadian public finance about 1850 and in the Bank Acts of 1870 and 1871; and in the negotiations for the Treaty of Washington of 1871. Like many another North

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American politician, he saw advantages for himself as well as for his country in the coming of the railway. He was admired by his colleagues for his skills, but disliked, as Lord Elgin said, because he was "a clever man and too much for them." Longley's treatment of Hincks's career is almost annalistic, with very few judgments before a brief but fairly explicit summation in conclusion. Unlike most Canadian historians, the author gives a fair amount of attention to political patronage and also draws attention usefully to the shift from politics to political economy in Canada about 1850. He is occasionally too allusive for non-Canadian readers; he makes little attempt to discuss Hincks's principles of action or the matrix of his ideas; and the book shows a few signs of having been on the stocks for some time in that some recent tributary scholarship is ignored and some is merely listed in the bibliographical notes whereas it has superseded authorities cited in the footnotes.—J. B. BREBNER.

Albert Jay Nock's long-time enemy has been the state, which, in his considered opinion, has enveloped civilization and thoroughly debased its social and political values in the interests of the "psychically-anthropoid masses of democracy." In his *Memoirs of a Superfluous Man* (New York and London, Harper & Brothers, 1943; viii, 326 pp. $3.00), Mr. Nock finds nothing to retract. He fails to see that "collectivist" tendencies from the time of Theodore Roosevelt to the New Deal have advanced the nation an iota. The spread of literacy, he believes, has not been accompanied by a spread of intelligence. Reform has done no more than shift the base of exploitation from the corporation to the state. Living in the midst of war, our critic reviews the kaleidoscopic events of the past several decades and finds our behavior "orderly, regular and to be expected. It presages calamity close at hand, due to the fact that society's structure is built on a foundation of unsound principles" (p. 241). Sound policies, one gathers, would have included abstention from all wars since 1898 (it would be interesting to have Mr. Nock's views on the Civil War), and the development of a political and cultural élite capable of holding democracy in rein. Mr. Nock, who regards the bulk of mankind as "subhuman", has, of course, not been consulted on the measures necessary for creating such an aristocracy. One would expect him to find Woodrow Wilson less offensive as statesman and personality than Henry Adams found General Grant. In fact, Mr. Nock seems to have found Wilson even more distasteful. So far as one can understand, our philosopher is opposed to democratic processes in principle. To him, Wilson's superior culture

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and powers of leadership serve only to mark him out as a demagogue and apostate. It should be noted that Mr. Nock's philosophic anarchism is neither soured nor fanatical, and that the reference to Henry Adams has not been fortuitous. Mr. Nock is a scholarly writer who has read "Mr. Dooley" as well as Rabelais, and whose friendships have included the elder La Follette as well as Ralph Adams Cram. Mr. Nock appears to remember a better time—he vividly describes one—in which the humanistic discipline gave a certain character to education, in which institutions other than the state displayed energy and initiative, and, briefly, in which a philosopher of his temperament was not superfluous. One may disagree fundamentally with his outlook and still observe that a modern integration of culture and democracy is still to be achieved. Mr. Nock, in shaking off the too-familiar hand of his fellow man, reminds us that democracy has its duties as well as its privileges.—LOUIS FILLER, Washington, D. C.

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